Stonehill v. Diokno Digest

Stonehill v. Diokno

20 SCRA 283 (1967)

Concepcion, CJ

Facts:

1. Respondent (porsecution) made possible the issuance of 42 search warrants against the petitioner and the corporation to search persons and premises of several personal properties due to an alleged violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Custom Laws, Internal Revenue Code and the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines. As a results, search and seizures were conducted in the both the residence of the petitioner and in the corporation's premises.

2.The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as their issuance violated the Constitution and the Rules of Court for being general warrants.  Thus,he filed a petition with the Supreme Court for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction to prevent the seized effects from being introduced as evidence in the deportation cases against the petitioner. The court issued the writ only for those effects found in the petitioner's residence.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can validly assail the legality of the search and seizure in both premises

RULING: No, he can only assail the search conducted in the residences but not those done in the corporation's premises. The petitioner has no cause of action in the second situation since a corporation has a personality separate and distinct from the personality of its officers or herein petitioner regardless of the amount of shares of stock or interest of each in the said corporation, and whatever office they hold therein. Only the party whose rights has been impaired can validly object the legality of a seizure--a purely personal right which cannot be exercised by a third party. The right to object belongs to the corporation ( for the 1st group of documents, papers, and things seized from the offices and the premises).

Gulf Oil Corp. vs. Gilbert Digest

Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert

Forum Non-Conveniens

Facts:

1. Plaintiff Gilbert filed an action in New York against the petitioner for negligence due to the delivery of gasoline to his tanks and pumps. The venue statutes of the United States permit this. Gilbert resides in Virginia, USA.

2. Petitioner Gulf Oil is a company organized under the laws of Pennsylvania with authority to do business in both Virginia and New York. It designated officials in each state as agents to receive the process. Gulf Oil invoked the doctrine of 'forum non-conveniens' and claimed that Virginia is the appropriate venue for the trial becuase it is where the plaintiff resides, where corporation does business, where the witness likewise resides and it is also the place where the events took place.

3. On one hand, plaintiff contends that the action filed in New York is justified since the action involved an amount for claim for damages close to $400 thousand which may stagger the imagination of the local jury, the diversity of the citizenship of the parties and that plaintiff's counsel resides in New York.

4. The District Court of New Yorl dismissed the tort action pursuant to FNC (forum non-conveniens) while the Appeals Court reversed the decision.

Issue: Whether or not the action was properly dismissed from NY court under the doctrine of FNC thought personam jurisdiction and venue are proper

HELD:

YES. The application of the doctrine lies in the the discretion of the court. However, tje interests of the plaintiff, the defendant and the forum state need to be considered. Here, there is not interest for any party to have the litigation in New York. In fact, interests weigh against it.

Moreover, the plaintiff may not choose an inconvenient forum to harass the petitioner. Finally, the state has an interest in avoiding the overcrowding of its own courts and subjecting its citizens to jury duty in a case having no ties to their state.

Rubi vs. Provincial Board Digest

Rubi v. Provincial Board

39 Phil 660

Facts:

The Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted a resolution which required all Mangyans to stay in one permanent settlement. The said resolution was approved by the Secretary of Interior as required under Sec. 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code. This provision authorized the establishment of non-Christian sites to be selected by the provincial governor. Sec. 2145 of the RAC is now herein assailed on ground that it is an unlawful delegation of legislative power to the provincial officials.

Issue: Whether or not Sec. 2145 of the RAC is valid

The provision is valid, as an exception to the general rule. The legislature is permitted to delegate legislative powers to the local authorities on matters that are of purely local concerns.

Bugnay Construction v. Laron Digest

G.R. No. 79983 August 10, 1989
Ponente: Regalado, J.:

Facts:
1. A lease contract between the City of Dagupan and P & M Agro was executed for the use of a city lot called the Magsaysay Market Area. Subsequently, the City filed a case to rescind the contract due to the failure of P&M to comply with the lease contract conditions.

2. Thereafter, the City issued a resolution granting the lease of said lot to the petitioner Bugnay COnstruction for the establishment of a Magsaysay Market building. As a result, respondent Ravanzo filed a taxpayer's suit against the City assailing the validity of the lease contract between the petitioner and the city. Ravanzo was the counsel of P&M Agro in the earlier case.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent is the real party in interest

NO.

