Pangan v. Gatbalite Digest

Pangan v. Gatbalite Digest

Facts:

1. On September 16, 1987, the petitioner was convicted of the offense charged and was sentenced to serve a penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, on October 24, 1988, affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC. Petitioner never got to serve his sentence and hid for about nine years.

2. Then, on January 20, 2000, the petitioner was apprehended and detained at the Mabalacat Detention Cell. Four days thereafter, he filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at the RTC of Angeles City, impleading respondent (Acting Chief of Police of Mabalacat, Pampanga). Petitioner contended that his arrest was illegal and unjustified on the grounds that, a) the straight penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor prescribes in five years under No. 3,Article 93 [of the] Revised Penal Code, and (b)   having been able to continuously evade service of sentence for almost nine years, his criminalliability has long been totally extinguished under No. 6, Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code.

3. The petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied since there was no evasion of the service of the sentence. Evasion presupposes escape during the service of the sentence consisting in deprivation of liberty.

Issue: Whether or not the penalty already prescribed

HELD: NO.

The period of prescription of penalties – the succeeding Article 93 provides – "shall commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence". Article 157 of the RPC discussed how evasion of service of sentence was perfected. It is provided therein that, 

"The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of his sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment. To consider properly the meaning of evasion service of sentence, its elements must be present these are: (1) the offender is a convict by final judgment; (2) he "is serving his sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty"; and (3) he evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence. For, by the express terms of the statute, a convict evades "service of his sentence" by "escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment." 

That escape should take place while serving sentence, is emphasized by the second sentence of Article 157. It provides for a higher penalty if such "evasion or escape shall have taken place by means of unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors, or by using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivance with other convicts or employees of the penal institution, . . ." Indeed, evasion of sentence is but another expression of the term "jail breaking."

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, "escape" in legal parlance and for purposes of Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means the unlawful departure of prisoner from the limits of his custody. Clearly, one who has not been committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom.

 

In this case, the petitioner was never brought to prison. As the record would show, even before the execution of the judgment for his conviction, he was already in hiding. He now begs for the compassion of the Court because he has ceased to live a life of peace and tranquility after he failed to appear in court for the execution of his sentence. But it was petitioner who chose to become a fugitive. The Court accords compassion only to those who are deserving. Petitioner's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt but he refused to answer for the wrong he committed. He is therefore not to be rewarded therefor.

Hasegawa and Nippon Eng. Consultants v. Kitamura Digest

Hasegawa and Nippon Eng. v. Kitamura 

G.R. No. 149177 November 23, 2007

Ponente: Justice Nachura

Facts:

1. The petitioner Nippon Engineering Consultants Co. is a Japanese consultancy firm which provides technical and management support in the infrastructure project of foreign governments. It entered into a Independent Contractor Agreement (ICA) with respondent Kitamura, a Japanese national permanently residing in the Philippines. Under the ICA, the respondent will extend professional services to the petitioner for a year.

2. Subsequently Kitamura was assigned as project manager of STAR project in 1999. In 2000, he was informed by the petitioner that it will no longer renew the ICA and that he will be retained until its expiration. Kitamura filed a civil casefor specific performance before the RTC of Lipa and damages.

3. The lower court ruled that it has jurisdiction over the dispute and denied the petitioner's motion to dismiss since accordingly, it is vested by law with the power to entertain and hear the civil case filed by Kitamura. The Court of Appeals upheld the lower court's decision.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case

HELD: YES

1. The only issue is the jurisdiction, hence, choice-of-law rules as raised by the petitioner is inapplicable and not yet called for (reference to lex loci, lex contractus, or state of most significant rule). The petitioner prematurelyinvoked the said rules before pointing out any conflict between the laws of Japan and the Philippines.

2. The doctrine on forum non conveniens cannot be invoked to deprive the RTC of its jurisdiction. Dismissing the case on this ground requires a factual determination hence the principle is considered to be more a matter of defense.

Bank of America, NT & SA v. Litonjua

Bank of America, NT & SA v. Litonjua

G.R. No. 120135 March 31, 2003

Ponente: Austria-Martinez, J.

Facts:

1. The Litonjuas (Eduardo and Aurelio), private respondents, were engaged in the shipping business. They owned 2 vesselsthrough their company and deposited their revenues with the petitioner banks in both Hongkong and UK. The respondents alleged that the petitioner offered easy loans to help them acquire additional three (3) vessels through their company. The operation and the funds were then placed under the control of the petitioner while the possession of the vessels were left in the hands of persons designated.

2. The said vessels were subsequently foreclosed when the business of respondents declined. However, the bank as trustee failed to render an accounting of the incomes of the said vessels. This prompted the Litonjuas to file a complaint. The petitioner bank filed a motion to dismiss  on the ground of forum non conveniens and lack of cause of action. The MD was denied by the lower court. The petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with the CA. The Court of Appeals dismissed. It was treated by the CA as a petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the case should have been dismissed on the ground of FNC

HELD:

NO. Whether a suit is to be dismissed on the ground of FNC depends largely upon the facts of the case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the courts. The following requisites must be met: 

- The Philippine court must be one to which the parties may conveniently resort to

- The Philippine courts is in the position to make intelligent decisions as to law and facts

- It has or likely have the power to enforce its decision.

As to the issue on forum shopping, the court held that there is no forum shopping due to the pendency of the foreign action. Forum shopping exists where elements of litis pendentia are present and where a final judgement is one case will amount to res judicata in the other. Litis pendentia presuposses the existence of these elements; identity of parties, identity of righs asserted and relief prayed for (founded on the same acts) and the identity of the two cases is such that judgement in one case would amount to res judicata in the other. 

Not all the elements for litis pendentia are present here. The petitioner failed to show these as it merely mentioned that civil cases were filed in Hongkong and UK without showing the identity of the rights asserted or reliefs sought, as well as the presence of elements of res judicata should one of the case be adjudged.

Sinochem International Co. v. Malaysia International Shipping Corp. Digest

Sinochem International Co. v. Malaysia International Shipping Corp. Digest

549 U.S. 422 (2007)

Facts:

1. Sinochem is a Chinese government-owned company. It contracted with Triorient for Sinochem to purchase steel coils paid by a letter of credit (LC) through the production of a valid bill of lading. It alleged that the respondent backdated the bill of lading and petitioned the Chinese court to arrest the vessel. 

