Rubi vs. Provincial Board Digest

Rubi v. Provincial Board

39 Phil 660

Facts:

The Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted a resolution which required all Mangyans to stay in one permanent settlement. The said resolution was approved by the Secretary of Interior as required under Sec. 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code. This provision authorized the establishment of non-Christian sites to be selected by the provincial governor. Sec. 2145 of the RAC is now herein assailed on ground that it is an unlawful delegation of legislative power to the provincial officials.

Issue: Whether or not Sec. 2145 of the RAC is valid

The provision is valid, as an exception to the general rule. The legislature is permitted to delegate legislative powers to the local authorities on matters that are of purely local concerns.

People vs. Manalo Digest 219 SCRA 656

People v. Manalo

G.R.Nos. 96123-24 March 8, 1993

Melo, J.:

Object Evidence

Facts:

1. Accused Rolando Manalo  for shooting one Warlito Bonillo and one Carlito Diomampo with an unlicensed pistol Colt Caliber .45.

2. The conviction was the result of the filing of two (2) amended informations. The accused pleaded not guilty. After trial on the merits the accused was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder in relation to PD 1728.

3. Witness Carlos Lacbay narrated that at about 5PM of Nov. 29, 1989 he visited one of the victims, Diomampo, in the latter's house where they conversed over some wine and camote regarding the latter's interest in buying a motorcycle. After 2 hours, witness Lacbay decided to leave, while Diomampo and a brother-in-law offered to accompany him home. After this, Lacbay rode on his service motorcycle while Diomampo and the other person (Bonilla) rode in tandem in their own motocycle.

4. When the group arrived at Bgy. San Rafael in San Pablo City at about 7 pm, and parked their motorcycles, accused Manalo (an acquaintance of both victims) arrived and invited the victims to his house for some drinks. The two acceded after insisting that Lacbay would go as he did, with them. As they were walking to accused house, Bonilla and Diamampao walked ahead, with accused following close by and Lacbay behind the latter.

5. After the victims entered the house of accused, the latter suddenly drew a .45 Caliber gun and shot Diomampo once in the head and then Bonilla on the temple about 3 meters from behind. Both died immediately, nevertheless, accused fired another shot at Diomampo. Lacbay who saw everything was so shocked. The accused told him that he shot both because Diomampo had impregnated his daughter, Dina Manalo. After this, accused asked Lacbay to dig, to which the latter refused. Finally, accused asked him not to leave the place as he would look for someone to do the digging. Lacbay took this chance to flee the scene. Subsequently, both the bodies of Bonilla and Diomampo were found buried in a shallow pit under the 'banggerahan' of accused' house.

6. The defense maintains the innocence of Manalo, arguing that he is merely a witness to the crime perpetrated by two unknown assailants. According to the defense' version of the story, it was these two unknown persons who killed both victims. Accordingle, the assailants were already waiting in the area for  Bonilla and Diomampo, then thereafter shot them.

RULING:

The court had examined the evidence and it found that it supported the judgement of the lower court.The accused banks on the alleged absence of physical evidence showing that accused fired a gun. The court held that this circumstance did not prove his innocence since even if a paraffin test would yield a negative result, it is still possible for one to have fired a gun and washed his hands thereafter.The court also recognized the great possibility that there will be no paraffin traces left in the hands when a bullet was fired from a .45 Caliber pistol, as held in the case of People vs. Rebullar (188 SCRA 838).

Finally, the lone witness to the crime, Lacbay has positively identified Manalo as the sole perpetrator of the killing. Lacbay can never be said to be a prejudiced witness since he had no other motive nor misunderstanding to maliciously testify against Manalo. The little delay in reporting the killings to the authorities was due to the shock, confusion and fear of Lacbay and that he had to wait ans consult with a relative who was a member of the Philippine marines.

More importantly, the accused Manalo has executed an extrajudicial statement admitting the killings but which he later on withdrew during the trial. Accused adopted two irreconciliable stands that is actually the heart of the case, rendering him unworthy of credit and belief. Accused also wrote several letters, one to Mr. Marcela Bonilla offering money as settlement for the death of the two victims and then to Fiscal Escondo requesting him no to charge murder but only homicide as he had no intention to kill the victims. In one of these letters, he even asked forgiveness for  the crime he had committed.

Dison v. Posadas Digest

Dison v. Posadas

G.R. No. 36770 November 4, 1932

Butte, J.:

Facts:

1. Plaintiff Luis Dison filed a suit against CIR to recover inheritance tax paid under protest amounting to P2,808.73. Felix Dison, plaintiff's father executed  a deed of gift which transferred 22 tracts of land, reserving to himself during his lifetime the usufruct of 3 tracts. The donation was formally accepted by plaintiff.