1. The Court held that the respondent has no standing to file the case. There was no disbursement of public funds involved in this case since it is the petitioner, a private party which will fund the planned construction of the market building.

Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works Digest

G.R. No. L-10405 December 29, 1960
Ponente: Concepcion, J.

Legal Standing

Facts:
1. Petitioner was the governor of Rizal, filed a petition assailing the validity of R.A. 920 which contains an item providing for an appropriation of P85,000.00 for the construction and repair of a feeder road in Pasig. The said law was passed in Congress and approved by the President.

2. The property over which the feeder road will be constructed is however owned by Sen. Zulueta. The property was to be donated to the local government, though the donation was made a few months after the appropriation was included in RA 920. The petition alleged that the said planned feeder road would relieve Zulueta the responsibility of improving the road which is inside a private subdivision.

3. The lower court (RTC) ruled that the petitioner has standing to assail the validity of RA 920, due to the public interest involved in the appropriation. However, he does not have a standing with respect to the donation since he does not have an interest that will be injured by said donation, hence it dismissed the petition.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has the standing to file the petition

YES.

1. Petitioner has standing. He is not merely a taxpayer but the governor of the province of Rizal which is considered one of the most populated biggest provinces during that time, its taxpayers bear a substantial portion of the burden of taxation in the country.

2. Public funds can only be appropriated for a public purpose. The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is whether it is used to promote public interest. Moreover, the validity of a stature depends on the powers of the Congress at the time of its passage or approval, not upon events occurring, or acts performed subsequent thereto, unless it is an amendment of the organic law.

Pimentel v. Executive Secretary Digest

G.R. No. 158088 July 6, 2005

Facts:

1. The petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court  to the Senate of the Philippinesfor its concurrence pursuant to Sec. 21, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution.

2. The Rome Statute established the Int'l Criminal Court which will have jurisdiction over the most serious crimes as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression as defined by the Statute. The Philippines through the Chargie du Affairs in UN. The provisions of the Statute however require that it  be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory state. 

3. Petitioners contend that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic and international law, is a function of the Senate, hence it is the duty of the Executive Department to transmit the signed copy to the senate to allow it to exercise its discretion. 

Issue: Whether or not the Exec. Secretary and the DFA have the ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine mission to the U.N. even without the signature of the President.

The Supreme Court held NO. 

1. The President as the head of state is the sole organ and authorized in the external relations and he is also the country's sole representative with foreign nations, He is the mouthpiece with respect to the country's foreign affairs.

2. In treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states and enter into treaties but this power is limited by the Constitution with the 2/3 required vote of all the members of the Senate for the treaty to be valid. (Sec. 21, Art VII).

3. The legislative branch part is essential to provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign relations, to ensure the nation's pursuit of political maturity and growth.

Estrada v. Escritor Digest

Estrada v. Escritor

A.M.No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003

Puno, J.:

Facts:

1. Respondent is the Court interpreter of RTC Branch 253 in Las Pinas City. The complainant Estrada requested for an investigation  of respondent for living with a man not her husband while she was still legally married and having borne a child within this live-in arrangement. Estrada believed that Escritor is committing a grossly immoral act which tarnishes the image of the judiciary, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed  therein as it might appear that the court condones her act.

2. Respondent admitted she started living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. more than 20 years ago when her husband was still alive but living with another woman. She likewise admitted having a son with Quilapio but denies any liability for alleged grossly immoral conduct because, 1) She is a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower Society, 2) That the conjugal arrangement was in  conformity  with their religious beliefs, and 3)  That the conjugal arrangement with Quilapio has the approval of her congregation.

3. Escritor likewise claimed that she had executed a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness' in accordance with her religion which allows members of the Jehovah’s witnesses who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations. The Declaration thus makes the resulting union moral and binding within the congregation all over the world except in countries where divorce is allowed.

Held:

Escritor was therefore held not administratively liable for grossly immoral conduct. Escritor’s conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to religion. The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms—including religious freedom—may be enjoyed. 