2. Malaysia International (respondent) is a Malaysian company, chartered and subcontracted bu Triorient to transport the steel coils. Sinochem filed the action in a Chinese court. Malaysia Int'l filed an action in the US citing Sinochem's petition for preservation allegedly contained misrepresentation.. The US districtcourt however dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens on the ground that the case could be adjudicated adequately and conveniently in the Chinese courts. Moreover, it is the latter which accordingly had subject-matter jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether or not a district court can validly dismiss a case at once based on forum non conveniens (FNC) even without any other threshold objection

HELD:

YES. The court has the jurisdiction to respond immediately to an FNC plea and there is no need to take up first any other threshold objection. In essence, a court need not even resolve whether it has authority to adjudicate the case on the basis of subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction over the defendant if it determines that in any event, a foreign tribunal is the more suitable arbiter of the merits of the case. Forum non conveniens is a non merits ground for dismissal.

Yamashita v. Styer Digest

Yamashita vs. Styer

G.R. L-129 December 19, 1945

Ponente: Moran, C.J.

Facts:

1. Yamashita was the Commanding General of the Japanese army in the Philippines during World War 2. He was charged before the American military commission for war crimes.

2. He filed a petition for habeas corpus and prohibition against Gen. Styer to reinstate his status as prisoner of war from being accused as a war criminal. Petitioner also questioned the jurisdiction of the military tribunal.

Issue: Whether or not the military tribunal has jurisdiction

Held:

YES.
1. The military commission was lawfully created in conformity with an act of Congress sanctioning the creation of such tribunals.

2. The laws of war imposes upon a commander the duty to take any appropriate measures within his powers to control the troops under his command to prevent acts which constitute violation of the laws of war. Hence, petitioner could be legitimately charged with personal responsibility arising from his failure to take such measure. In this regard the SC invoked Art. 1 of the Hague Convention No. IV of 1907, as well as Art. 19 of Hague Convention No. X, Art. 26 of 1929 Geneva Convention among others.

3. Habeas corpus is untenable since the petitioner merely sought for restoration to his former status as prisoner of war and not a discharge from confinement. This is a matter of military measure and not within the jurisdiction of the courts.

4. The petition for prohibition against the respondent will also not life since the military commission is not made a party respondent in the case. As such, no order may be issued requiring it to refrain from trying the petitioner.

Kuroda v. Jalandoni Digest

Kuroda vs. Jalandoni

G.R. L-2662, March 26, 1949

Ponente: Moran, C.J.

Facts:

1. Petitioner Sheginori Kuroda was the former Lt. General of the Japanese Army and commanding general of the Japanese forces during the occupation (WWII) in the country. He was tried before the Philippine Military Commission for War Crimes and other atrocities committed against military and civilians. The military commission was establish under Executive Order 68.

2. Petitioner assails the validity of EO 68 arguing it is unconstitutional and hence the military commission did not have the jurisdiction to try him on the following grounds:

- that the Philippines is not a signatory to the Hague Convention (War Crimes)

3. Petitioner likewise assails that the US is not a party of interest in the case hence the 2 US prosecutors cannot practice law in the Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not EO 68 is constitutional thus the military tribunal jurisdiction is valid

HELD:

1. EO 68 is constitutional hence the tribunal has jurisdiction to try Kuroda. EO 68 was enacted by the President and was in accordance with Sec. 3, Art. 2 of Constitution which renounces war as an instrument of national policy. Hence it is in accordance with generally accepted principles of international law including the Hague Convention and Geneva Convention, and other international jurisprudence established by the UN, including the principle that all persons (military or civilian) guilty of plan, preparing, waging a war of aggression and other offenses in violation of laws and customs of war. The Philippines may not be a signatory to the 2 conventions at that time but the rules and regulations of both are wholly based on the generally accepted principles of international law. They were accepted even by the 2 belligerent nations (US and Japan)

2. As to the participation of the 2 US prosecutors in the case, the US is a party of interest because its country and people have greatly aggrieved by the crimes which petitioner was being charged of.

3. Moreover, the Phil. Military Commission is a special military tribunal and rules as to parties and representation are not governed by the rules of court but the provision of this special law.

The Value of Speed Reading in Law School

Speed reading should be one of the basic weapons in your arsenal as a law student. It significantly reduces time spent on studying. Law school means tackling voluminous reading materials on a regular basis and this is where speed reading becomes handy.

Learning how to speed read is pretty easy when you know the basics. First thing, you need to learn to put yourself under some sort of stress by setting a definite time to finish a specific number of pages. I do this by, say, I need to finish 300 pages of textbook in 2 hours.

Then, you have to train your eye to spot on words that are relevant, while merely skimming over the not-so relevant mumbo-jumbo of (articles, conjunctions, etc.), and simultaneously making a mental note of important points in what you are reading. In goes like this, it is akin to jotting important ideas and notes in your head and mentally highlighting them, in you mind that is. In short, teach your brain to multi-task. I do a mental bulleted version or mental highlighting of those phrases and words that are worthy of remembering.

Finally, after you put down that volume of material, review and recall the important points. If some ideas are still unclear or you miss out some pertinent stuff in the reading material, go over it fast, of course.

So there, that's how speed reading saves me time. It is very helpful when you try to read voluminous books before a class or before your exam. I often do two readings in order to reinforce what was read the first time, and for better results and retention.

I once had to finish a 500-600 page Prof. Balane book in 4-5 hours, I didn't have much time left since my exam is the day after. With speed reading I was able to do a second reading of that same book all in one day. Isn't that great?

For more help in training yourself how to speed read, the Extreme Speed Reading E-Book might be a good idea for you to try. There are also online accelerated reading training courses that you could try like SpeedReaderX.

Abangan vs. Abangan Digest

Abangan v. Abangan

Facts:

1. On September 1917, the CFI of Cebu admitted to probate Ana Abangan's will executed on July 1916. It is from this decision which the opponent appealed. It is alleged that the records do not show the testatrix knew the dialect in which the will was written.

Issue: Whether or not the will was validly probated

YES. The circumstance appearing on the will itself,  that it was executed in Cebu City and in the dialect of the place where the testarix is a resident is enough to presume that she knew this dialect in the absence of any proof to the contrary. On the authority of this case and that of Gonzales v Laurel, it seems that for the presumption to apply, the following must appear: 1) that the will must be in a language or dialect generally spoken in the place of execution, and, 2) that the testator must be a native or resident of the said locality

Vitug vs. CA Digest

Vitug v. Court of Appeals

Facts:

1. The case is a chapter in an earlier suit involving the issue on two (2) wills of the late Dolores Vitug who died in New York, USA in Nov 1980. She named therein private respondent Rowena Corona (Executrix) while Nenita Alonte was co-special administrator together with petitioner Romarico pending probate.