2. The plaintiff (herein petitioner) alleged in his complaint that the tax is illegal since he received the property by a deed of gift inter vivos duly accepted and registered before the death of his father. He also contended that Act 2601 being an inheritance tax statute, does not tax gifts. The defendant answered in general denial with a countermand. The court dismissed the countermand. Both sides appealed, but the CIR appeal was dismissed.

Issue: Whether or not the gifts inter vivos are taxable (inheritance tax)

YES.

Inheritance tax is imposed upon the gift inter vivos that plaintiff received from his father as this was really an advancement upon the inheritance to which he would be entitled upon the death of the latter. Sec. 1540 of the Administrative Code did not tax gifts per se but only those which are made to those who shall prove to be heirs, devisees, legatees and donees mortis causa of the donor. The term 'heirs' include those given the status of heirs irrespective of the quantity of property they may receive as such.

Vidal de Roces vs. Posadas Digest

Vidal de Roces v. Posadas

G.R. No. 34937 March 13, 1933

Imperial, J.:

Facts:

1. Sometime in 1925, plaintiffs Concepcion Vidal de Roces and her husband, as well as one Elvira Richards, received as donation several parcels of land from Esperanza Tuazon. They took possession of the lands thereafter and likewise obtained the respective transfer certificates.

2.The donor died a year after without leaving any forced heir. In her will, which was admitted to probate, she bequeathed to each of the donees the sum of P5,000. After the distribution of the estate but before the delivery of their shares, the CIR (appellee) ruled that plaintiffs as donees and legatees should pay inheritance taxes. The plaintiffs paid the taxes under protest.

3. CIR filed a demurrer on ground that the facts alleged were not sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The court sustained the demurrer and ordered the amendment of the complaint but the appellants failed to do so. Hence, the trial court dismissed the action on ground that plaintiffs, herein appellants, did not really have a right of action.

4. Plaintiffs (appellant) contend that  Sec. 1540 of the Administrative Code does not include donation inter vivos and if it does, it is unconstitutional, null and void for violating SEC. 3 of the Jones Law (providing that no law shall embrace more than one subject and that the subject should be expressed in its titles ; that the Legislature has no authority to tax donation inter vivos; finally, that said provision violates the rule on uniformity of taxation.

5. CIR however contends that the word 'all gifts'  refer clearly to donation inter vivos and cited the doctrine in Tuason v. Posadas.

Issue: Whether or not the donations should be subjected to inheritance tax

YES. Sec. 1540 of the Administrative Code clearly refers to those donation inter vivos that take effect immediately or during the lifetime of the donor, but made in consideration of the death of the decedent. Those donations not made in contemplation of the decedent's death are not included as it would be equivalent to imposing a direct tax on property and not on its transmission.

The  phrase 'all gifts' as held in Tuason v. Posadas refers to gifts inter vivos as they are considered as advances in anticipation of inheritance since they are made in consideration of death.

Moran Sison v. Teodoro Digest

Moran Sison vs. Teodoro

G.R. No. L-9271 March 29, 1957

Bautista Angelo, J.:

Facts:

1. The CFI of Manila which had jurisdiction over the estate of Margarita David, issued an order appointing appellantCarlos Moran Sison as judicial administrator without compensation after filing a bond. After entering into his duties as administrator, he filed an accounting of his administration which included items as an expense of administration the premiums he paid on his bond.

2. One of the heirs, herein appellee Narcisa Teodoro, objected to the approval of the items. The court approved the report but disallowed the items objected to on the ground that these cannot be considered as expenses of administration. Moran Sison filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not an executor or judicial administrator can validly charge the premiums on his bond as an expense of administration against the estate

NO.

The premiums paid by an executor or administrator serving without a compensation for his bond cannot be charged against the estate. Further Sec. 7 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court  does not authorize the executor or administrator to charge to the estate the money spent for the bond. As held in the case of Sulit v. Santos (56 Phil 626), the position of an executor or administrator is one of trust. The law safeguards the estates of deceased persons by making as a requirement for qualification the ability to give a suitable bond. The execution of said bond is therefore a condition precedent to acceptance of the responsibilities of the trust.

Further, the giving of the bond is not a necessary expense in the care, management, and settlement of the estate within the meaning of Sec. 680 of the Civil Code of Procedure, since such are the requirements after the executor or administrator has already qualified for the office and has entered the performance of his duties.