In the area of religious exercise as preferred freedom, however, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the state interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. In the absence of a showing that the state interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.

German v. Barangan Digest

German v. Barangan
G.R. No. L-68828 March 27, 1985
Escolin, J.:

Facts:

1. In the afternoon of October 2, 1984, petitioners, composed of about 50 businessmen, students and office employees converged at J.P. Laurel Street, Manila, for the purpose of hearing Mass at the St. Jude Chapel which adjoins the Malacañang grounds located in the same street. Wearing yellow T-shirts, they started to march down with raised clenched fists and shouts of anti-government invectives. The marchers were barred by respondent Major Lariosa, upon orders of his superiors and co-respondent Gen. Santiago Barangan, from proceeding any further, on the ground that St. Jude Chapel was located within the Malacañang security area. Despite plea, they were not allowed in the church. 

2. Because of the alleged warning given them by respondent Major Lariosa that any similar attempt by petitioners to enter the church in the future would likewise be prevented, petitioners took this present recourse. 

3. Petitioners' alleged purpose in converging at J.P. Laurel Street was to pray and hear mass at St. Jude church. At the hearing of this petition, respondents assured petitioners and the Court that they have never restricted, and will never restrict, any person or persons from entering and worshipping at said church. They maintain, however, that petitioners' intention was not really to perform an act of religious worship, but to conduct an anti-government demonstration at a place close to the very residence and offices of the President of the Republic. 

4. Invoking their constitutional freedom to religious worship and locomotion, petitioners seek the issuance of [1] a writ of mandamus to compel respondents to allow them to enter and pray inside St. Jude Chapel located at J.P. Laurel Street, Manila; and [2] a writ of injunction to enjoin respondents from preventing them from getting into and praying in said church.

ISSUE: Whether or not the restriction to petitioners to attend church is a violation of their freedom to religious worship

NO. 

1. The restriction imposed on the use of J.P. Laurel Street, was established in the interest of national security. Petitioners are not denied or restrained of their freedom of belief or choice of their religion, but only in the manner by which they had attempted to translate the same into action. This curtailment is in accord with the pronouncement of this Court in Gerona v. Secretary of Education.

2. While it is beyond debate that every citizen has the undeniable and inviolable right to religious freedom, the exercise thereof, and of all fundamental rights for that matter, must be done in good faith. As Article 19 of the Civil Code admonishes: "Every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties ... observe honesty and good faith."

Pamil v. Teleron Digest

Pamil v. Teleron

G.R. No. L-34854 November 20, 1978

Facts:

1. In 1971, Private respondent, Father Margarito R. Gonzaga, was elected and duly proclaimed as mayor of Alburquerque, Bohol.   Petitioner filed a suit for quo warranto, to disqualify respondent based on Section 2175 of the Administrative Code provision: "In no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors for public works of the municipality." 

2. The suit did not prosper, with the lower court held that the ineligibility was impliedly repealed by the Election Code of 1971. The matter was then elevated to this Tribunal by petitioner. It is his contention that there was no such implied repeal, that it is still in full force and effect. Thus was the specific question raised.

ISSUE: Whether or not an ecclesiastic was eligible to an elective municipal position

NO. The attack on the continuing effectivity of Section 2175 having failed, it must be, as noted at the outset, given full force and application. Section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code, as far as ecclesiastics are concerned, must be accorded respect. The presumption of validity calls for its application. Under the circumstances, certiorari lies. 

Ebranilag v. The Division of Supt. of Schools Digest

Ebranilag, et. al. v. The Division Supt. of Schools

March 1, 1993

FACTS: 

1. In G.R. No. 95770 "Roel Ebralinag, et al. vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu and Manuel F. Biongcog, Cebu District Supervisor," the petitioners are 43 high school and elementary school students in several towns of in Cebu province. All minors, they are assisted by their parents who belong to the religious group known as Jehovah's Witness. This is a consolidated petition.

2. All the petitioners in these two cases were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by RA 1265 of July 11, 1955, and by DO No. 8 of the DECS making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions

3. In G.R. No. 95887, "May Amolo, et al. vs. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu and Antonio A. Sangutan," the petitioners are 25 high school and grade school students enrolled in public schools in Asturias, Cebu, whose parents are Jehovah's Witnesses. Both petitions were prepared by the same counsel, Attorney Felino M. Ganal.