2. In January 1985, Romarico filed a motion asking for authorization of the probate court to sell shares of stocks and real property of the estate as reimbursements for advances he made to the estate. The said amount was spent for payment of estate tax from a savings account in the Bank of America.

3. Rowena Corona opposed the motion to sell contending that from the said account are conjugal funds, hence part of the estate. Vitug insisted saying that the said funds are his exclusive property acquired by virtue of a survivorship agreement executed with his late wife and the bank previously. In the said agreement, they agreed that in the event of death of either, the funds will become the sole property of the survivor.

4. The lower court upheld the validity of the survivorship agreement and granted Romarico's motion to sell. The Court of Appeals however held that said agreement constituted a conveyance mortis causa which did not comply with the formalities of a valid will. Further, assuming that it is donation inter vivos, it is a prohibited donation. Vitug petitioned to the Court contending that the said agreement is an aleatory contract.

Issue: Whether or not the conveyance is one of mortis causa hence should conform to the form required of wills

NO. The survivorship agreement is a contract which imposed a mere obligation with a term--being death. Such contracts are permitted under Article 2012 on aleatory contracts. When Dolores predeceased her husbandm the latter acquired upon her death a vested right over the funds in the account. The conveyance is therefore not mortis causa.

Piper Aircraft Co. vs. Reyno Digest

Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno

Forum non-conveniens

Facts:

1. Reyno was the representative of the estates of citizens and decedents who were residents of Scotland. The decedents were killed in a plane crash (mechanical failure) in Scotland during a chartered flight of an aircraft manufactured by the petitioner. 

2. Petitioner is a company in Pennsylvania, while Hartzel, the one maintaining the propeller was from Ohio. The aircraft was registered in United Kingdom. It was operated by a UK company owned by McDonald (of Scotland). Meanwhile, the  plane pilot who also died is of Scottish descent.

3. The UK government conducted an investigation. The representatives of five (5) passengers who perished filed an action against Piper Corp and Hartzel in California while the survivors filed a separate action in UK against Air Navigation, McDonald and the pilot's estate. Hartzel was properly served with process. The petitioner Piper and Hartzell both moved to dismiss on ground of forum non-conveniens (FNC).

Issue: Whether or not the court should dismiss on ground of FNC

HELD:

YES. The court held that the private and public factors favored Scotland. When an alternative forum has jurisdiction to hear a case and when trial in the chosen forum would establish oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant, or when the chosen forum is inappropriate because of considerations affecting the courts own administrative and legal concerns, the court may in the exercise of sound discretion dismiss the case by applying the list of private and public interest factors. The wreckage of the plane was in Scotland (private) while Scotland had greater interest in hearing the case that concerns Scottish citizens (public).

The private factors include; relative ease of access to evidence, attendance of witnesses, cost of attendance, viewing the scene and other practical matters. While public factors include: administrative difficulties of courts, interest in having local controversies adjudicated at home, interest in trial in a forum familiar with the law governning the action, avoidance of unnecessary problems in the CFLm unfairness of burdening the citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty.

Gulf Oil Corp. vs. Gilbert Digest

Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert

Forum Non-Conveniens

Facts:

1. Plaintiff Gilbert filed an action in New York against the petitioner for negligence due to the delivery of gasoline to his tanks and pumps. The venue statutes of the United States permit this. Gilbert resides in Virginia, USA.

2. Petitioner Gulf Oil is a company organized under the laws of Pennsylvania with authority to do business in both Virginia and New York. It designated officials in each state as agents to receive the process. Gulf Oil invoked the doctrine of 'forum non-conveniens' and claimed that Virginia is the appropriate venue for the trial becuase it is where the plaintiff resides, where corporation does business, where the witness likewise resides and it is also the place where the events took place.

3. On one hand, plaintiff contends that the action filed in New York is justified since the action involved an amount for claim for damages close to $400 thousand which may stagger the imagination of the local jury, the diversity of the citizenship of the parties and that plaintiff's counsel resides in New York.

4. The District Court of New Yorl dismissed the tort action pursuant to FNC (forum non-conveniens) while the Appeals Court reversed the decision.

Issue: Whether or not the action was properly dismissed from NY court under the doctrine of FNC thought personam jurisdiction and venue are proper

HELD:

YES. The application of the doctrine lies in the the discretion of the court. However, tje interests of the plaintiff, the defendant and the forum state need to be considered. Here, there is not interest for any party to have the litigation in New York. In fact, interests weigh against it.

Moreover, the plaintiff may not choose an inconvenient forum to harass the petitioner. Finally, the state has an interest in avoiding the overcrowding of its own courts and subjecting its citizens to jury duty in a case having no ties to their state.

Citybank N.A. vs. Cabamongan 488 SCRA 517 Digest

Citybank v. Cabamongan 

488 SCRA 517 

G.R. No. 146918 May 2, 2006

Ponente: Austria-Martinez, J.:

Bank negligent

Facts:

1. The Cabamongan spouses Luis and Carmelita are both based in California, USA. The spouses opened a foreign currency time deposit account for their children with petitioner CityBank with a 180-day term. An impostor who claimed to be Carmelita (wife) succeeded to preterminate the time deposit after presenting passport, credit card and other identification.

2. The bank personnel who attended to the transaction ignored several red flags which could have alerted the bank as to the real identity of the person claiming to be 'Carmelita'. For one, she failed to present the certificate of time deposit, there was also a discrepancy in her signature with that in the signature cards of the bank. Finally, the photo in the bank's file did not look like this person claiming to be Carmelita. Despite all these irregularities, the bank went through with the transaction, which only took 40 minutes. The document waiver which the impostor signed was also not notarized, as required under bank's procedures.

3. To the aghast of the spouses, they only came to learn of the incident through a daughter-in-law who called them up in the US. Apparently, a break-in occurred previously in their US residence and several important documents were lost to the thief. The spouses demanded payment from the bank who refused. Hence the filing of the suit against petitioner bank.

4. The spouses presented a PNP Document Examiner expert who analysed the signature and concluded that the signature was forged, hence the discrepancy between the signature of the impostor and the one written in the signature cards held by the bank. 

4. The trial court ruled in favor of the spouses Cabamongan, held the bank negligent and awarded actual, moral and exemplary damages. The bank appealed to the CA which affirmed the lower court's decision. Both parties filed a petition for review on certiorari before the SC where the petitioner insisted that it Carmela who preterminated the TD despite claims to the contrary, while the Cabamongan spouses contended that Citybank's negligence was established by evidence.

