Yu v. Mapayo Digest 181 SCRA 774

G.R. No. L-29742 March 29, 1972 

Facts:

1.             Appellant filed a complaint in the City Court of Davao to recover from defendant Mapayo the sum of P2, 800, which represented an unpaid balance of the purchase price of an engine (Gray Marine), sold to defendant. 

2.             The defendant admitted the said transaction in his answer but he alleged that the engine had hidden defects causing him to spend the same amount for the repairs and labor, wherefore plaintiff had agreed to waive the balance due on the price of the engine and counterclaimed for damages and attorneys' fees. 

3.             The Court disallowed the defences and ordered the defendant to pay plaintiff P2, 500.00 and costs.

4.             Defendant Mapayo appealed to CFI and filed an answer that was a virtual reproduction of his original defences in the City Court.

5.             The defendant, as well as his counsel, failed to appear and the court scheduled the case for hearing ex parte on the same day. The Court ordered plaintiff to present his evidence but it failed to do so. The plaintiff's counsel refused to comply and instead of calling his witnesses, he moved the Court to present them after the defendant had presented their evidence. The court asked said counsel twice whether he would present his evidence for the plaintiff, but said counsel refused to do so and sticked to his demand that he would introduce his witnesses only in rebuttal.

6.             This prompted the court to dismiss the case on ground of failure of the plaintiff to prosecute, hence this appeal.

Issue: W/N the CFI validly dismissed the case on ground of plaintiff's failure to prosecute

NO. The court held that the dismissal in untenable and contrary to law. The defendant was not able to support his special defenses. The answer admitted defendant's obligation as stated in the complaint, and pleaded special defences hence the plaintiff had every right to insist that it was for the defendant to come forward with evidence in support of his special defences. Judicial admissions do not require proof.

Solid Bank v CA Digest

G.R. No. 164805 April 30, 2008

Facts:

1.       Gateway obtained 4 foreign currency denominated loans from petitioner Solid Bank as capital for its manufacturing operations. The loans were secured by Promissory notes and by assignment to Solid Bank of all the proceeds of Gateway's Back-end Services Agreement with Alliance Semiconductors. 

2.       However, Gateway failed to pay its obligations despite repeated demands from the petitioner. This prompted petitioner to file a complaint for collection of sum of money. 

3.       During the trial, Petitioner filed a motion for the production and inspection of documents after learning that Gateway already received proceeds of its Back-end agreement with Alliance. The motion called for the inspection of all books of accounts, financial statements, receipts, checks, vouchers, and other accounting records. The court granted the motion. 

4.       Subsequently, after a couple of postponements, Gateway was only able to produce the billings and not all the other documents. The Court chastised it for not exerting due diligence in procuring the required documents and it ordered that those not produced shall be deemed established in accordance with Solid Bank's claim. 

5.       Gateway filed a petition for certiorari before the CA to nullify the 2 orders of the lower court. CA granted the petition and ruled that the motion to produce and inspect failed to comply with Sec. 1, Rule 27 of the Ruled of Court. Hence this petition. 

Issue: W/N the motion for production and inspection complied with Sec. 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Court 

HELD: NO (Petition denied).

1.       Rule 27 of the Revised Rules of Court permits "fishing" for evidence, the only limitation being that the documents, papers, etc., sought to be produced are not privileged, that they are in the possession of the party ordered to produce them and that they are material to any matter involved in the action. A fishing expedition no longer precludes a party from prying into the facts underlying his opponent's case. However, fishing for evidence has its limitations. 

2.       Solidbank's motion was fatally defective and violates Sec. 1 Rule 27 due to its failure to specify with particularity the documents it required Gateway to produce. Simply, the motion called for a blanket inspection, too broad and too generalized in scope. Its request that "all documents pertaining to, arising from, in connection with or involving the Back-end Services Agreement" ask for a promiscuous mass of documents.

3.       A motion for production and inspection of documents should not demand a roving inspection of a promiscuous mass of documents. The inspection should be limited to those documents designated with sufficient particularity in the motion, such that the adverse party can easily identify the documents he is required to produce. 

4.       Since it is Solid Bank who asserted that Gateway already received payment from its Back-end Agreement with Alliance, then the burden of proof is on its side. Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. Throughout the trial, the burden of proof remains with the party upon whom it is imposed, until he shall have discharged the same.

Delos Santos v. Jarra Digest

G.R. No. L-4150 February 10, 1910 Facts: The Plaintiff Felix delos Santos filed this suit against Agustina Jarra. Jarra was the administratix of the estate of Jimenea. Plaintiff alleged that he owned 10 1st class carabaos which he lent to his father-in-law Jimenea to be used in the animal-power mill without compensation. This was done on the condition of their return after the work at the latter’s mill is terminated. When delos Santos demanded the return of the animals Jimenea refused, hence this suit. Issue: W/N the contracts is one of a commodatum Ruling: YES. The carabaos were given on commodatum as these were delivered to be used by defendant. Upon failure of defendant to return the cattle upon demand, he is under the obligation to indemnify the plaintiff by paying him their value. Since the 6 carabaos were not the property of the deceased or of any of his descendants, it is the duty of the administratrix of the estate to either return them or indemnify the owner thereof of their value.

Yaokasin v Commissioner Digest

GR No. 84111, December 22, 1989

Facts: The Philippine Coast Guard seized 9000 sacks of refined sugar owned by petitioner Yaokasin, which were then being unloaded from the M/V Tacloban, and turned them over to the custody of the Bureau of Customs. On June 7, 1988, the District Collector of Customs ordered the release of the cargo to the petitioner but this order was subsequently reversed on June 15, 1988. The reversal was by virtue ofCustoms Memorandum Order (CMO) 20-87 in implementation of the Integrated Reorganization Plan under P.D. 1, which provides that in protest and seizure cases where the decision is adverse to the government, the Commissioner of Customs has the power of automatic review.

Petitioner objected to the enforcement of Sec. 12 of the Plan and CMO 20-87 contending that these were not published in the Official Gazette. The Plan which was part of P.D. 1 was however published in the Official Gazette.

Issue: W/n circular orders such as CMO 20-87 need to be published in the OG to take effect

NO.

Article 2 of the Civil Code does not apply to circulars like CMO 20-87 which is an administrative order of the Commissioner of Customs addressed to his subordinates, the custom collectors. Said issuance requiring collectors of customs to comply strictly with Section 12 of he Plan, is addressed only to particular persons or a class of persons (the customs collectors), hence no general applicability. As held in Tanada v. Tuvera, “It need not be published, on the assumption that it has been circularized to all concerned.”

Moreover, Commonwealth Act. 638 provides an enumeration of what shall be published in the Official Gazette. It provides that besides legislative acts, resolutions of public nature of Congress, executive, administrative orders and proclamations shall be published except when these have no general applicability.

MRCA v. CA Digest

Facts: The Petitioner MRCA Inc., filed a complaint against private respondents spouses (who were defendants in said civil case). Said case was dismissed by the trial court due to the non-payment of proper filing fees when petitioner failed to include include in the complain the amount of moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses sought to be recovered.

The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed said ruling, hence the petitioner comes to SC by petition for review. Petitioner contends that the Manchester ruling does not apply to the case since said court decision was not published in the Official Gazette. It should be noted that petitioner filed said complaint ten months after the promulgation of the Manchester ruling.

Issue: w/n court rulings need to be published in the Official Gazette order to be effective

HELD: NO.

Publication in the Official Gazette is not a prerequisite for the effectivity of a court ruling even if it lays down a new rule or procedure. It is a well-established doctrine that the procedure of the court may be changed at any time and become effective at once so long as it does not affect or change vested rights. (Aguillon v Dir. of Lands)

As such, the court granted the petition and held that the Manchester ruling should apply to the case of the petitioner though it was modified by the Sun Insurance case where the court allowed the payment of docket fees within a reasonable period but not beyond the reglamentary period. Petitioner was allowed to amend the complaint and specify therein the amount of damages it seeks from defendant and pay the proper filing fees

Pesigan v. Angeles Digest

GR L-64279

Civil law, when Laws take effect

Facts: Petitioners Anselmo and Marcelo Pesigan, carabao dealers transported on April 2. 1982, twenty-six (26) carabaos & a calf from Camarines Norte with Batangas as its destination. They were provided with health certificates from the provincial veterinarian and three (3) other permits attesting that the cattle was not part of lose, stolen or questionable animals.

Despite this, the said cattle was confiscated by respondents Zenarosa and Miranda, who were respectively the police station commander and provincial veterianarian of Basud, Camarines Norte. The confiscation was on the basis of said EO 626-A which was dated October 25, 1980 but was published in theOfficial Gazette on June 14, 1982.

Executive Order 626-A provides, "that henceforth, no carabao, regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. The carabaos or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government to be distributed ... to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos".

The Pesigans filed an action for replevin against herein respondents for the recovery of the subject cattle but this could not be executed by the sheriff. Subsequently, the judge dismissed the case for lack of cause of action. Hence, the petitioners filed an appeal to the Supreme Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issue: Whether or not Executive Order No. 626-A dated October 25, 1980, providing for the confiscation and forfeiture by the government of cattle transported from one province to another, can be enforced even before its actual publication in the Official Gazette of June 14, 1982

HELD: NO

The Supreme Court held that EO 626-A is a penal regulation published more than two months after the confiscation of the cattle or in June 14, 1982. Hence, it became effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code. It should therefore not be enforced against the petitioners. 

Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. (People v Que Po). Justice and fairness dictate that the public must be informed of that provision by means of publication in the Gazette before violators of the executive order can be bound thereby.

Note: The word "laws" in Article 2 of the NCC also includes circulars and regulations which prescribe penalties.

Kasilag v Rodriguez

Issue: W/N petitioner has a valid legal defense of ignorance of the law

HELD: YES

The petitioner is not a lawyer and therefore not conversant with the laws. When he accepted the mortgage of the improvements, it isbased on his well-grounded belief that he is was not violating the prohibition on the alienation of land. Thus is possessing, and consenting the receipt of its fruits, he has no knowledge that this is already in the nature of a contract of antichresis, which as a lien, was prohibited by section 116. Therefore, petitioner's ignorance of the provisions of section 116 is excusable and may, therefore, be the basis of his good faith.

People v. Veridiano Digest

Civil Law, When laws take effect, Publication of laws

Issue: w/n BP 22 which was circulated a month after private respondent issued the dishonored check is applicable

Facts: On 2nd week of May in 1979, private respondent Benito Go Bio Jr. issued a check amounting to P200,000 to one Filipinas Tan. Said check was subsequently dishonored and despite repreated demands, the respondent failed to make the necessary payment hence the filing of charges against him for violation of BP 22 or the Bouncing Check law.

Go Bio filed a Motion to Quash alleging that the information did not charge an offense on ground that BP 22 has not yet taken effect when the offense was committed on May 1979. Said law took into effect on June 29, 1979. The prosecution opposed the motion and contended that the date of the dishonor of the check -- September 26, 1979, is the date of the commission of the offense, hence BP 22 is applicable.

The respondent judge granted Go Bio's motion and dismissed the criminal action. Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that BP 22 was published in the Official Gazette on April 4, 1979, and hence became effective 15 days thereafter or on April 24, 1979. PR contends however that said publication was only released on June 14, 1979 but since the questioned check was issued about the second week of May 1979, then he could not have violated BP 22 because it was not yet released for circulation at the time.

Issue: W/N BP 22 was already in effect when the offense was committed

HELD: NO. It is proved that the penal statute in question was made public or circulated only on June 14, 1979 and not on its printed date of April 9, 1979. Publication of the law is necessary so that the public can be apprised of the contents and or penalties of a penal statute before it can be bound by it. If a statute had not been published before its violation, then in the eyes of the law there was no such law to be violated. Hence, the accused could not have committed the alleged crime. When the alleged offense was committed there was still no law penalizing it.

The term "publication" in BP 22 must be given the ordinary accepted meaning -- or to make known to the people in general. Moreover, if BP 22 intended to make the printed date of issue of the Gazette as the point of reference in the determination of its the effectivity, it could have provided a special effectivity provision.

Puzon v Abellera Digest

G.R. No. 75082 July 31, 1989

Retroactivity

Facts:

The oppositor appellee Alejandra Abellera (substituted upon her death by Domondon) was the owner of the subject 2-hectare parcel of land situated in Baguio City, a land which was previously part of the public domain but was titled pursuant to RA 931. In another case Republic v Pio Marcos, the Supreme Court declared that all titles issued under RA 931 are null and void since the said Act was applicable only to places covered by cadastral proceedings, and not to the City of Baguio which was covered by a townsite reservation.

This same ruling was subsequently incorporated into a law, P.D. 1271 with the title "An act nullifying decrees of registration and certificates of title covering lands within the Baguio Townsite Reservation pursuant to RA 931 which took effect on December 22, 1977. PD 1271 considered as valid certain titles of lands that are alienable and disposable under certain conditions and for other purposes. Hence, the lot in question was reverted to the public domain.

The subject lots were sold in an auction sale due to the non-payment of taxes.\Petitioner took interest and subsequently won the bid. A year after, a certificate of sale was issued. In this connection, the petitioner filed a case to consolidate his ownership of the lots. Meanwhile, Domondon found out about the auction sale and filed an opposition to the petition for consolidation filed by petitioner. The trial court ruled that said auction sale is null and void and that the assessments were illegally made. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence this petition with petitioner contending that the tax assessments were valid and that PD 1271 has a curative effect.

Issue: Whether or not PD 1271 can be applied retroactively

YES. Article 4 of the New Civil Code prohibits the retroactive application of laws unless expressly provided therein, such rule allows some exceptions and PD 1271 falls under one of the exceptions. The intent of PD 1271 is necessarily to make such titles valid from the time they were issued. This implies that the intent of the law is to recognize the effects of certain acts of ownership done in good faith by persons with Torrens titles issued in their favor before the cut-off date stated, honestly believing that they had validly acquired the lands. And such would be possible only by validating all the said titles issued before 31 July 1973, effective on their respective dates of issue. However, the validity of these titles would not become operative unless and after the conditions stated in PD 1271 are met.

Moore and Sons v Wagner Digest

Facts of the Case:

In the proceeding for settlement of the intestate estate of deceased Samuel Allen, his widow petitioner for provision of allowance for hreself and her daughter Avelina Allen amounting to P80.00. The Special Administrator appointed objected to the allowance requested on the ground that the estate is insolvent since the total claims presented against it amounts to P2,457.00 while the estate's balance only amounted to P870.97. 

The lower court approved the allowance citing Art. 1430 of the New Civil Code and Sec. 684 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the lower court's decision.

Issue: May a widow validly demand for support or allowance when the liabilities of the deceased's estate exceed its assets?

Ruling: No. Support cannot be granted if proved that there is no more property, private or conjugal, pertaining to the surviving spouses or heirs of the deceased since by virtue of Art. 1430 (NCC), support is only an advance payment on account of the respective share of each partner. In this case, it is indisputable that the deceased Samuel Allen's estate liabilities exceed the assets. Moreover, his widow admitted that she has not contributed to the property of marriage. As such, it is therefore unlawful to grant support when there is no property to be partitioned.

Bata Industries v CA Digest

G.R. No. L-53672, May 31, 1982

Facts: 

The respondent New Olympian Rubber Products sought to register the mark "BATA" for casual rubber shoe products, alleging it had used the said mark since the 1970s. The petitioner, a Canadian corporation opposed with its allegations that it owns and has not abandoned said trademark. The petitioner has no license to do business in the Philippines and the trademark has never been registered in the Philippines by any foreign entity. Bata Industries does not sell footwear under the said trademark in the Philippines nor does it have any licensing agreement with any local entity to sell its product.

Evidence show that earlier, even before the World War II, Bata shoes made by Gerbec and Hrdina (Czech company) were already sold in the country. Some shoes made by the petitioner may have been sold in the Philippines ntil 1948. On the other hand, respondent spent money and effort to popularize the trademark "BATA" since the 70's. Moreover, it also secures 3 copyright registrations for the word "BATA". The Philippine Patent Office (PPO) dismissed the opposition by the petitioner while the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed said decision. However, a 2nd resolution by the CA affirmed the PPO decision.

Issue: Does the petitioner have the right to protect its goodwill alleged to be threatened with the registration of the mark?

NO. Bata Industries has no Philippine goodwill that would be damaged by the registration of the mark.

Any slight goodwill obtained by the product before World War II was completely abandoned and lost in the more than 35 years that passed since Manila's liberation from Japan. The petitioner never used the trademark either before or after the war. It is also not the successor-in-interest of Gerbec & Hrdina and there there was no privity of interest between them, Furthermore, the Czech trademark has long been abandoned in Czechoslovakia.

Trans-Asia v CA Digest

G.R. No. 145428, July 7 2004

Facts of the Case: The petitioner and private respondents were embroiled in a labor dispute which unfortunately resulted to a strike and dismissal of several employees. In order to prevent further damage and halt work stoppage, the Secretary of Labor issued a reinstatement orders instructing the petitioner to readmit the dismissed employees under terms and conditions prevailing before the strikes. The petitioner contended that the subject reinstatement orders constitute a clear encroachment upon management's prerogatives.

Issue: Is the reinstatement order valid?

Ruling: The reinstatement order is valid as it was issued pursuant to Art. 263 of the Philippine Labor Code which empowers the Secretary of Labor to acquire jurisdiction over labor disputes involving an industry inimical to national interest. The maritime industry in which the context of this labor dispute occurs is clearly such and any disruption and work stoppage therein will adversely affect trade, commerce and transportation in the country. This is a clear legal basis for the exercise of the Secretary's power in this case. Moreover, management prerogative is not absolute and Art. 263 provided the limitation to the exercise of this prerogative. Under this provision, the Secretary of Labor is given great breath of discretion to provide solution to a labor dispute of this kind at the soonest. Hence, in this case, management prerogative must therefore give way to promote the general welfare.

Barzaga v CA Digest

G.R. No. 115129 February 12, 1997

Facts: 
The petitioner’s wife was suffering from a debilitating ailment and with forewarning of her impending death, she expressed her wish to be laid to rest before Christmas day to spare her family of the long vigils as it was almost Christmas. After his wife passed away, petitioner bought materials from herein private respondents for the construction of her niche. Private respondents however failed to deliver on agreed time and date despite repeated follow-ups. The niche was completed in the afternoon of the 27th of December, and Barzaga's wife was finally laid to rest. However, it was two-and-a-half (2-1/2) days behind schedule.

Issue: Was there delay in the performance of the private respondent's obligation?

Ruling: Yes. Since the respondent was negligent and incurred delay in the performance of his contractual obligations, the petitioner is entitled to be indemnified for the damage he suffered as a consequence of the delay or contractual breach. There was a specific time agreed upon for the delivery of the materials to the cemetery.

This is clearly a case of non-performance of a reciprocal obligation, as in the contract of purchase and sale, the petitioner had already done his part, which is the payment of the price. It was incumbent upon respondent to immediately fulfill his obligation to deliver the goods otherwise delay would attach. An award of moral damages is incumbent in this case as the petitioner has suffered so much.

Hickok v CA Digest

G.R. No. L-44707, August 31, 1982

Facts:

Petitioner is a foreign corporation and all its products are manufactures by Quality House Inc. The latter pays royalty to the petitioner. Hickok registered the trademark 'Hickok' earlier and used it in the sale of leather wallets, key cases, money folds, belts, men’s underwear, neckties, hankies, and men's socks. While Sam Bun Liong used the same trademark in the sale of Marikina shoes. Both products have different channels of trade. The Patent Office did not grant the registration, but the Court of Appeals reversed the PPO decision.

Issue: Is there infringement in this case?

NONE. Emphasis should be on the similarity of the products involves and not on the arbitrary classification or the general description of their properties or characteristics. Also, the mere fact that one person has adopted and used a trademark on his goods does not prevent the adoption and use of the same by others on unrelated articles of different kind.

There is a different design and coloring of the trademark itself. The 'Hickok' trademark is in red with white background in the middle of 2 branches of laurel (in light gold) while the one used by Sam Bun Liong is the word 'Hickok ' in white with gold background between 2 branches of laurel in red with the word 'shoes' also in red placed below the word 'Hickok'.

Hinlo v. Hinlo Digest

G.R. No. 170243 April 16, 2008 

Facts of the Case: 

Enrique Hinlo died intestate in 1986. His heirs, herein petitioners filed for letters of administration where the widow Ceferina was initially appointed as special administrator but was eventually replaced by Nancy Zayco and Remo Hinlo (as co-admin) due ot the illness of their mother.

In 2003, respondent Atty. Hinlo, the grandson of the deceased filed for a petition of issuance of letters in his favor and for the removal of the petitioners. This was opposed by the petitioners. The lower court revoked the appointment of the petitioners and issued letters of administration in favor of respondent wherein he was also required to file a bond.

The petitioners received the copy of the decision dated July 23 on August 2, 2002. They then file a Motion for reconsideration on August 9. The lower court (RTC) denied their motion in an order dated July 23, 2003. The petitioners received their copy of this decision on July 31, 2003 and submitted their record on appeal on the 29th of August 2003. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) denied the notice on appeal/record on appeal on the ground that the July 23 orders are interlocutory and not subject to appeal, and that they were also filed late. The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition for mandamus and affirmed RTC decision that the appeal was filed late.

Issue: Whether or not the July 23 orders are interlocutory

NO.

 (1)The July 23 orders are not interlocutory but final orders hence, are appealable. The order appointing an administrator of a deceased person's estate is a final determination of the rights of the parties in connection with the administration, management and settlement of the decedent’s estate.

(2) In appeals in special proceedings, a record on appeal is required. Both the notice and record should be field within the 30-day period from the receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Hence, the petitioner has until August 30 to file the appeal, so their appeals  was made on time. The CA decision was reversed and set aside. Petition is granted.

Esso Standard v CA Digest

G.R. No. L-29971

Facts of the Case: 

The petitioner Esso Standard is a foreign corporation duly licensed to do business in the philippines. it is engaged in the sale of petroleum products which are identified by the trademarl 'Esso'. Esso is a successor of Standard Vacuum Oil Co, it registered as a business name with the Bureau of Commerce in 1962. United Cigarette is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of cigarettes. it acquired the business from La Oriental Tobacco Corp including patent rights, once of which is the use of 'Esso' on its cigarettes.

The petitioner filed a trademark infringement case alleging that it acquired goodwill to such an extent that the buying public would be deceived as ti the quality and origin of the said products to the detriment and disadvantage of its own products. The lower court found United Cigarette guilty of infringement. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that there was no infringment in this case.

Issue: Is there infringement committed?

Ruling: NONE. Infringement is defined by law as the use without the consent of the trademark owner of any reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation of any registered mark or tradename which would likely cause confusion or mistake or deceive purchasers or others as to the source or origin of such goods.

The products of both parties (Petroleum and cigarettes) are non-competing. But as to whether trademark infringement exists depend on whether or not the goods are so related that the public may be or is actually deceived and misled that they come from the same maker. Under the Related Goods Theory, goods are related when they belong to the same class or have the same descriptive properties or when they have same physical attributes. In these case, the goods are absolutely different and are so foreign from each other it would be unlikely for purchasers to think that they came from the same source. Moreover, the goods flow from different channels of trade and are evidently different in kind and nature.

Sta.Ana v. Maliwat Digest

G.R. No. L-23023 August 31, 1968

Facts of the Case: 

In 1962, Florentino Maliwat sought to register the trademark "FLORMANN" used on shirts, pants, jackets and shoes for ladies men and children. He claimed its first use in commerce in 1955. Also in the same year (1962), Jose P. Sta. Ana (Petitioner) filed an application for the registration of the trademark "FLORMEN" (used in ladies and children shoes). he claimed its first use in commerce in 1959. Due to the confusing similarity , the Director of the Patent Office ordered an interference. Maliwat's application was then granted due to his prior adoption and use while that of Sta. Ana was denied. It was stipulated by the parties that 'Flormann' was used as a trademark in 1953 and Maliwat used it on shoes in 1962.

Issue: Was there any trademark infringement committed?

Ruling: YES. Both products of the parties have the same descriptive properties, thus its trademark must be protected.

The law does not require that the goods of the previous user and the late user of the same mark should possess the same descriptive properties or should fall into the same categories in order to bar the latter from registering his amrk. The meat of the matter is the likelyhood of confusion, mistake or deception upon the purchase of the goods of the parties. Herein, the similarity of the mark 'FLORMANN' and the name 'FLORMEN', as well as the likelihood of confusion is admitted. As such, Maliwat as prior adopter has a better right to use the mark.

Sebial v. Sebial Digest

G.R. No. L-23419

Facts of the Case:

 Gelacio Sebial died in 1943, he had 3 children with this 1st wife Reoncia (Roberta's mother) and 6 other children with his 2nd wife Dolores, (Benjamina's mother). In 1960, BEjamina filed for the settlement of her father's estate and her appointment as administrator. Thisd petition was oppsed by Roberta on the ground that said estate had already been apportioned and that she should be the one appointed as administrator and not Benjamina. The Court appointed Benjamina and found that alleged partition was invalid and ineffective. So the letters of administration were issued and a notice to the creditors was issue don the same date. The oppositors motion for reconsideration was denied. For the possibility of an amicale settlement, the court ordered both sides to give a complete list of the porperties of te decedent with segregation for each marriage.

On Nov. 1961, the lower court approved the administrator's inventory (second one) or six months from the appointment. Roberta them moved for the motion reocnsideration alleging as ground that the court has no jusridiction to approve the inventory as it was files beyiind the 3-month period. The Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Did the court lose jurisdiction to approve the inventory which was made 6 months after the appointment?

Ruling. NO. Under section 1 of Rule 83 of the Rules of Court, the prescribed three-month period is not mandatory. Once a petition for the issuance of letters of administration is filed with the proper court and the publication of the notice of hearing is complied with, said court acquires jurisdiction over the estate and retains such until the probate proceedings is closed. Hence, even if the inventory was filed only after the three-month period, this delay will not deprive the probate court of its jurisdiction to approve it. However, under section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court, such unexplained delay can be a ground for an administrator's removal.

Luzon Surety v Quebrar & Kilayko Digest

G.R. No. L-40517 January 31, 1984

Facts of the Case: 

Luzon Surety issued two administrator's bond in behalf of defendant Quebrar  as administrator of 2 estates (Chinsuy and Lipa). The plaintiff and both Quebrar and Kilayko bound themselves solidarily after executing an indemnity agreement where both the defendants agreed to pay the premiums every year. In the years 1954-55, the defendants paid the premiums and the documnetary stamps. In 1957, the Court  approved the project of partition, while in 1962, Luzon Surety demanded payments of premiums from 1955 onwards. It was also in the same year when the court granted the motion of the defendants to have both bonds cancelled. Hence, plaintiff file a case in the CFI. The court (CFI) allowed the plaintiff to recover since the bonds were in force and effect from the filing until 1962. The Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court on questions of law.

Issue: Are the bonds still in force and effect from 1955 to 1962?

Ruling. YES. Under Rule 81 (Sec.1) of the Rules of COurt, the administrator is required to put up a bond for the purpose of indemnifying creditors, heirs, legatees and the estate. It is conditioned uponthe faithful performance of the administrator's trust. Hence, the surety is then liable udner the administrator's bond.

Even after the approved project of partitio, Quebrar as administrator still had something to do. The administration is for the purpose of liquidation of the estate and the distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees. Liquidation means the determination of all the assets of the estate and the payment of all debts and expenses. it appears that there are still deblts and expenses to be paid after 1957.

Moreover, the bond stipulationdd not provide that it will terminate at the end of the 1st year if the premium remains unpaid. Hence, it does not necessariy extinguish or terminate the effectivity of the coutner bond in the absence of an express stipualtion to this effect. As such, as long as the defendant remains the administrator of the estate, the bond will be held liable and the plaintiff's liabilities subsist being the co-extensive with the administrator.

Lindain v CA Digest

Facts: 

Plaintiffs as minors, owned a parel of registered land which their mother (Dolores) as guardian, sold for P2,000.00 under a deed of absolute sale to the spouses Apolonia and Federico. The latter knew that the sale was without judicial approval but still proceeded with the transaction. The plaintiffs now contend that the sale is null and void as it was without the court's approval. The Regional trial Court ruled that the sale is indeed null and void, while upon appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) confirmed the sale as valid and dismissed the complaint. Hence this petition.

Issue: Does the sale by a guardian of a minor's property require judicial approval?

YES.

Under Art. 320 (NCC), a parent acting merely as a legal administrator of the property of his minor children does not have the power to dispose of or alienate the property of the said child without judicial approval. And under Rule 84 (Code of Civil Procedure), the powers and duties of the widow as legal administrator of her minor children's property are merely powers of possession and management. Hence, the power to sell, mortgage, encumber or dispose must proceed from the court (Rule 89). Moreover, the private respondent spouses are not purchasers in good faith as they knew right from the beginning the the transaction was without judicial approval. Further, the minors' action for reconveyance has not yet prescribed.

Usero v CA Digest

G.R. No. 152115, 26 January 2005

Property Law

Facts: This is a consolidated petition assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA). Petitioners and the private respondent are registered owners of neighboring parcels of land wherein between the lots is a low-level strip of land with stagnant body of water. Whenever there is a storm or heavy rain, the water therein would flood thereby causing damage to houses of the Polinars prompting them to build a concrete wall on the bank of the strip of land about 3meters from their house and riprapped the soil in that portion.

The Useros claimed ownership of the strip, demanded the halt of the construction but the Polinars never heeded believing that the strip is part of a creek. However, the Polinars offered to pay for the land. As the parties still failed to settle, both filed separate complaints for forcible entry. The Municipal Trial Court ruled in favor of the petitioner, while the regional trial court reversed and ordered the dismissal of the complaint and confirmed the existence of the creek between the lots.

Issue: Whether or not the disputed strip of land is part of the creek hence part of public domain

Held: YES. Art. 420 of the Philippine New Civil Code (NCC) provides for properties which are part of public domain. A creek is included in the phrase "and others of similar character". A creek, which refers to a recess or arm of a river is a property belonging to the public domain, therefore not susceptible of private ownership. Being a public water, it cannot be registered under the Torrens system under the name of any individual.

Sun Insurance v Asuncion Digest

G.R. Nos. 79937-38 February 13, 1989

Facts:

Petitioner Sun Insurance (or SIOL) files a complaint for the annulment of a decision on the consignation of fire insurance policy. Subsequently, the Private Respondent (PR) files a complaint for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment in a civil case against SIOL. In addition, PR also claims for damages, attorney’s fees, litigation costs, etc., however, the prayer did not state the amount of damages sought although from the body of the complaint it can be inferred to be in amount of P 50 million. Hence, PR originally paid only PhP 210.00 in docket fees.The complaint underwent a number of amendments to make way for subsequent re-assessments of the amount of damages sought as well as the corresponding docket fees. The respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required.

Issue: Did the Court acquire jurisdiction over the case even if private respondent did not pay the correct or sufficient docket fees?

YES.

It was held that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglamentary period. Same rule goes for permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings.

In herein case, obviously, there was the intent on the part of PR to defraud the government of the docket fee due not only in the filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of the second amended complaint. However, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering that, unlike in Manchester, the private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required.

Where a trial court acquires jurisdiction in like manner, but subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.

Faberge v IAC Digest

G.R. No. 71189, November 4, 1992

Facts of the Case:

Co Beng Kay applied for the registration of the trademark 'BRUTE' to be used it its underwear (briefs) products. The petitioner opposed on the ground that there is similarity with their own symbol (BRUT, Brut33 & Device) used on its aftershave, deodorant, cream shave, hairspray and hair shampoo/soaps and that it would cause injury to their business reputation. It must be noted that the petitioner never applied for registration of said trademark for its brief products. The Patent Office allowed Co Beng Kay the registration and this was further affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Issue: Is there confusing similarity between the challenged marks and that its use would likely cause confusion on the part of the purchasers?

HELD: NONE. Co Beng Kay may rightly appropriate the mark. In this case Sec. 20 (Philippine Intellectual Property Law) is controlling. The certificate of registration issued confers the exclusive right to use its own symbol only to those goods specified by the first user in the certificate, subject to any conditions or limitations stated therein. Moreover, the two products are so dissimilar that a purchaser of one (a brief) would not be misled or mistaken into buying the other (such as an aftershave).

Mindanao Bus Co. v. City Assessor Digest

G.R. No. L-17870 29 September 1962

Facts: Petitioner is a public utility company engaged in the transport of passengers and cargo by motor vehicles in Mindanao with main offices in Cagayan de Oro (CDO). Petitioner likewise owned a land where it maintains a garage, a repair shop and blacksmith or carpentry shops. The machineries are placed thereon in wooden and cement platforms. The City Assessor of CDO then assessed a P4,400 realty tax on said machineries and repair equipment. Petitioner appealed to the Board of Tax Appeals but it sustained the City Assessor's decision, while the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) sustained the same.

Note: This is merely a case digest to aid in remembering the important points of a case. It is still advisable for any student of law to read the full text of assigned cases.

Issue: Whether or not the machineries and equipments are considered immobilized and thus subject to a realty tax

Held: The Supreme Court decided otherwise and held that said machineries and equipments are not subject to the assessment of real estate tax.

Said equipments are not considered immobilized as they are merely incidental, not esential and principal to the business of the petitioner. The transportation business could be carried on without repair or service shops of its rolling equipment as they can be repaired or services in another shop belonging to another
.

Juan Nakpil and Sons v. CA Digest

G.R. No. L-47851 October 3, 1986

Facts of the Case:

The private respondent (Philippine Bar Association) hired the services of the petitioner to make the plans and specifications for the construction of their office building. The building was completed by the contractor but subsequently, an earthquake struck causing its partial collapse and damage.

Issue: Is the petitioner liable for damages in this case?

HELD: Yes. The petitioner made substantial deviations from the plans and specifications and failed to observe requisite workmanship standards in the construction of the building while their architect drew plans that contain defects and other inadequacies. Both the contractor and the architect cannot escape liability for damages when the building collapsed due to an earthquake. Other buildings in the area withstood the tremor. The lower court also found that the spirals in one of the columns in the ground floor has been cut. One who creates a dangerous condition cannot escape liability even if an act of God may have intervened as in this case. As such, the liability of the contractor (herein petitioner) and the architect for the collapse of the building is solidary.

Balucanag v Francisco Digest

Facts of the Case:

The petitioner bought a lot owned by Mrs. Charvet which was then previously leased by the latter to one Richard Stohner. The said lease contract provided that the lessee may erect structures and improvements which shall remain as lessee's property and he may remove them at any time. It further provided that should the lessee fail to remove the same structures or improvements withing two months after the expiration of the lease, the lessor may remove them or cause them to be removed at the expense of the lessee. Stohner made fillings on the land and constructed a house. When he failed to pay the rent, the petitioner, through counsel, sent Stohner a demand letter ordering him to vacate the lot. The lessee contended that he is a 'builder in good faith.'

Issue: Is the lessee a builder in good faith?

Ruling: No, the lessee cannot be considered a builder in good faith. The provision under Art. 448 of the New Civil Code (Philippine) on a builder of good faith applies only to the owner of the land who believes he is the rightful owner thereof, but not to a lessee who's interest in the land is derived only from a rental contract. Neither can Stohner be considered a 'possessor in good faith'. A possessor in good faith is a party who possesses property believing that he is its rightful owner but discovers later on a flaw in his title that could indicate that he might not be its legal owner. It cannot apply to a lessee because he knows right from the start that he is merely a lessee and not the owner of the premises.

As a mere lessee, he introduces improvements to the property at his own risk such that he cannot recover from the owner the reimbursements nor he has any right to retain the premises until reimbursements. What applies in this case is Art. 1678 (NCC) which provides that, " if the lessee, makes, in good faith, useful improvements which are suitable to the use for which the lease is intended, without altering the form or substance of the property leased, the lessor upon the termination of the lease shall pay the lessee 1/2 of the value of the improvements at the time. Should the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, the lessee may remove the improvements even though the principal thing may suffer damage thereby. He shall not. however, cause any more impairment upon the property leased than is necessary."

Phil Refining v, Ng Sam Digest

Phil. Refining Co. v. Ng Sam and Director of Patents G.R. No. L-26676, July 30, 1982

Facts of the Case: The petitioner Philippine Refining Co. first used'Camia' as trademark for its products in 1922. In 1949, it caused the registration of the said trademark for its lard, butter, cooking oil, detergents, polishing materials and soap products. In 1960, Ng Sam filed an application for 'Camia' for its ham product (Class 47), alleging its first use in 1959. The petitioner opposed the said application but the Patent Office allowed the registration of Ng Sam.

Issue: Is the product of Ng Sam (Ham) and those of the petitioner so related that the use of the trademark 'Camia' on said goods would result to confusion as to their origin?

HELD: NO. The businesses of the parties are non-competitive and the products are so unrelated that the use of the same trademark will not give rise to confusion nor cause damage to the petitioner. The right to a trademark is a limited one, hence, others may use the same mark on unrelated goods if no confusion would arise.

A trademark is designed to identify the user, hence, it should be so distinctive and sufficiently original so as to enable those who see it to recognize instantly its source or origin. A trademark must be affirmative and definite, significant and distinctive and capable of indicating origin.

'Camia' as a trademark is far from being distinctive, It in itself does not identify the petitioner as the manufacturer of producer of the goods upon which said mark is used. If a mark is so commonplace, it is apparent that it can't identify a particular business and he who adopted it first cannot be injured by any subsequent appropriation or imitation by others and the public will not be deceived.

Mere classification of the goods cannot serve as the decisive factor in the resolution of whether or not the goods a related. Emphasis should be on the similarity of products involved and not on arbitrary classification of general description of their properties or characteristics.

Tibay v. CA Digest

Tibay, et. al v Court of Appeals

GR No. 119655, 24 May 1996

Bellosillo, [J.]

Facts:

1.       In January 22 1987, the Petitioner Violeta Tibay (and Nicolas Roralso) obtained a fire insurance policy for their 2-storey from the Private Respondent Fortune Life Insurance Co. The said policy covers the period from January 23, 1987 until January 23, 1988 or one year for P600, 000 and at the agreed premium of P2, 983.50. On January 23 or the next day, petitioner made a partial payment of the premium with P600. 

2.       Unfortunately, on March 8 1987, the said building was burned to the ground. It was only two days after the fire that Petitioner Violeta advanced the full payment of the policy premium which was accepted by the insurer. On this same day, petitioner likewise filed the claim that was then referred to the insurer's adjuster. Investigation of the cause of fire commenced and the petitioner submitted the required proof of loss.

3.       Despite that, the private respondent Fortune refused to pay the insurance claim saying it as not liable due to the non-payment by petitioner of the full amount of the premium as stated in the policy.

4.       The petitioner then brought the matter to the Insurance Commission but nothing good came out. Hence this case filed.

5.       The trial court rule in favor of the petitioner. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's decision and held that Fortune is not liable but ordered it to return the premium paid with interest to the petitioner. Hence, this petition for review.

Issue: W/N the partial payment of the premium rendered the insurance policy ineffective?

 YES.

1.       Insurance is a contract whereby one undertakes for a consideration to indemnify another against loss, damage or liability arising from an unknown or contingent event. The consideration is the premium, which must be paid at the time, way and manner as stated in the policy, and if not so paid as in this case, the policy is therefore forfeited by its own terms. In this case, the policy taken out by the petitioner provides for payment of premium in full. Since the petitioner only made partial payment with the remaining balance paid only after the fire or peril insured against has occurred, the insurance contract therefore did not take effect barring the insured from claiming or collecting from the loss of her building. 

2.       Under Section 77 of the Insurance Code (Philippine), it provides therein that "An insurer is entitled to payment of the premium as soon as the thing insured is exposed to the peril insured against. Notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, no policy or contract of insurance issued by an insurance company is valid and binding unless and until the premium thereof has been paid, except in the case of a life or an industrial life policy whenever the grace period provision applies." Herein case, the controversy is on the payment of the premium. It cannot be disputed that premium is the elixir vitae of the insurance business because the insurer is required by law to maintain a reserve fund to meet its contingent obligations to the public. Due to this, it is imperative that the premium is paid fully and promptly. To allow the possibility of paying the premium even after the peril has ensued will surely undermine the foundation of the insurance business.