4. The Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are "acts of worship" or "religious devotion’ only given to God.They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State . They think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit which the Constitution protect against official control 

5. In 1989, the DECS Regional Office in Cebu received complaints about teachers and pupils belonging to the Jehovah's Witnesses, and enrolled in various public and private schools, who refused to sing the Philippine national anthem, salute the Philippine flag and recite the patriotic pledge.

6.  The students and their parents filed these special civil actions for Mandamus,Certiorari and Prohibition alleging that the public respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion — (1) in ordering their expulsion without prior notice and hearing, hence, in violation of their right to due process, their right to free public education, and their right to freedom of speech, religion and worship 

7. The Court issued a TRO and a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and ordered to immediately re-admit the petitioners to their respective classes until further orders. 

ISSUE: Whether or not the expulsion is valid

NO. The court upheld the petitioners' right under the Constitution to refuse to salute the Philippine flag on account of their religious beliefs. Religious freedom as a fundamental right deserving the "highest priority and amplest protection among human rights. It reversed the expulsion orders made by the public respondents therein as violative of both the free exercise of religion clause and the right of citizens to education under the 1987 Constitution. 

Although the Court upholds in this decision   nevertheless, that another foreign invasion of our country will not be necessary in order for our countrymen to appreciate and cherish the Philippine flag.

Gerona v. Sec. of Education Digest

Gerona, et. al v SEC. OF EDUCATION

106 Phil 2 Aug. 12, 1959

FACTS: 

1. Petitioners belong to the Jehova’s Witness whose children were expelled from their schools when they refused to salute, sing the anthem, recite the pledge during the conduct of flag ceremony. DO No. 8 issued by DECS pursuant to RA 1265 which called for the manner of conduct during a flag ceremony. The petitioners wrote the Secretary of Education on their plight and requested to reinstate their children. This was denied. 

2. As a result, the petitioners filed for a writ of preliminary injunction against the Secretary and Director of Public Schools to restrain them from implementing said DO No. 8.

3. The lower court (RTC) declared DO 8 invalid and contrary to the Bill of Rights.

ISSUE: Whether or not DO 8 is valid or constitutional

DO 8 is valid. Saluting the flag is not a religious ritual and it is for the courts to determine, not a religious group, whether or not a certain practice is one.

1. The court held that the flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect. Considering the complete separation of church and state in our system of government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance. Saluting the flag consequently does not involve any religious ceremony. 

After all, the determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not a religious ceremony must rest with the courts. It cannot be left to a religious group or sect, much less to a follower of said group or sect; otherwise, there would be confusion and misunderstanding for there might be as many interpretations and meanings to be given to a certain ritual or ceremony as there are religious groups or sects or followers.

2. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption form or non-compliance with reasonable and non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent authority. In enforcing the flag salute on the petitioners, there was absolutely no compulsion involved, and for their failure or refusal to obey school regulations about the flag salute they were not being persecuted. Neither were they being criminally prosecuted under threat of penal sacntion. If they chose not to obey the flag salute regulation, they merely lost the benefits of public education being maintained at the expense of their fellow citizens, nothing more. According to a popular expression, they could take it or leave it. Having elected not to comply with the regulations about the flag salute, they forfeited their right to attend public schools.

3. The Filipino flag is not an image that requires religious veneration; rather it is symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, of sovereignty, an emblem of freedom, liberty and national unity; that the flag salute is not a religious ceremony but an act and profession of love and allegiance and pledge of loyalty to the fatherland which the flag stands for; that by authority of the legislature, the Secretary of Education was duly authorized to promulgate Department Order No. 8, series of 1955; that the requirement of observance of the flag ceremony or salute provided for in said Department Order No. 8, does not violate the Constitutional provision about freedom of religion and exercise of religion; that compliance with the non-discriminatory and reasonable rules and regulations and school discipline, including observance of the flag ceremony is a prerequisite to attendance in public schools; and that for failure and refusal to participate in the flag ceremony, petitioners were properly excluded and dismissed from the public school they were attending.