Issue: Whether or not the bank is negligent and therefor should be held liable when it allowed the pretermination of the TD in favor of the impostor

HELD:

YES. The bank was indeed negligent as it failed to exercise the highest degree of care and diligence required of it. The banking business is impressed with public interest and of paramount importance thereto is the trust and confidence of the public in general. The Court has held that the bank "is bound to know the signatures of its customers; and if it pays a forged check, it must be considered as making payment out of its own funds, and cannot ordinarily charge the amount so paid to the account of the depositor whose name was forged."(San Carlos Milling Ltd. vs. BPI)

It has been sufficiently shown that the signatures of Carmelita in the pretermination were forged. The petitioner, even with its signature verification procedure failed to detect the forgeries. Citybank cannot label its negligence as mere error. For not exercising the degree of diligence required of banking institutions, it is liable for damages.

Related Digests:
FEBTC v. Pacilan Digest
Bank of America v. PRC Digest
BPI v. Suarez Digest
City Trust Bank v. Cruz Digest

10 Tips to Survive Work and Law School

You must be crazy to be in law school and work all at the same time. But yes, I did it for two years, stopped, then again, now in my final years (hopefully), and boy it is crazy -- suicidal even. The first few months are difficult but soon you will get the hang of it.

It has its own perks, yes, but everyday is a total adrenaline-pumping and stress-juice producing ride. I love the earning part of it. That means I don't have to ask for dole outs from generous benefactors (kinda) but I admit, it eats me up little by little. I have to trade money for sleep, time, sanity and beauty!

Contrary to popular belief a full time law student doesn't always have the upper hand when it comes to study time, so hurray for us working law students! When one has the luxury of time, there is a tendency to be complacent, right? I even have time to do this blog, plus 5 more others, still have time to do freelance work online, roam and be fabulous all at the same time. :)

So how do you survive being in-between two equally-demanding responsibilities of work and law study?

1.  A Cool Boss
First, you must have a really cool, understanding and supportive boss. One who allows you to leave work in time for you not to be late for your class. It is hard when there is a deadline or meeting you need to attend and you need to rush off to class without missing a beat. I'm glad I can say I'm one of the lucky few.

2. Understanding Boyfriend, Girlfriend, or Spouse
Oh I almost forgot, you are also a living human capable of having a relationship. Well, your loved one must be understanding enough to take 2nd priority, period. Law school is demanding enough, but add work, oh well, you do the math, because a day consist only of 24 hours.

3. Manageable Law Professors
You are lucky if your law professor is not so nit-picky when it comes to lates and absences, otherwise, it's another reason to add to your woes.

4. Your Own Transportation (a.k.a. car)
There are days when you would simply want to teleport from the office to your classroom in order to save time and energy. A car would be good to make that last minute dash from the office to law school or vice-versa, on rush hour. Having your own mode of transport is also great when you need to catch that much-needed 10-minute power nap. But hey, don't sleep and drive, or drive and sleep -- both two dangerous combo that could cause you limb and life.

5. Location, location, matters
Choose a school that is accessible from your work, or workplace which is accessible to school, whenever possible. I traded schools solely on this consideration. It would be great if all three (school, work and home) are close to each other for you to save on commute time.

6. Get a good task scheduler app
If you are like some people, a task scheduler to help you manage your little time might help. In my case, I have all this Android apps which supposedly help me budget my time - which I don't have much really. If you are not so techy, then your good ol' notepad will do. Just jot down what you need to accomplish on a weekly and daily basis. Make sure you stick to those tasks somehow ( I don't most of the time!). My list would often go like this...

Day 1
                   -  9pm-11 pm, Digest case for (subject), edit/proofread, 
                                           then post to blog (haha!)
                   - 11pm-12 mn, Do house stuff
                   - 12mn -3 or 4am, Sleep (on my study chair most of the time).
                   - 4am-5am, Read codal for 30mins, then attempt to read 
                                      corresponding book
                   - 5am - 7:30 am, Prepare for work, do house stuff, etc
                   - 7:30am - 8:30am, Commute time, Mad rush
                   -  9am-5pm, W-O-R-K
                   - 5pm-5:30 pm, Commute time
                   - 6pm-9pm, LAW SCHOOL

Oh well, you get what I mean.

7. Schedule your leaves at work nicely
It is good to reserve your work leaves for exam periods in law school. It helps to maintain your sanity during those gruelling days when you have to review for that exam.

8. Limit and manage your social network time
Facebook and other social media are great time-stealers. It is easy to forget time when you are sharing stories and photos or chatting with your friends online, but really, you don't have to update everyday (unless your a social media practitioner). On most days, I would allot 10 minutes per visit, and more than that, I would already feel guilty.

9. Get a massage every payday
Yeah, why not! It is one of those guilt-free pleasures that you can allow yourself to indulge in. After all, you deserve to destress you body. Get a massage twice every month, or more.

10. Eat heartily.
Those sleepless nights can definitely take a toll on your body but its always good to counterbalance this health-adverse activity (law school, I mean) with the consumption of good and healthy food. It's alright to gain some healthy weight when you are in law school. If you are working and studying law, dieting should be the least of your worries, staying up 20 hours a day will m=be more than enough exercise for you, believe me.

All in all, pursuing a law degree and working for another master (your employer) is not for the weak. I bade you to have a strong heart, mind, and body to withstand all the challenges. Your success in both largely depends on how bad you want to be a lawyer, so there! Goodluck!

Legal Form Help

Finding common legal forms is often a source of difficulty for many people who have no background in law. Don't fret, as even lawyers need a little help in drafting these legal documents. Your job will be easier if you have a guide.

Personal transactions and business dealings often always require certain documents like contracts, deeds, agreements, affidavits and wills. Having an easy reference by way of ready templates will save you time and headache.

If you are looking for assistance in our business and personal transactions, it can be a great relief. Get your much needed help from Eagle Legal Forms. It is not only perfect for business and offices, law students, but even for lawyers.

People vs. Ladao Digest

People v. Ladao

G.R. No. 100940-41 November 27, 2001

Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J.:

Confession

Facts:

1. The accused-appellant Ladao was among those apprehended by the Caloocan Police on the night of February 9, 1990, in connection with the rampant robbery and hold-up incidents in Caloocan. In the ensuing investigation conducted by Police Inspector Antonio Paras and Ricardo Concepcion, accused-appellant and his co-accused executed, with the assistance of Atty. Juanito R. Crisostomo of the Public Attorney's Office, Caloocan City, their extra-judicial confession admitting authorship of the crime of robbery with homicide.