FEBTC v. Pacilan Digest

Far East Bank vs. Pacilan

G.R. 157314 July 29, 2005

Callejo Sr, J.:

Facts:

1. Pacilan maintains a current account with petitioner bank (now BPI). He issued several postdated checks, the last one being check no. 2434886 amounting to P680. The said check was presented to petitioner bank for payment on April 4, 1988 but was dishonored. It appeared that the account of Pacilan has been closed on the evening of April 4 on the ground that it was 'improperly handled'.

2. It appeared that the plaintiff issued four checks from March 30 - April 4, 1988 amounting in total to P7,410, on one hand, his funds in the bank only amounted to P6,981.43, thus an overdraft of P 428.57 resulted therefrom. Consequently, the last check was dishonored despite the fact that plaintiff deposited the amount the following day.

3. Pacilan wrote a complaint to the bank but after the bank did not reply, he filed an action for damages against it and the employee (Villadelgado) who closed the account. The plaintiff alleged that the immediate closure of his account was malicious and intended to embarrass him.

4. The lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and awarded actual damages (P100,000) and exemplary damages (P50,000). The bank appealed, but the CA affirmed the lower court's decision with modifications and held that the closure of the bank of plaintiff's account despite its rules and regulation allowing a re-clearing of a check returned for insufficiency of funds, is patently malicious and unjustifiable. Hence, this appeal.

5.  The petitioner contended that in closing the account, it acted in good faith and in accordance with the pertinent banking rules and regulations governing the operations of a regular demand deposit, allowing it to close an account if the depositor frequently draws checks against insufficient funds or uncollected deposits.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is liable for damages

NO. The award of damages under Art. 19 of the Civil Code is unjustifiable. The petitioner has the right to close the account of plaintiff based on the rules and regulations on regular demand deposits. The facts do not show that the petitioner abused its rights in the exercise of its duties. The evidence negates the existence of bad faith and malice on the part of the petitioner bank, which are the second and third elements necessary to prove an abuse of right in violation of Art. 19.

The records also showed that indeed plaintiff has mishandled his account by issuing checks previously against insufficient funds not just once, but more than a hundred times.

Moreover, the acceptance by the bank of the deposit the day after the closure of the account cannot be considered as bad faith nor done with malice but a mere simple negligence of its personnel.

As a result, whatever damage the plaintiff has suffered (by virtue of the subsequent dishonor of the other checks he issued) should be borne by him alone as these was the result of his own act in irregularly handling his account.

Bank of America v. PRC Digest

Bank of America vs. Philippine Racing Club

G.R. 150228  July 30, 2009

Ponente: Leonardo-De Castro, J:

Facts:

1. Plaintiff PRCI is a domestic corporation which maintains a current account with petitioner Bank of America. Its authorized signatories are the company President and Vice-President. By virtue of a travel abroad for these officers, they pre-signed checks to accommodate any expenses that may come up while they were abroad for a business trip. The said pre-signed checks were left for safekeeping by PRCs accounting officer. Unfortunately, the two (2) of said checks came into the hands of one of its employees who managed to encash it with petitioner bank. The said check was filled in with the use of a check-writer, wherein in the blank for the 'Payee', the amount in words was written, with the word 'Cash' written above it.

2. Clearly there was an irregularity with the filling up of the blank checks as both showed similar infirmities and irregularities and yet, the petitioner bank did not try to verify with the corporation and proceeded to encash the checks.

3. PRC filed an action for damages against the bank. The lower court awarded actual and exemplary damages. On appeal, the CA affirmed the lower court's decision and held that the bank was negligent. Hence this appeal. Petitioner contends that it was merely doing its obligation under the law and contract in encashing the checks, since the signatures in the checks are genuine.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can be held liable for negligence and thus should pay damages to PRC

Both parties are held to be at fault but the bank has the last clear chance to prevent the fraudulent encashment hence it is the one foremost liable .

1. There was no dispute that the signatures in the checks are genuine but the presence of irregularities on the face of the check should have alerted the bank to exercise caution before encashing them. It is well-settled that banks are in the business impressed with public interest that they  are duty bound to protect their clients and their deposits at all times.  They must treat the accounts of these clients with meticulousness and a highest degree of care considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship. The diligence required of banks are more than that of a good father of a family.

2. The PRC officers' practice of pre-signing checks is a seriously negligent and highly risky behavior which makes them also contributor to the loss. It's own negligence must therefore mitigate the petitioner's liability. Moreover, the person who stole the checks is also an employee of the plaintiff, a cleck in its accounting department at that. As the employer, PRC supposedly should have control and supervision over its own employees.

3. The court held that the petitioner is liable for 60% of the total amount of damages while PRC should shoulder 40% of the said amount.