First Lepanto Ceramics v. CA Digest

First Lepanto Ceramic v CA

Facts:

1.    Petitioner assailed the conflicting provisions of B.P. 129, EO 226 (Art. 82) and a circular, 1-91 issued by the Supreme Court which deals with the jurisdiction of courts for appeal of cases decided by quasi-judicial agencies such as the Board of Investments (BOI).

2.   BOI granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s application to amend its BOI certificate of registration by changing the scope of its registered product from "glazed floor tiles" to "ceramic tiles." Oppositor Mariwasa filed a motion for reconsideration of the said BOI decision while oppositor Fil-Hispano Ceramics, Inc. did not move to reconsider the same nor appeal therefrom. Soon rebuffed in its bid for reconsideration, Mariwasa filed a petition for review with CA.

4.   CA temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing its decision. The TRO lapsed by its own terms twenty (20) days after its issuance, without respondent court issuing any preliminary injunction.

5.    Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and to lift the restraining order contending that CA does not have jurisdiction over the BOI case, since the same is exclusively vested with the Supreme Court pursuant to Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987.

6.    Petitioner argued that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or B.P. 129 and Circular 1-91, "Prescribing the Rules Governing Appeals to the Court of Appeals from a Final Order or Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies" cannot be the basis of Mariwasa's appeal to respondent court because the procedure for appeal laid down therein runs contrary to Article 82 of E.O. 226, which provides that appeals from decisions or orders of the BOI shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court.

7.    While Mariwasa maintains that whatever inconsistency there may have been between B.P. 129 and Article 82 of E.O. 226 on the question of venue for appeal, has already been resolved by Circular 1-91 of the Supreme Court, which was promulgated on February 27, 1991 or four (4) years after E.O. 226 was enacted.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the case

YES. Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned. Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was previously allowed to be filed directly with the Supreme Court, should now be brought to the Court of Appeals.

Tan v. Del Rosario Digest

Tan v Del Rosario

Facts:

1.  Two consolidated cases assail the validity of RA 7496 or the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme ("SNIT"), which amended certain provisions of the NIRC, as well as the Rules and Regulations promulgated by public respondents pursuant to said law.

2.   Petitioners posit that RA 7496 is unconstitutional as it allegedly violates the following provisions of the Constitution:

-Article VI, Section 26(1) — Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

- Article VI, Section 28(1) — The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.

- Article III, Section 1 — No person shall be deprived of . . . property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

3.  Petitioners contended that public respondents exceeded their rule-making authority in applying SNIT to general professional partnerships. Petitioner contends that the title of HB 34314, progenitor of RA 7496, is deficient for being merely entitled, "Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme for the Self-Employed and Professionals Engaged in the Practice of their Profession" (Petition in G.R. No. 109289) when the full text of the title actually reads,

'An Act Adopting the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme For The Self-Employed and Professionals Engaged In The Practice of Their Profession, Amending Sections 21 and 29 of the National Internal Revenue Code,' as amended. Petitioners also contend it violated due process.

5.  The Solicitor General espouses the position taken by public respondents.

6.  The Court has given due course to both petitions.

ISSUE: Whether or not the tax law is unconstitutional for violating due process

NO. The due process clause may correctly be invoked only when there is a clear contravention of inherent or constitutional limitations in the exercise of the tax power. No such transgression is so evident in herein case.

1.  Uniformity of taxation, like the concept of equal protection, merely requires that all subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities. Uniformity does not violate classification as long as: (1) the standards that are used therefor are substantial and not arbitrary, (2) the categorization is germane to achieve the legislative purpose, (3) the law applies, all things being equal, to both present and future conditions, and (4) the classification applies equally well to all those belonging to the same class.

2.  What is apparent from the amendatory law is the legislative intent to increasingly shift the income tax system towards the schedular approach in the income taxation of individual taxpayers and to maintain, by and large, the present global treatment on taxable corporations. The Court does not view this classification to be arbitrary and inappropriate.

ISSUE 2: Whether or not public respondents exceeded their authority in promulgating the RR

No. There is no evident intention of the law, either before or after the amendatory legislation, to place in an unequal footing or in significant variance the income tax treatment of professionals who practice their respective professions individually and of those who do it through a general professional partnership.