2. In his extra-judicial confession, accused-appellant declared that he and his four co-accused, together with three others who were able to escape, held up the passenger jeepney driven by the victim. He further stated that they tied the hands and feet of the victim and threw him into the estero not knowing that the place was filled with water. Using the jeepney of the victim, they plied the Recto-Caloocan route and picked up passengers whom they likewise robbed. Thereafter, they abandoned the jeepney somewhere.

3. Accused-appellant Henry Soriano appeals from the lower court's decision convicting him and his four co-accused of the crime of robbery with homicide.

Issue: W/N the extrajudicial confession is admissible against the accused

YES. Settled is the rule that once the prosecution has shown that there was compliance with the constitutional requirement on pre-interrogation advisories, a confession is presumed to be voluntary and the declarant bears the burden of proving that his confession was involuntary and untrue. The burden is on the accused to destroy this presumption.  A confession is admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat, or promise of reward or leniency. The exculpatory tone of accused-appellant’s confession is demonstrative of its voluntariness rather than compulsion.

Accused-appellant failed to present any proof that force and violence were employed to coerce him to sign the extra-judicial confession.  He did not submit himself to an examination by a physician to bolster his claim.  Neither did he complain of the alleged torture to his relatives or to Prosecutor Neptali Aliposa when he swore to the truth of his statement.  Likewise, he filed no criminal complaint or administrative charge against the police officers concerned. 

Moreover, the language of the confession and the details in it could only come from a participant in the commission of the crime.  Every aspect thereof jibes with the sworn statements given by his co-accused.  His confession reflects the manner in which the crime was committed; the kind of weapon used; the place where they boarded the victim’s jeepney; the role of each accused; and their relative positions inside the jeep.  Furthermore, accused-appellant's admission that they threw the victim in an estero filled with water confirms the result of the post mortem examination indicating that the victim drowned to death.

Valid confession

Accused-appellant’s allegation that he and his co-accused were not assisted by counsel during the custodial investigation is belied by the affidavit executed by Atty. Crisostomo attesting to the voluntariness of accused-appellant’s confession and the legal assistance he rendered during the investigation. Moreover, Atty. Crisostomo testified that he informed accused-appellant and his co-accused of their constitutional rights and assisted them during the custodial investigation. As such, his confession constitutes evidence of the highest order since it is backed up by the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless he is prompted by truth and his conscience.

Note that apart from the extra-judicial confession, the conviction is supported by other competent evidence.  Hilda Castro’s testimony, positively identifying accused-appellant and his co-accused as the persons who robbed them between Tayuman and Blumentritt, is on all fours with the confession of accused-appellant and that of his co-accused that after dumping the victim in the estero, they used the latter’s jeepney and robbed the passengers they picked up in the Recto-Caloocan route and vice-versa.  In fact, Hilda Castro’s bag was recovered from the abandoned jeepney of the victim, which shows that accused-appellant and his companions were the same persons who took away the jeepney of the victim and killed him, and thereafter staged another hold-up where Hilda Castro happened to be one of the victims.

People v Amaca 277 SCRA 215 Digest

People vs. Amaca

GR No. 110129 August 11, 1997
Ponente: Panganiban, J.:

Offer of compromise in Criminal Cases; Res Gestae

 Facts:

1.    Accused Amaca and another known as “Ogang” were charged for shooting Wilson Vergara. During the trial, the prosecution presented Dr. Edgar Pialago, a resident physician on duty when the victim was brought to the hospital after the shooting. The doctor testified that he was able to attend to the victim who had undergone a surgical operation conducted by another doctor. At that time, the major organs of the victim were no longer functioning normally, while his pancreas was likewise injured due to the 2 gunshot wounds at his back. The victim was admitted at 10:45PM but expired the following evening at 10PM. According to Dr. Pialago, even with immediate medical attention, the victim could not survive the wounds he sustained.

2.     Another witness testified, PO Mangubat,  a police officer , who interviewed the victim (Wilson Vergara) right after the shooting. Mangubat  testified that he saw the victim already on board a Ford Fiera pick-up ready for transport to the hospital. He inquired from the victim about the incident, and the former answered he was shot by CVO Amaca and Ogang. Upon query why he was shot, the victim said he did not know the reason why he was shot. Upon being asked as to his condition, the victim said that he was about to die.  He was able to reduce into writing the declaration of the victim and made latter affixed his thumb mark with the use of his own blood in the presence of Wagner Cardenas, the brother of the City Mayor. 

3.       Segundina Vergara, mother of the victim, and her son-in-law Jose Lapera both desisted from further prosecution of the case. the former because of the "financial help" extended by the accused to her family, and the latter because Segundina had already "consented to the amicable settlement of the case." Despite this, the Department of Justice found the existence of a prima facie case based on the victim's ante mortem statement.

4.       The lower court convicted Amaca on the basis of the victim's ante mortem statement to Police Officer Mangubat positively identifying accused. The dying declaration was deemed sufficient to overcome the accused’s  defense of alibi. However, due to the voluntary desistance of the victim's mother from further prosecuting the case, the court a quo declined to make a finding on the civil liability of the appellant.

Issue:  1) Whether or not offer of compromise is admissible against the accused

YES. The "financial help" when viewed as an offer of compromise may be deemed as additional proof to demonstrate appellant's criminal liability. The victim's mother desisted from prosecuting the case in consideration of the "financial help" extended to her family by the accused-appellant. 

It is a well-settled rule that that the desistance of the victim's complaining mother does not bar the People from prosecuting the criminal action, but it does operate as a waiver of the right to pursue civil indemnity. Hence, in effectively waiving her right to institute an action to enforce the civil liability of accused-appellant, she also waived her right to be awarded any civil indemnity arising from the criminal prosecution. This waiver is bolstered by the fact that neither she nor any private prosecutor in her behalf appealed the trial court's refusal to include a finding of civil liability. But the heirs, if there are any may file an independent civil action to recover damages for the death of Wilson Vergara.

Issue (2): Whether or not  the dying declaration of victim should be admitted

YES.  The victim’s dying declaration is admissible.

A dying declaration is worthy of belief because it is highly unthinkable for one who is aware of his impending death to accuse, falsely or even carelessly, anyone of being responsible for his foreseeable demise. Indeed, "when a person is at the point of death, every motive for falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak the

truth." This is the rationale for this exception to the hearsay rule under Section 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The elements of such exception are: (1) the deceased made the declaration conscious of his impending death; (2) the declarant would have been a competent witness had he survived; (3) the declaration concerns the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (4) the declaration is offered in a criminal case where the declarant's death is the subject of inquiry; and (5) the declaration is complete in itself. All these concur in the present case.

Finally, Police Officer Mangubat is presumed under the law to have regularly performed his duty. There is nothing in the circumstances surrounding his investigation of the crime which shows any semblance of irregularity or bias, much less an attempt to frame Amaca. Even the accused testified that he had no previous misunderstanding with Police Officer Mangubat and knew no reason why the latter would falsely testify against him.

Declarant is a competent witness

The serious nature of the victim's injuries did not affect his credibility as a witness since said injuries, as previously mentioned, did not cause the immediate loss of his ability to perceive and to identify his shooter. 

Homicide only not murder

Appellant may be held liable only for homicide since treachery was not alleged in the Information, while evident premeditation and night time, although duly alleged, were not satisfactorily proven. The Information readily reveals that the killing was qualified only by evident premeditation. Treachery was not alleged in the information. It is  necessary to qualify the crime to murder. Treachery is an element of the crime. The Constitution requires that the accused must be informed of the "nature and cause of the accusation against him."The failure to allege treachery in the Information is a major lapse of the prosecution.

Moreover, treachery and night time may not be considered even as generic aggravating circumstances, because there is nothing in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses to convincingly show that the accused-appellant consciously and purposely adopted (1) such means of attack to render the victim defenseless and (2) the darkness of night to facilitate the commission of the crime, to prevent its discovery or even evade capture. 

People vs Lase 219 SCRA 584 Digest

People v. Lase

Offer of Compromise in Criminal Case

Facts:

1. Appellant was convicted of the murder of one Dante Huelva. Huelva was urinating on the roadside when accused appellant stabbed him in the back. This was witnessed by two people Sayson and Pangatihon. 

2. Accused-appellant interposed the defense of alibi and relied on the testimony of his principal witnesses to support his version that he was somewhere else and not at the scene of the crime at the time of the killing. 

3. During the trial, Godofreda Huelva, mother of the victim testified that accused-appellant offered to settle the case for the sum of P10,000.00. In his surrebuttal testimony, accused-appellant vaguely denied this offer of compromise. He, however, insinuated that he could offer a higher amount

RTC: The Trial court held him liable for the killing of Dante Huelva qualifying it to murder,

Issue: Whether or not the offer to settle the case should be admitted as evidence of guilt

YES. An offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. The second paragraph of Section 27, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly provides that,'In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. Murder is not among those criminal cases that can be compromised. 

Treachery was proven but not evident premeditation

The crime was committed with treachery due to the sudden and unexpected attack on the victim, who was then urinating at the side of the road, with a deadly 7-inch Batangas knife. Accused-appellant consciously adopted this mode of attack to facilitate or insure the commission of the crime without risk to himself arising from any defensive or retaliatory act on the part of the victim. Evident premeditation was not duly established by the prosecution.

As to the delay in giving the witness' statement

The failure of prosecution witness Pangantihon to immediately report the incident did not affect his credibility. His initial reluctance either due to unwillingness to be involved in or dragged into criminal investigations is understandable. 

Rubi vs. Provincial Board Digest

Rubi v. Provincial Board

39 Phil 660

Facts:

The Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted a resolution which required all Mangyans to stay in one permanent settlement. The said resolution was approved by the Secretary of Interior as required under Sec. 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code. This provision authorized the establishment of non-Christian sites to be selected by the provincial governor. Sec. 2145 of the RAC is now herein assailed on ground that it is an unlawful delegation of legislative power to the provincial officials.

Issue: Whether or not Sec. 2145 of the RAC is valid

The provision is valid, as an exception to the general rule. The legislature is permitted to delegate legislative powers to the local authorities on matters that are of purely local concerns.

People vs. Manalo Digest 219 SCRA 656

People v. Manalo

G.R.Nos. 96123-24 March 8, 1993

Melo, J.:

Object Evidence

Facts:

1. Accused Rolando Manalo  for shooting one Warlito Bonillo and one Carlito Diomampo with an unlicensed pistol Colt Caliber .45.

2. The conviction was the result of the filing of two (2) amended informations. The accused pleaded not guilty. After trial on the merits the accused was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder in relation to PD 1728.

3. Witness Carlos Lacbay narrated that at about 5PM of Nov. 29, 1989 he visited one of the victims, Diomampo, in the latter's house where they conversed over some wine and camote regarding the latter's interest in buying a motorcycle. After 2 hours, witness Lacbay decided to leave, while Diomampo and a brother-in-law offered to accompany him home. After this, Lacbay rode on his service motorcycle while Diomampo and the other person (Bonilla) rode in tandem in their own motocycle.

4. When the group arrived at Bgy. San Rafael in San Pablo City at about 7 pm, and parked their motorcycles, accused Manalo (an acquaintance of both victims) arrived and invited the victims to his house for some drinks. The two acceded after insisting that Lacbay would go as he did, with them. As they were walking to accused house, Bonilla and Diamampao walked ahead, with accused following close by and Lacbay behind the latter.

5. After the victims entered the house of accused, the latter suddenly drew a .45 Caliber gun and shot Diomampo once in the head and then Bonilla on the temple about 3 meters from behind. Both died immediately, nevertheless, accused fired another shot at Diomampo. Lacbay who saw everything was so shocked. The accused told him that he shot both because Diomampo had impregnated his daughter, Dina Manalo. After this, accused asked Lacbay to dig, to which the latter refused. Finally, accused asked him not to leave the place as he would look for someone to do the digging. Lacbay took this chance to flee the scene. Subsequently, both the bodies of Bonilla and Diomampo were found buried in a shallow pit under the 'banggerahan' of accused' house.

6. The defense maintains the innocence of Manalo, arguing that he is merely a witness to the crime perpetrated by two unknown assailants. According to the defense' version of the story, it was these two unknown persons who killed both victims. Accordingle, the assailants were already waiting in the area for  Bonilla and Diomampo, then thereafter shot them.

RULING:

The court had examined the evidence and it found that it supported the judgement of the lower court.The accused banks on the alleged absence of physical evidence showing that accused fired a gun. The court held that this circumstance did not prove his innocence since even if a paraffin test would yield a negative result, it is still possible for one to have fired a gun and washed his hands thereafter.The court also recognized the great possibility that there will be no paraffin traces left in the hands when a bullet was fired from a .45 Caliber pistol, as held in the case of People vs. Rebullar (188 SCRA 838).

Finally, the lone witness to the crime, Lacbay has positively identified Manalo as the sole perpetrator of the killing. Lacbay can never be said to be a prejudiced witness since he had no other motive nor misunderstanding to maliciously testify against Manalo. The little delay in reporting the killings to the authorities was due to the shock, confusion and fear of Lacbay and that he had to wait ans consult with a relative who was a member of the Philippine marines.

More importantly, the accused Manalo has executed an extrajudicial statement admitting the killings but which he later on withdrew during the trial. Accused adopted two irreconciliable stands that is actually the heart of the case, rendering him unworthy of credit and belief. Accused also wrote several letters, one to Mr. Marcela Bonilla offering money as settlement for the death of the two victims and then to Fiscal Escondo requesting him no to charge murder but only homicide as he had no intention to kill the victims. In one of these letters, he even asked forgiveness for  the crime he had committed.

Dison v. Posadas Digest

Dison v. Posadas

G.R. No. 36770 November 4, 1932

Butte, J.:

Facts:

1. Plaintiff Luis Dison filed a suit against CIR to recover inheritance tax paid under protest amounting to P2,808.73. Felix Dison, plaintiff's father executed  a deed of gift which transferred 22 tracts of land, reserving to himself during his lifetime the usufruct of 3 tracts. The donation was formally accepted by plaintiff.

2. The plaintiff (herein petitioner) alleged in his complaint that the tax is illegal since he received the property by a deed of gift inter vivos duly accepted and registered before the death of his father. He also contended that Act 2601 being an inheritance tax statute, does not tax gifts. The defendant answered in general denial with a countermand. The court dismissed the countermand. Both sides appealed, but the CIR appeal was dismissed.

Issue: Whether or not the gifts inter vivos are taxable (inheritance tax)

YES.

Inheritance tax is imposed upon the gift inter vivos that plaintiff received from his father as this was really an advancement upon the inheritance to which he would be entitled upon the death of the latter. Sec. 1540 of the Administrative Code did not tax gifts per se but only those which are made to those who shall prove to be heirs, devisees, legatees and donees mortis causa of the donor. The term 'heirs' include those given the status of heirs irrespective of the quantity of property they may receive as such.

Vidal de Roces vs. Posadas Digest

Vidal de Roces v. Posadas

G.R. No. 34937 March 13, 1933

Imperial, J.:

Facts:

1. Sometime in 1925, plaintiffs Concepcion Vidal de Roces and her husband, as well as one Elvira Richards, received as donation several parcels of land from Esperanza Tuazon. They took possession of the lands thereafter and likewise obtained the respective transfer certificates.

2.The donor died a year after without leaving any forced heir. In her will, which was admitted to probate, she bequeathed to each of the donees the sum of P5,000. After the distribution of the estate but before the delivery of their shares, the CIR (appellee) ruled that plaintiffs as donees and legatees should pay inheritance taxes. The plaintiffs paid the taxes under protest.

3. CIR filed a demurrer on ground that the facts alleged were not sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The court sustained the demurrer and ordered the amendment of the complaint but the appellants failed to do so. Hence, the trial court dismissed the action on ground that plaintiffs, herein appellants, did not really have a right of action.

4. Plaintiffs (appellant) contend that  Sec. 1540 of the Administrative Code does not include donation inter vivos and if it does, it is unconstitutional, null and void for violating SEC. 3 of the Jones Law (providing that no law shall embrace more than one subject and that the subject should be expressed in its titles ; that the Legislature has no authority to tax donation inter vivos; finally, that said provision violates the rule on uniformity of taxation.

5. CIR however contends that the word 'all gifts'  refer clearly to donation inter vivos and cited the doctrine in Tuason v. Posadas.

Issue: Whether or not the donations should be subjected to inheritance tax

YES. Sec. 1540 of the Administrative Code clearly refers to those donation inter vivos that take effect immediately or during the lifetime of the donor, but made in consideration of the death of the decedent. Those donations not made in contemplation of the decedent's death are not included as it would be equivalent to imposing a direct tax on property and not on its transmission.

The  phrase 'all gifts' as held in Tuason v. Posadas refers to gifts inter vivos as they are considered as advances in anticipation of inheritance since they are made in consideration of death.

Moran Sison v. Teodoro Digest

Moran Sison vs. Teodoro

G.R. No. L-9271 March 29, 1957

Bautista Angelo, J.:

Facts:

1. The CFI of Manila which had jurisdiction over the estate of Margarita David, issued an order appointing appellantCarlos Moran Sison as judicial administrator without compensation after filing a bond. After entering into his duties as administrator, he filed an accounting of his administration which included items as an expense of administration the premiums he paid on his bond.

2. One of the heirs, herein appellee Narcisa Teodoro, objected to the approval of the items. The court approved the report but disallowed the items objected to on the ground that these cannot be considered as expenses of administration. Moran Sison filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not an executor or judicial administrator can validly charge the premiums on his bond as an expense of administration against the estate

NO.

The premiums paid by an executor or administrator serving without a compensation for his bond cannot be charged against the estate. Further Sec. 7 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court  does not authorize the executor or administrator to charge to the estate the money spent for the bond. As held in the case of Sulit v. Santos (56 Phil 626), the position of an executor or administrator is one of trust. The law safeguards the estates of deceased persons by making as a requirement for qualification the ability to give a suitable bond. The execution of said bond is therefore a condition precedent to acceptance of the responsibilities of the trust.

Further, the giving of the bond is not a necessary expense in the care, management, and settlement of the estate within the meaning of Sec. 680 of the Civil Code of Procedure, since such are the requirements after the executor or administrator has already qualified for the office and has entered the performance of his duties.

FEBTC v. Pacilan Digest

Far East Bank vs. Pacilan

G.R. 157314 July 29, 2005

Callejo Sr, J.:

Facts:

1. Pacilan maintains a current account with petitioner bank (now BPI). He issued several postdated checks, the last one being check no. 2434886 amounting to P680. The said check was presented to petitioner bank for payment on April 4, 1988 but was dishonored. It appeared that the account of Pacilan has been closed on the evening of April 4 on the ground that it was 'improperly handled'.

2. It appeared that the plaintiff issued four checks from March 30 - April 4, 1988 amounting in total to P7,410, on one hand, his funds in the bank only amounted to P6,981.43, thus an overdraft of P 428.57 resulted therefrom. Consequently, the last check was dishonored despite the fact that plaintiff deposited the amount the following day.

3. Pacilan wrote a complaint to the bank but after the bank did not reply, he filed an action for damages against it and the employee (Villadelgado) who closed the account. The plaintiff alleged that the immediate closure of his account was malicious and intended to embarrass him.

4. The lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and awarded actual damages (P100,000) and exemplary damages (P50,000). The bank appealed, but the CA affirmed the lower court's decision with modifications and held that the closure of the bank of plaintiff's account despite its rules and regulation allowing a re-clearing of a check returned for insufficiency of funds, is patently malicious and unjustifiable. Hence, this appeal.

5.  The petitioner contended that in closing the account, it acted in good faith and in accordance with the pertinent banking rules and regulations governing the operations of a regular demand deposit, allowing it to close an account if the depositor frequently draws checks against insufficient funds or uncollected deposits.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is liable for damages

NO. The award of damages under Art. 19 of the Civil Code is unjustifiable. The petitioner has the right to close the account of plaintiff based on the rules and regulations on regular demand deposits. The facts do not show that the petitioner abused its rights in the exercise of its duties. The evidence negates the existence of bad faith and malice on the part of the petitioner bank, which are the second and third elements necessary to prove an abuse of right in violation of Art. 19.

The records also showed that indeed plaintiff has mishandled his account by issuing checks previously against insufficient funds not just once, but more than a hundred times.

Moreover, the acceptance by the bank of the deposit the day after the closure of the account cannot be considered as bad faith nor done with malice but a mere simple negligence of its personnel.

As a result, whatever damage the plaintiff has suffered (by virtue of the subsequent dishonor of the other checks he issued) should be borne by him alone as these was the result of his own act in irregularly handling his account.

Bank of America v. PRC Digest

Bank of America vs. Philippine Racing Club

G.R. 150228  July 30, 2009

Ponente: Leonardo-De Castro, J:

Facts:

1. Plaintiff PRCI is a domestic corporation which maintains a current account with petitioner Bank of America. Its authorized signatories are the company President and Vice-President. By virtue of a travel abroad for these officers, they pre-signed checks to accommodate any expenses that may come up while they were abroad for a business trip. The said pre-signed checks were left for safekeeping by PRCs accounting officer. Unfortunately, the two (2) of said checks came into the hands of one of its employees who managed to encash it with petitioner bank. The said check was filled in with the use of a check-writer, wherein in the blank for the 'Payee', the amount in words was written, with the word 'Cash' written above it.

2. Clearly there was an irregularity with the filling up of the blank checks as both showed similar infirmities and irregularities and yet, the petitioner bank did not try to verify with the corporation and proceeded to encash the checks.

3. PRC filed an action for damages against the bank. The lower court awarded actual and exemplary damages. On appeal, the CA affirmed the lower court's decision and held that the bank was negligent. Hence this appeal. Petitioner contends that it was merely doing its obligation under the law and contract in encashing the checks, since the signatures in the checks are genuine.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can be held liable for negligence and thus should pay damages to PRC

Both parties are held to be at fault but the bank has the last clear chance to prevent the fraudulent encashment hence it is the one foremost liable .

1. There was no dispute that the signatures in the checks are genuine but the presence of irregularities on the face of the check should have alerted the bank to exercise caution before encashing them. It is well-settled that banks are in the business impressed with public interest that they  are duty bound to protect their clients and their deposits at all times.  They must treat the accounts of these clients with meticulousness and a highest degree of care considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship. The diligence required of banks are more than that of a good father of a family.

2. The PRC officers' practice of pre-signing checks is a seriously negligent and highly risky behavior which makes them also contributor to the loss. It's own negligence must therefore mitigate the petitioner's liability. Moreover, the person who stole the checks is also an employee of the plaintiff, a cleck in its accounting department at that. As the employer, PRC supposedly should have control and supervision over its own employees.

3. The court held that the petitioner is liable for 60% of the total amount of damages while PRC should shoulder 40% of the said amount.

BPI v. Suarez Digest

G.R. No. 167750

March 15, 2010

Carpio, J.:

Facts:

1. Reynaldo Suarez is a lawyer who used to maintain both savings and current account with petitioner in its Ermita branch. Sometime in 1997, respondent had a client who wanted to buy several parcels  of land in Tagaytay but the latter did not want to deal directly with the owners of said land. 

2. Suarez and his client entered into an agreement where the former will be the one to purchase the lands. Both likewise agreed that the client would deposit money in Suarez' BPI account and thereafter, he would issue the checks for the sellers.

3. The client deposited a check with BPI branch. Aware that a check has 3-days clearing time, Suarez' assistant called the bank which confirmed that the said amount had been credited to his account on that same day. Relying on this confirmation, Suarez issued five (5) checks in the name of the sellers. Unfortunately, all checks were dishonored due to insufficient funds. A penalty amounting P57,000 was also debited from his account. The checks were dishonored despite the assurance by RCBC, the drawee bank that the amount has been debited from the account of the drawee. 

4. On top of this, the bank noted on the checks 'DAIF' (drawn against insufficient fund) and not 'DAUD''  (drawn against uncollected deposit). The bank offered to reverse the penalty but denied Suarez claim for damages. Suarez rejected this offer hence the case filed for damages.

5. The lower court ruled in favor of Suarez and awarded actual, moral, and exemplary damages. BPI appealed but the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court ruling. The CA ruled that the bank was negligent in handling the accounts of the respondent hence the latter's entitlement to damages. Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner bank is liable for its negligence in handling the respondent's account

1. No, BPI was not negligent because it was justified in dishonoring the checks for lack of sufficient funds in Suarez account. There was no sufficient evidence to prove that BPI conclusively confirmed the same-day crediting of the amount of the check to Suarez account. While BPI has the discretion to disregard the 3-day clearing policy, Suarez failed to prove his entitlement to such privilege. 

2. The award of actual damages is without basis since BPI is justified in dishonoring the checks for being drawn against uncollected deposit, hence BPI can rightfully impose the said penalty charges against Suarez' account.

3. The award of moral damages has no basis because Suarez failed to prove that his claimed injury was proximately caused by the erroneous marking of the 'DAIF' on the checks.

4. Suarez is however entitled to nominal damages due to BPI's failure to exercise the diligence required as the bank's business is deemed to be affected with public interest. The bank must at all times maintain a high level of meticulousness and should guard against injury attributableto negligence or bad faith on its part. Suarez therefore has the right to expect a high level of care and and diligence from BPI.

Sample Authorization Letter to Pick-up An Official Document

                                                                                      Date

Office or Government Agency

Address

AUTHORIZATION LETTER

To Whom It May Concern:

This is to authorize (Name of Person to be Authorized) to act in my behalf to pick up the (Certificate/Document to be picked-up)  for (Company you represent.)

Attached is my Identification card for your reference.

Name of the Company Officer authorizing the pick-up

Position