BPI v. Suarez Digest

G.R. No. 167750

March 15, 2010

Carpio, J.:

Facts:

1. Reynaldo Suarez is a lawyer who used to maintain both savings and current account with petitioner in its Ermita branch. Sometime in 1997, respondent had a client who wanted to buy several parcels  of land in Tagaytay but the latter did not want to deal directly with the owners of said land. 

2. Suarez and his client entered into an agreement where the former will be the one to purchase the lands. Both likewise agreed that the client would deposit money in Suarez' BPI account and thereafter, he would issue the checks for the sellers.

3. The client deposited a check with BPI branch. Aware that a check has 3-days clearing time, Suarez' assistant called the bank which confirmed that the said amount had been credited to his account on that same day. Relying on this confirmation, Suarez issued five (5) checks in the name of the sellers. Unfortunately, all checks were dishonored due to insufficient funds. A penalty amounting P57,000 was also debited from his account. The checks were dishonored despite the assurance by RCBC, the drawee bank that the amount has been debited from the account of the drawee. 

4. On top of this, the bank noted on the checks 'DAIF' (drawn against insufficient fund) and not 'DAUD''  (drawn against uncollected deposit). The bank offered to reverse the penalty but denied Suarez claim for damages. Suarez rejected this offer hence the case filed for damages.

5. The lower court ruled in favor of Suarez and awarded actual, moral, and exemplary damages. BPI appealed but the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court ruling. The CA ruled that the bank was negligent in handling the accounts of the respondent hence the latter's entitlement to damages. Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner bank is liable for its negligence in handling the respondent's account

1. No, BPI was not negligent because it was justified in dishonoring the checks for lack of sufficient funds in Suarez account. There was no sufficient evidence to prove that BPI conclusively confirmed the same-day crediting of the amount of the check to Suarez account. While BPI has the discretion to disregard the 3-day clearing policy, Suarez failed to prove his entitlement to such privilege. 

2. The award of actual damages is without basis since BPI is justified in dishonoring the checks for being drawn against uncollected deposit, hence BPI can rightfully impose the said penalty charges against Suarez' account.

3. The award of moral damages has no basis because Suarez failed to prove that his claimed injury was proximately caused by the erroneous marking of the 'DAIF' on the checks.

4. Suarez is however entitled to nominal damages due to BPI's failure to exercise the diligence required as the bank's business is deemed to be affected with public interest. The bank must at all times maintain a high level of meticulousness and should guard against injury attributableto negligence or bad faith on its part. Suarez therefore has the right to expect a high level of care and and diligence from BPI.

Sample Authorization Letter to Pick-up An Official Document

                                                                                      Date

Office or Government Agency

Address

AUTHORIZATION LETTER

To Whom It May Concern:

This is to authorize (Name of Person to be Authorized) to act in my behalf to pick up the (Certificate/Document to be picked-up)  for (Company you represent.)

Attached is my Identification card for your reference.

Name of the Company Officer authorizing the pick-up

Position

City Trust Bank v. Cruz Digest

G.R. No. 157049

August 11, 2010

Bersamin, J.:

Facts:

1. Respondent Carlos Romulo Cruz, an architect and a businessman, maintained both current and savings account with the petitioner bank in their Loyola Heights Branch. Due to an oversight by its bank employee, the savings account of respondent was closed. This resulted to extreme embarrassment of the respondent when checks he issued could not be honored despite the fact that his savings account has sufficient funds. 

2. Unmoved by the apologies and adjustments made by the bank, respondent filed a complaint for damages before the RTC wherein the said court awarded exemplary damages (P100,000) and moral damages (P20,000) plus attorneys fees. The bank appealed to the CA, but CA affirmed the lower court's decision. The Court of Appeals said that the erroneous closure of the respondent's account would not have occurred if the bacnk had not been careless in supervising its employees. Moreover, the CA explained that the negligence of the bank's personnel was the proximate cause of the damage to the respondent. The CA also denied the bank's motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal.

3. Petitioner contends that there were decisive situation facts showing excusable negligence and good faith that did not justify the award of damages.

Issue: Whether or not the bank is liable for the damages caused to the respondent

YES. The petition has no merit. 

1. The petitioner as a banking institution has the direct obligation to supervise closely its employees handling its depositors' account. It should always be mindful of the fiduciary nature of its relationship with the depositors which require it and its employees to record accurately every single transaction, considering that the depositor's account should always reflect the amounts of money the depositors could dispose of as they saw fit. If the bank fell short of this obligation, it should bear the responsibility for the consequences to the depositors, who, like the herein respondent, suffered embarrassment due to the negligence in the handling of his account. 