Insular v. CTA Digest

Insular v CTA

G.R. No. L-31057 May 29, 1981

Facts:

1.  Petitioner is a licensed forest concessionaire engaged in the purchase of manufactured oil and motor fuel used in the operation of its forest concession, sawmill, planning mills, power units, vehicles, dry kilns, water pumps, lawn mowers and in furnishing free water and light to its employees on which a specific tax was paid.

2.   Petitioner filed with the CIR a claim for refund of P19,921.37 representing 25% of the specific tax paid on the manufactured oil and fuel used in its operations pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, RA 1435. CIR denied the Company's claim for refund on the ground that the privilege of partial tax refund refer to those using oil in the operation of forest and mining concessions is limited to a period of five (5) years from June 14, 1956, the date effectivity of said Act. Consequently, oil used in such concession after June 14, 1961 are subject to the full tax prescribed in Section 142 of the National Internal Revenue Code.

3.  Petitioner filed a petition for review before the respondent court and CTA ruled that the operation of a sawmill is distinct from the operation of a forest concession, hence, the refund provision of Section 5 of RA 1435 allowing partial refund to forest and mining concessionaires cannot be extended to the operators of a sawmill. And out of the P19,921.37 claimed, representing the 25% of specific tax paid, respondent court found out that only the amount of P14,598.08 was paid on oil utilized in logging operations. Respondent court, however, did not allow the refund of the full amount of P14,598.08 because the Company's right to claim the refund of a portion thereof, had already prescribed. Hence, the Company was credited the refund of P10,560.20 only. Both parties appealed from the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals.

4.  R.A. No. 1435 is "An Act to Provide Means for Increasing The Highway Special Fund." The Commissioner contends that the subject of RA 1435 was to increase Highway Special Fund. However, Section 5 of, the Act deals with another subject which is the partial exemption of miners and loggers. And tills partial exemption on which the Company based its claim for refund is clearly not expressed in the title of the aforesaid Act. More importantly, Section 5 provides for a decrease rather than an increase of the Highway Special Fund.

5.  The CTA ordered the CIR to refund to the petitioner the amount of P10,560.20 instead of P19,921.37, representing 25% of the specific tax paid on manufactured oil and motor fuel utilized by said company in the operation of its forest concession in the year 1963.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 5 of the act is unconstitutional

NO.

1.  RA 1435 deals with only one subject and proclaims just one policy, namely, the necessity for increasing the Highway Special Fund through the imposition of an increased specific tax on manufactured oils. The proviso in Section 5 of the law is in effect a partial exemption from the imposed increased tax. Said proviso, which has reference to specific tax on oil and fuel, is not, a deviation from the general subject of the law. The primary purpose of the aforequoted constitutional provision is to prohibit duplicity in legislation the title of which might completely fail to apprise the legislators or the public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or its operation. 

2. In deciding the constitutionality of a statute alleged to be defectively titled, every presumption favors the validity of the Act. As is true in cases presenting other constitutional issues, the courts avoid declaring an Act unconstitutional whenever possible. Where there is any doubt as to the insufficiency of either the title, or the Art, the legislation should be sustained.

Tio v Videogram Digest

Tio v Videogram

G.R. No. L-75697 June 18, 1987

Melencio-Herrera, J.:

Facts:

1.  Petitioner on his own behalf and purportedly on behalf of other videogram operators adversely affected assailed the constitutionality of PD 1987 entitled "An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The Decree promulgated on October 5, 1985, took effect on April 10, 1986, fifteen (15) days after completion of its publication in the Official Gazette.

2.   PD 1994 issued a month thereafter reinforced PD 1987 and in effect amended the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Petitioner contended among others  that the tax provision of the decree is a rider. 

ISSUE: Whether or not the PD 1987 is unconstitutional due to the tax provision included

RULING: PD 1987 is constitutional.

1.  The title of the decree, which calls for the creation of the VRB is comprehensive enough to include the purposes expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covered in all its provisions. It is unnecessary to express all those objectives in the title or that the latter be an index to the body of the decree.

