Showing posts with label Criminal Procedure. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Criminal Procedure. Show all posts

Dec 29, 2012

Pangan v. Gatbalite Digest

Pangan v. Gatbalite Digest

Facts:


1. On September 16, 1987, the petitioner was convicted of the offense charged and was sentenced to serve a penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, on October 24, 1988, affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC. Petitioner never got to serve his sentence and hid for about nine years.

2. Then, on January 20, 2000, the petitioner was apprehended and detained at the Mabalacat Detention Cell. Four days thereafter, he filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at the RTC of Angeles City, impleading respondent (Acting Chief of Police of Mabalacat, Pampanga). Petitioner contended that his arrest was illegal and unjustified on the grounds that, a) the straight penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor prescribes in five years under No. 3,Article 93 [of the] Revised Penal Code, and (b)   having been able to continuously evade service of sentence for almost nine years, his criminalliability has long been totally extinguished under No. 6, Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code.

3. The petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied since there was no evasion of the service of the sentence. Evasion presupposes escape during the service of the sentence consisting in deprivation of liberty.

Issue: Whether or not the penalty already prescribed

HELD: NO.

The period of prescription of penalties – the succeeding Article 93 provides – "shall commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence". Article 157 of the RPC discussed how evasion of service of sentence was perfected. It is provided therein that, 

"The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of his sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment. To consider properly the meaning of evasion service of sentence, its elements must be present these are: (1) the offender is a convict by final judgment; (2) he "is serving his sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty"; and (3) he evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence. For, by the express terms of the statute, a convict evades "service of his sentence" by "escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment." 

That escape should take place while serving sentence, is emphasized by the second sentence of Article 157. It provides for a higher penalty if such "evasion or escape shall have taken place by means of unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors, or by using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivance with other convicts or employees of the penal institution, . . ." Indeed, evasion of sentence is but another expression of the term "jail breaking."

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, "escape" in legal parlance and for purposes of Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means the unlawful departure of prisoner from the limits of his custody. Clearly, one who has not been committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom.
 
In this case, the petitioner was never brought to prison. As the record would show, even before the execution of the judgment for his conviction, he was already in hiding. He now begs for the compassion of the Court because he has ceased to live a life of peace and tranquility after he failed to appear in court for the execution of his sentence. But it was petitioner who chose to become a fugitive. The Court accords compassion only to those who are deserving. Petitioner's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt but he refused to answer for the wrong he committed. He is therefore not to be rewarded therefor.

Aug 27, 2012

Laurel v Desierto digest

Laurel v. Desierto
GR No. 145368, April 12, 2002

Facts:
Petitioner Vice-President Salvador Laurel was appointed as the head of the National Centennial Commission, a body constituted for the preparation of the National Centennial celebration in 1998. He was subsequently appointed as the Chairman of ExpoCorp., and was one of the nine (9) incorporators. A controversy erupted on the alleged anomalies with the bidding contracts to some entities and the petitioner was implicated. By virtue of an investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman, the petitioner was indicted for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019). The petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss questioning the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman, which was denied. He further filed a motion for reconsideration which was also denied, hence this petition for certiorari.

The petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and contended that he is not a public officer since ExpoCorp is a private corporation.

Issue: W/N the petitioner is a public officer

Yes, the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case of the petitioner since he is a public officer. The NCC is an office performing executive functions since one of its mandate is to implement national policies. Moreover, the said office was established by virtue of an executive order. It is clear that the NCC performs sovereign functions, hence it is a public office. Since petitioner is chair of the NCC, he is therefore a public officer. The fact that the NCC was characterized by EO 128 as an 'ad-hoc body' make it less of a public office. Finally, the fact that the petitioner did not receive any compensation during his tenure is of no consequence since such is merely an incidence and forms no part of the office.