2. Moreover, in several court decisions, banks are made liable for negligence even without sufficient proof of malice or bad faith and awarded damages each time to the suing depositors in proper consideration of their reputation and social standing. 

3. Finally, it is never overemphasized that the public always relies on a bank's profession of diligence and meticulousness in rendering service. Its failure to exercise such warrants its liability for exemplary damages and reasonable attorney's fees.

Affidavit of Loss of Mayor's Permit or Other Official Document

For those looking for a simple Affidavit of Loss for business documents such as Permit or any other business documentation issued for your company, the sample Affidavit form below may help.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES    )

CITY OF/MUN. OF  __________               ))    S.S.

AFFIDAVIT OF LOSS

I, ____(insert your name here)__, Filipino, of legal age, married/single and with residence at (insert your business address here), after having been duly sworn in accordance with law, hereby depose and state THAT:

1.      I am the (insert your position) of  (insert your company/corporation’s name here), a corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of the Philippines;

2.      That being registered with the BIR/Office of/etc., the (Company name or Corporation)  has been issued a  (insert kind of document lost here) ;

3.      That sometime in (date when permit/official document was lost), the original copy of the said (name of Permit/Official Document) could not be found and that despite diligent search and efforts, the same could no longer be found, such that I believe it is now lost beyond recovery;

4.      As such, I am executing this Affidavit of Loss to attest to the truth of the foregoing and for whatever legal purposes that this may serve.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this ____ day of ________, 20__ at _____________, Philippines.



                                                              Name of Affiant (signature above written name)
                                                                             AFFIANT

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)

CITY OF __________              ) ) S.S

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this ____ day of (month), 20___ at (City/Municipality), affiant exhibiting to me his valid government-issued identification no. _______________ issued at _________________ and valid until ______________.

                                                                                      Notary Public

                                                                                      Until 31 December 20___

                                                                                      PTR No. __________

                                                                                      Issued at: __________

                                                                                      Issued on: __________

                                                                                      TIN No. ___________

Doc. No. _______

Page No. _______

Book No. _______

Series of ________

New Updates: Blog Will Have a Section on Legal Forms

Starting today, the "Laws and Found Blog" will be updated with simple legal forms. Hopefully, this will help people and organizations in drafting simple forms for their use. It is still best to consult a lawyer to come up with one that fits your specific needs.


These great Amazon buys may just be what you are looking for in drafting those Legal Forms.

Van Dorn v. Romillo Digest

Van Dorn vs Romillo
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

Ponente: Melencio-Herrera, J.:

Facts:

After a divorce was granted by a United States court between petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipina and her American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial court here in the Philippines alleging that the her business was conjugal property and praying that she be ordered to render an accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business.

Issue: Whether or not the divorce is valid 

YES. 

There can be no question as to the validity of the Nevada divorce in any of the States of the US. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. Owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. The divorce is likewise valid as to the petitioner.

As such, pursuant to his national law, he is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He has no standing to sue as husband of the petitioner over their conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before his own country's court from asserting that right to exercise control over their conjugal assets.

BPI v. Santiago Digest

G.R. No. 169116 March 28, 2007

Ponente: Chico-Nazario, J.:

Service of Summons

Facts:

1. Centrogen, a domestic corporation engaged in pharmaceutical business obtained several loans from Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC), which was secured by a real estate mortage over a parcel of land by Irene Santiago. Subsequently, FEBTC merged with BPI. Due to failure of Centrogen to pay its loans, 

BPI filed a case for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage over the subject property before the RTC of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. Thereafter, a Notice of Sale was issued by the Provincial Sheriff on 21 January 2003. On the same day, the Spouses Santiago were served with the copy of the Notice of Sale.Upon receipt the spouses and Centrogen filed a Complaint seeking the issuance of a TRO and Preliminary and Final Injunction and in the alternative, for the annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage with BPI.

2. The complaint alleged that the initial loan obligation in the amount of P490,000.00, including interest thereon has been fully paid. Such payment notwithstanding, the amount was still included in the amount of computation of the arrears as shown by the document of Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage filed by the latter. Moreover, the Spouses Santiago and Centrogen contended that the original loan agreement was for the amount of 5 Million  but only 2 Million was released by petitioner and as a result, the squalene project failed and the company groped for funds to pay its loan obligations.

3. On 27 February 2003, BPI was summoned to file and serve its Answer and on the same day, summons was served on the Branch Manager of BPI . Instead of filing an Answer, BPI filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and other procedural infirmities attendant to the filing of the complaint. BPI claimed that the Branch Manager of its Sta. Cruz, Laguna Branch, was not one of those authorized by Section 11, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court to receive summons on behalf of the corporation. The summons served upon its Branch Manager, therefore, did not bind the corporation.  Also alleged lack of authorityof the person who signed. RTC denied the MD and issued new summons. 

4. The RTC granted the TRO to prevent foreclosure sale. BPI file MR but was denied hence this petition with BPI alleging that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over its person and consequently, the Order issued by the RTC, permanently enjoining the foreclosure sale, was therefore void and does not bind BPI.

Issue: Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over BPI

YES. The Court acquired jurisdiction over BPI. The defect of the service of the original summons was cured by the issuance of the new summons which was not questioned by BPI.

1. There was substantial compliance. Although it may be true that the service of summons was made on a person not authorized to receive the same in behalf of the petitioner. Since it appears that the summons and complaint were in fact received by the corporation through its said clerk, the Court finds that there was substantial compliance with the rule on service of summons. 

2. The ultimate test on the validity and sufficiency on service of summons is whether the same and the attachments thereto where ultimately received by the corporation under such circumstances that no undue prejudice is sustained by it from the procedural lapse and it was afforded full opportunity to present its responsive pleadings. This is but in accord with the entrenched rule that the ends of substantial justice should not be subordinated to technicalities and, for which purpose, each case should be examined within the factual milieu peculiar to it.

3. The Court also emphasized that there is no hard and fast rule pertaining to the manner of service of summons. Rather, substantial justice demands that every case should be viewed in light of the peculiar circumstances attendant to each.

Philamgen v. Breva Digest

Facts:

1. Respondent Milagros P. Morales filed a Complaint for damages and reimbursement of insurance premiums at RTC Davao against the petitioner Philamgen, a domestic corporation. The complaint specifically stated that the petitioner could be served with summons and other court processes through its Manager at its branch office located at Rizal St., Davao City.

2. Thereafter, Summons was served upon the petitioner's Davao regional office, and was received by its Insurance Service Officer.

3. In December 8, 1999, the petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over its person due to improper service of summons. It contended that summons was improperly served upon its employee in its regional office at Davao City, and that the said employee was not among those named in Section 11, Rule 14 upon whom service of summons may be properly made.The respondent filed an Amended Complaint, alleging that summons and other court processes could also be served at its principal office at the Philamlife Building, U.N. Avenue, Ermita, Manila, through the president or any of its officers authorized to receive summons.

4. The RTC denied the MD and directed the issuance of alias summons on its branch in Manila. the petitioner filed with the CA a special action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65, with application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, assailing the Orders dated December 10, 1999 and January 14, 2000.

5. On October 24, 2000, the CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the assailed orders of the RTC. The CA held that the service of the alias summons on the amended complaint upon the authorized officers of the petitioner at its principal office in Manila vested the RTC with jurisdiction over its person. The CA, likewise, denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said decision on April 25, 2001.

6. Hence, this petition for review, with petitioner averring that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over its person because the service of the summons at its regional office through an insurance service officer was improper.

Issue:  Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner as the defendant therein despite the amendment of the complaint

YES. 

1. Where the defendant has already been served summons on the original complaint, the amended complaint may be served upon him without need of another summons.  Conversely, when no summons has yet been validly served on the defendant, new summons for the amended complaint must be served on him

2. The complaint was amended after the petitioner filed the motion to dismiss.  The Rules provide that the amended complaint supersedes the complaint that it amends. Contrary to the petitioner’s claim, the summons issued on the amended complaint does not become invalid. In fact, summons on the original complaint which has already been served continues to have its legal effect. 

3. It is not pertinent whether the summons is designated as an “original” or an “alias” summons as long as it has adequately served its purpose. What is essential is that the summons complies with the requirements under the Rules of Court and it has been duly served on the defendant together with the prevailing complaint. In this case, the alias summons satisfies the requirements under the Rules, both as to its content and the manner of service. It contains all the information required under the rules, and it was served on the persons authorized to receive the summons on behalf of the petitioner at its principal office in Manila. Moreover, the second summons was technically not an alias summons but more of a new summons on the amended complaint. It was not a continuation of the first summons considering that it particularly referred to the amended complaint and not to the original complaint.

Signetics Corp. v. CA Digest

G.R. No. 105141 August 31, 1993

Ponente: Vitug, J.:

Service of Summons on Foreign Corporations

Facts:

1. The petitioner, Signetics was organized under the laws of the United States of America. Through Signetics Filipinas Corporation (SigFil), a wholly-owned subsidiary, Signetics entered into lease contract over a piece of land with Fruehauf Electronics Phils., Inc. (Freuhauf). 

2. Freuhauf sued Signetics for damages, accounting or return of certain machinery, equipment and accessories, as well as the transfer of title and surrender of possession of the buildings, installations and improvements on the leased land, before the RTC of Pasig (Civil Case No. 59264). Claiming that Signetics caused SigFil to insert in the lease contract the words "machineries, equipment and accessories," the defendants were able to withdraw these assets from the cost-free transfer provision of the contract. 

3. Service of summons was made on Signetics through TEAM Pacific Corp. on the basis of the allegation that Signetics is a "subsidiary of US PHILIPS CORPORATION, and may be served summons at Philips Electrical Lamps, Inc., Las Piñas, Metro Manila and/or c/o Technology Electronics Assembly & Management (TEAM) Pacific Corporation, Electronics Avenue, FTI Complex, Taguig, Metro Manila," service of summons was made on Signetics through TEAM Pacific Corporation.

4. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over its person. Invoking Section 14, Rule 14, of the Rules of Court and the rule laid down in Pacific Micronisian Line, Inc., v. Del Rosario and Pelington  to the effect that the fact of doing business in the Philippines should first be established in order that summons could be validly made and jurisdiction acquired by the court over a foreign corporation. 

5. The RTC denied the Motion to dismiss. While the CA affirmed RTC. Hence this petition. The petitioner argues that what was effectively alleged in the complaint as an activity of doing business was "the mere equity investment" of petitioner in SigFil, which the petitioner insists, had theretofore been transferred to TEAM holdings, Ltd.

Issue: Whether or not the lower court, had correctly assumed jurisdiction over the petitioner, a foreign corporation, on its claim in a motion to dismiss, that it had since ceased to do business in the Philippines.

YES.

1. Signetics cannot, at least in this early stage, assail, on the one hand, the veracity and correctness of the allegations in the complaint and proceed, on the other hand, to prove its own, in order to hasten a peremptory escape. As explained by the Court in Pacific Micronisian, summons may be served upon an agent of the defendant who may not necessarily be its "resident agent designated in accordance with law." The term "agent", in the context it is used in Section 14, refers to its general meaning, i.e., one who acts on behalf of a principal. 

The allegations in the complaint have thus been able to amply convey that not only is TEAM Pacific the business conduit of the petitioner in the Philippines but that, also, by the charge of fraud, is none other than the petitioner itself.

2. The rule is that, a foreign corporation, although not engaged in business in the Philippines, may still look up to our courts for relief; reciprocally, such corporation may likewise be "sued in Philippine courts for acts done against a person or persons in the Philippines" (Facilities Management Corporation v. De la Osa), provided that, in the latter case, it would not be impossible for court processes to reach the foreign corporation, a matter that can later be consequential in the proper execution of judgment. Hence, a State may not exercise jurisdiction in the absence of some good basis (and not offensive to traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice) for effectively exercising it, whether the proceedings are in rem, quasi in rem or in personam.

Samartino v. Raon, CA Digest

Facts:

1.       Respondents Leonor Bernardo-Raon and Agustin G. Crisostomo are the surviving sister and spouse, respectively, of the late Filomena Bernardo-Crisostomo, who passed away on May 17, 1994. Among the properties left by the deceased was her one-half share in a parcel of land in Noveleta, Cavite, registered under in the name of co-owners Lido Beach Corporation and Filomena Bernardo.

2.       2. In 1996, respondents instituted a complaint for ejectment against petitioner Regalado P. Samartino a complaint for ejectment alleging that during the lifetime of Filomena, she leased her share to petitioner for a period of five years counted from 1986; that the said lease expired and was not extended thereafter; and that petitioner refused to vacate the property despite demands therefor.

3.       Summons was served on Roberto Samartino, brother of petitioner. At the time of service, he was not at home as he was then confined at the NBI rehab center since January 19, 1996, where he was undergoing treatment and rehabilitation for drug dependency. Thus, on February 2, 1996, a liaison officer of the NBI-TRC appeared before the trial court with a certification that petitioner will be unable to comply with the directive to answer the complaint within the reglementary period, inasmuch as it will take six months for him to complete the rehabilitation program and before he can be recommended for discharge by the Rehabilitation Committee.^]

4.       The trial court, despite the written certification from NBI-TRC, declared petitioner in default and ordered them to present evidence ex-parte. On March 21, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondents. Counsel of respondent filed a motion to set aside judgement at the RTC, RTC affirmed lower court decision. This decision became final, the property was sold in an auction to the respondents, Petitioner filed petition for relief from judgement alleging  that the parcel of land from which he was being evicted had been sold to him by Filomena Bernardo-Crisostomo, as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 13, 1988. Petition was dismissed by RTC. Petitioner filed petition for certiorari before CA which was also dismissed, including his MR, hence this petition for review.

Issue: Whether or not the court (MTC & RTC) acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner

NO. The summon was ineffective.  There being no valid substituted service of summons, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. In actions in personam, summons on the defendant must be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. If efforts to serve the summons personally to defendant is impossible, service may be effected by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and discretion residing therein, or by leaving the copies at the defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.  

1.       Service of summons upon the defendant shall be by personal service first and only when the defendant cannot be promptly served in person will substituted service be availed of.

2.       The impossibility of personal service justifying availment of substituted service should be explained in the proof of service; why efforts exerted towards personal service failed. The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officer’s Return; otherwise, the substituted service cannot be upheld.

3.       It is only under exceptional terms that the circumstances warranting substituted service of summons may be proved by evidence aliunde. It bears stressing that since service of summons, especially for actions in personam, is essential for the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, the resort to a substituted service must be duly justified. Failure to do so would invalidate all subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds

4. Furthermore, nowhere in the return of summons or in the records of this case is it shown that petitioner’s brother, on whom substituted service of summons was effected, was a person of suitable age and discretion residing at petitioner’s residence.

Valmonte v. CA Digest

G.R. No. 108538 January 22, 1996

Ponente: Mendoza, J.:

Service of Summons

Facts:

1. Petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a foreign resident. Petitioners Lourdes and Alfredo are husband and wife both residents of 90222 Carkeek Drive South Seattle, Washington, U.S.A. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte, who is a member of the Philippine bar, however, practices his profession in the Philippines, commuting for this purpose between his residence in the state of Washington and Manila, where he holds office at S-304 Gedisco Centre, 1564 A. Mabini, Ermita, Manila.
2.  Private respondent Rosita Dimalanta, who is the sister of petitioner filed an action for partition against former and her husband. She alleged that, the plaintiff is of legal age, a widow and is at present a resident of 14823 Conway Road, Chesterfield, Missouri, U.S.A., while the defendants are spouses but, for purposes of this complaint may be served with summons at Gedisco Center, Unit 304, 1564 A. Mabini St., Ermita, Manila where defendant Alfredo D. Valmonte as defendant Lourdes Arreola Valmonte’s spouse holds office and where he can be found.He husband was also her counsel, who has a law office in the Philippines. The summons were served on her husband.
3. Petitioner in a letter, referred private respondent’s counsel to her husband as the party to whom all communications intended for her should be sent. Service of summons was then made upon petitioner Alfredo at his office in Manila.  Alfredo D. Valmonte accepted his summons, but not the one for Lourdes, on the ground that he was not authorized to accept the process on her behalf. Accordingly the process server left without leaving a copy of the summons and complaint for petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte.
4.  Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte thereafter filed his Answer with Counterclaim. Petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte, however, did not file her Answer. For this reason private respondent moved to declare her in default. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte entered a special appearance in behalf of his wife and opposed the private respondent’s motion. RTC denied the MR of respondents. CA declared petitioner Lourdes in default. Said decision was received by Alfredo hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was validly served with summons.

NO.

There was no valid service of summons  on Lourdes.

1.       The action herein is in the nature of an action quasi in rem. Such an action is essentially for the purpose of affecting the defendant’s interest in a specific property and not to render a judgment against him. As petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a nonresident who is not found in the Philippines, service of summons on her must be in accordance with Rule 14, § 17. Such service, to be effective outside the Philippines, must be made either (1) by personal service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court should be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant; or (3) in any other manner which the court may deem sufficient.

2.       In the case at bar, the service of summons upon petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was not done by means of any of the first two modes.  This mode of service, like the first two, must be made outside the Philippines, such as through the Philippine Embassy in the foreign country where the defendant resides.  The service of summons on petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte was not made upon the order of the court as required by Rule 14, § 17 and certainly was not a mode deemed sufficient by the court which in fact refused to consider the service to be valid and on that basis declare petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte in default for her failure to file an answer.

3.       Secondly, the service in the attempted manner on petitioner was not made upon prior leave of the trial court as required also in Rule 14, § 17. As provided in § 19, such leave must be applied for by motion in writing, supported by affidavit of the plaintiff or some person on his behalf and setting forth the grounds for the application.

4.       Finally, and most importantly, because there was no order granting such leave, petitioner Lourdes was not given ample time to file her Answer which, according to the rules, shall be not less than sixty (60) days after notice.