2. The foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the general object of the decree, which is the regulation of the video industry through the VRB as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with nor foreign to the general subject and title. As a tool for regulation  it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the decree.

3.  The express purpose of PD 1987 to include taxation of the video industry in order to regulate and rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videos is evident from Preambles 2 and 5. Those preambles explain the motives of the lawmaker in presenting the measure. 

Lidasan v. Comelec Digest

Lidasan v Comelec

G.R. No. L-28089   October 25, 1967

Sanchez, J.:

Facts:

1.   Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the 1967 elections assails the constitutionality of RA 4790 and petitioned that Comelec's resolutions implementing the same for electoral purposes be nullified. Under RA 4790, 12 barrios in two municipalities in the province of Cotabato are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in the boundaries of the two provinces.

2.  Barrios Togaig and Madalum are within the municipality of Buldon in the Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.

3.  Apprised of this development, the Office of the President, recommended to Comelec that the operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation."

4. Comelec, by resolution declared that the statute should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur", but which includes barrios located in another province — Cotabato is unconstitutional for embracing more than one subject in the title

YES. RA 4790 is null and void

1.   The constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative power. First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof. Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be "expressed in the title" of the bill. This constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of command." Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which became RA 4790, only its title was read from its introduction to its final approval in the House where the bill, being of local application, originated.

2.  The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.

3.  The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which technical accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title which is so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad.

4.  The title — "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur" — projects the impression that only the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that the legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur.

5.   Finally, the title did not inform the members of Congress the full impact of the law. One, it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur. Two, it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill. 

Dela Cruz v. Paras Digest

Dela Cruz v Paras

G.R. No. L-42571-72 July 25, 1983

Fernando, CJ:

Facts:

1.  Assailed was the validity of an ordinance which prohibit the operation of night clubs. Petitioners contended that the ordinance is invalid,  tainted with nullity, the municipality being devoid of power to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling. Petitioners at the same time alleging that their rights to due process and equal protection of the laws were violated as the licenses previously given to them was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing.

2.  RA 938, as amended, was originally enacted on June 20, 1953. It is entitled: "An Act Granting Municipal or City Boards and Councils the Power to Regulate the Establishments, Maintenance and Operation of Certain Places of Amusement within Their Respective Territorial Jurisdictions.' 

The first section reads, "The municipal or city board or council of each chartered city shall have the power to regulate by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs, cabarets, dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools, and other similar places of amusement within its territorial jurisdiction:
On May 21, 1954, the first section was amended to include not merely "the power to regulate, but likewise "Prohibit ... " The title, however, remained the same. It is worded exactly as RA 938.

3.  As thus amended, if only the said portion of the Act was considered, a municipal council may go as far as to prohibit the operation of night clubs. The title was not in any way altered. It was not changed one bit. The exact wording was followed. The power granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition.

4.   Petitioners contended that RA 938 which prohibits the operation of night clubs would give rise to a constitutional question. The lower court upheld the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 84 and dismissed the cases. Hence this petition for certiorari by way of appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid

NO. It is unconstitutional. It undoubtly involves  a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit. 

1.  The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. "Since there is no dispute as the title limits the power to regulating, not prohibiting, it would result in the statute being invalid if, as was done by the Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a night club was prohibited. There is a wide gap between the exercise of a regulatory power "to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, and improve the morals, in the language of the Administrative Code, such competence extending to all "the great public needs.

2.   In accordance with the well-settled principle of constitutional construction that between two possible interpretations by one of which it will be free from constitutional infirmity and by the other tainted by such grave defect, the former is to be preferred. A construction that would save rather than one that would affix the seal of doom certainly commends itself.

3.  Under the Local Govt Code, it is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. It would be, therefore, an exercise in futility if the decision under review were sustained. All that petitioners would have to do is to apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses, because no such businesses could legally open, would be subject to judicial correction. That is to comply with the legislative will to allow the operation and continued existence of night clubs subject to appropriate regulations. In the meanwhile, to compel petitioners to close their establishments, the necessary result of an affirmance, would amount to no more than a temporary termination of their business.

4.  Herein what was involved is a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit.