Dadivas de Villanueva v. Villanueva, 54 Phil 93

"The law is not so unreasonable as to require a wife to live in marital relations with a husband whose incurable propensity towards other women makes common habitation with him unbearable...xxx"

My dears, this case happened even before World War 2, think 1927-ish era.  Nevertheless, the story seems familiar, in fact, this is still good case law as it is still cited in one of my Remedial law books.
 

Villanueva v. Villanueva
G.R.  No. L-33352

Facts

The wife (Aurelia Dadivas de Villanueva) files for support against the husband (Rafael Villanueva) to obtain separate maintenance as she decided to live separately from the marital home (a month before filing this case) due to the husband's cruelty and repeated infidelity with other women outside their marital ties. The wife also wants to obtain custody of their 2 younger children, aged 10 and 9 as well as reimbursement of attorney's fees incurred for this case.

It appears that during the ten years prior to the filing of this case, the defendant has been involved in illicit relations with four different women, including another different one while this case was pending.

The complainant for the purpose of keeping the marriage intact, continued to bear with the infidelity of the defendant. It was only on April 20, 1927 when due to the cruelty of the defendant, the complainant decided to live their conjugal home.

The Lower Court's decision

The lower court absolved the defendant husband and abrogated a previous order approving support, hence the wife's appeal to the Court of Appeals.  Said decision was later affirmed hence this appeal.

Issue

Whether the complainant is entitled to support (separate maintenance) on the ground of cruelty and marital infidelity.

Ruling

Yes. The complainant is entitled to support.

It was held by the Supreme Court that (to quote)

"The law is not so unreasonable as to require a wife to live in marital relations with a husband whose incurable propensity towards other women makes common habitation with him unbearable.

Deeply rooted instincts of human nature sanction the separation in such a case, and the law is not so unreasonable as to require as acquiescence on the part of the injured party which is beyond the capacity of nature.

Inn order to entitle a wife to maintain a separate home and to require separate maintenance from her husband it is not necessary that the husband should bring a concubine into the marital domicile. Perverse and illicit relations with women outside of the marital establishment are enough.

As was said by Justice Moreland in Goitia v. Campos Rueda (35 Phil 252, 262),  a husband cannot, by his own wrongful acts, relieve himself from the duty to support his wife imposed by law; and where a husband by wrongful, illegal, and unbearable conduct, drives his wife from the domicile fixed by him, he cannot take advantage of her departure to abrogate the law applicable to the marital relations and repudiate his duties thereunder.

Eternal Gardens v. CA, North Philippine Union Mission Digest

Eternal Gardens v. CA, North Philippine Union Mission Digest

Facts:

1. Eternal Gardens entered into a land development agreement with private respondent Mission wherein the former would subdivide a property of the latter into memorial lots to be sold to third parties. Further, the parties agreed that the petitioner will deposit 40% of the monthly gross collection in the name of Mission. Subsequently, Maysilo Estates and the heirs of Vicente Encarnacion laid a claim on the subject property. This prompted the petitioner to file an interpleader suit to compel the Mission and Maysilo Estates to litigate their conflicting claims between themselves. On the other hand, the heirs of Encarnacion filed an action for the quieting of title to the property against the petitioner and the private respondent.

2. The respondent moved that the payments be deposited with the court while the case is ongoing. The petitioner assails the decision of the court ordering it to deposit the amounts due to the Mission by virtue of the agreement previously entered into.

Issue: Whether or not deposit is proper under the circumstances of this case

RULING:

Yes, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, the essence of the interpleader on the part of the petitioner, aside from disavowal of interest in the property being litigated, is the deposit of the property or funds in controversy with the court. This rule is founded on justice and equity so that the plaintiff will not be benefited from the property or funds in litigation at the expense of whoever will ultimately be adjudged as entitled thereto.

RCBC v. Metrocon Digest

RCBC v. Metrocon

Facts:

1. The Respondent filed an interpleader suit against the petitioner and  LEYCON to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims between themselves and to determine which will receive the rental payments for the subject property. Respondent is the lessee of LEYCON, who previously contracted a loan from the petitioner. The subject leased property was mortgaged as security for the loan which was later on foreclosed by the petitioner.

2. LEYCON filed an unlawful detainer case against the respondent, and the later moves to dismiss this case due to an amicable settlement forged later on. LEYCON likewise filed the same but the lower court denied the motions hence the appeal to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court granted the petition and ordered the dismissal of the ejectment case.

Issue: Whether or not the action for interpleader is proper

RULING:

No. The reason for the interpleader case ceased when the MeTC ordered respondent to pay LEYCON the rents due. Even if the petitioner could not be bound in that decision, respondent was a party to that case. Moreover, the said decision already became final and executory and thus became judicial fiat on the respondent. The desire of the respondent to dismiss the interpleader case is not due to its lac of interest but more to the fact that there is no more need to pursue the cause of action, as the conflict has already been resolved.

Ocampo v. Tirona Digest

Ocampo v. Tirona

Interpleader

Facts: 

Respondent Tirona was a lessee of a land purchased by the petitioner. However, when the area was declared a priority development, respondent informed petitioner that she will suspend paying the rentals. The petitioner purchased the said land from the original owner. This prompted the petitioner to file an action for unlawful detainer and damages against the respondent.

The MTC held that Tirona had no reason to suspend the payment of rents as this made her occupation of the property illegal. Thus, the petitioner has the right to recover possession. The RTC concurred with this decision.

Issue: Whether or not an action for interpleader is proper in this case

RULING:

Yes. Tirona should have filed an interpleader and need not wait for the actual filing of a suit by petitioner against her. The action is proper when a lessee does not know who to pay to the rentals due to conflicting claims in the subject property.

This remedy is afforded not to protect anyone against double liabilities but to protect him against double vexation with respect to one's liability.

When a court orders that claimants litigate among themselves there arises a new action. The pleading which initiates the action is referred to as the complaint of interpleader and not a cross-complaint.

Heirs of Lorenzo Yap v. CA Digest

Heirs of Lorenzo Yap v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No.. 133047 August 17, 1999

Facts: 

1. Petitioners as heirs of Lorenzo Yap filed an action against Ramon Yap and co-respondent for the reconveyance of land, with buildings and improvement on it. They alleged that the said property was held in trust by Ramon and that it was their father Lorenzo who purchased the said land and constructed the apartment building on it. However, alleging that since at that time, Lorenzo was still a Chinese citizen, hence prohibited from owning land, he caused it to be registered in the name of respondent Ramon.

2. The said property was sold by Ramon to his co-respondent which caused the petitioners to file this action.

3. The lower court ruled in favor of the respondents or the ownership of Ramon. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not a trust was constituted between Lorenzo and Ramon

RULING: No, and even it there was an implied trust, it could not have been valid as it was in contravention of applicable laws. There is a basic distinction between implied and express trusts. Express trusts cannot be proved by parole evidence. Even then, in order to establish the existence of an implied trust in real property by parole evidence, the prove should be as fully convincing as the facts as if the acts giving rise to the trust obligation are proven by an authentic document. The petitioners' evidence was insufficient to prove clearly that a trust was constituted between their father and Ramon.

Related Digest on Trusts: See Saltiga v. Romeo for detailed discussion on implied and express trusts

People v. Serzo Digest

People v. Serzo

Rights of the Accused

Facts:

1. Appellant Mario Serzo was convicted of murder by the lower court for the stabbing/killing of Alfredo Casabal after the latter rescued minors being held by the former.

2. Pre-trial was waived and the case proceeded to trial on the merits. 

3. The accused alleged that he was denied the right to counsel. During the arraignment he appeared without counsel,so the court appointed a counsel de officio. Thereafter, he moved that the arraignment be reset so he can engage the services of his own counsel however, during the arraignment, he still appeared without one. The arraignment proceeded with him being assisted by the counsel de officio.

4. During the trial, the same counsel appeared and cross-examined for the accused.

Issue: Whether or not the accused was denied of his right to counsel

HELD: NO. Herein, the accused was provided with a counsel de officio who assisted him in all stages of the proceedings.The option to hire ones counsel cannot be used to sanction reprehensible dilatory tactics, trifle with the Rules or prejudice the equally important right of the State and the offended party to speedy and adequate justice.

The right to counsel is guaranteed by the Constitution to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial system where an accused is pitted against the awesome prosecution machinery of the state. It is also a recognition of the accused not having the skill to protect himself before a tribunal which has the power to take his life or liberty.

The right covers the period from custodial investigation until judgment is rendered, even on appeal. RA 7438 provides that any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel.

The right is however not absolute and is waivable; a) the state must balance the private against the state's and offended party's equally important rightto speedy and adequate justice, and b) the right is waivable as long as the waiver is unequivocal, knowing, and intelligently made.

Paciente v. Dacuycuy Digest

Paciente v. Dacuycuy 114 SCRA 924

G.R. No. L-58319 June 29, 1982

Ponente: Guttierez, J.:

Facts:

1. Leonardo Homeres died, leaving to his widow Lilia, and two (2) minor children a lot. Subsequently, the lot was sold to Conchita Dumdum, who later on sold it to the petitioner. The petitioner then mortgaged the subject lot to the Citytrust bank as security for a loan. Thereafter, Lilia was declared guardian of the minors in the guardianship proceedings.

2. The guardianship court issued an order for the cancellation of the transfer certificate of title for the lot. It also ordered the petitioner to pay the minors the price of the lot alienated. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the guardianship court has jurisdiction to order the cancellation on the transfer certificate of title of the subject lot

RULING: Yes, in this case the title and ownership of the minors over the disputed property is clear and indisputable, as such, the court orders for the return or deliver of the property is valid. However, the order directing the payment or deposit of P10,000 is null and void as it was issued without a hearing to determine the value of the property and the time frame for fixing such valuation was unclear.

Parco v. CA Digest

Parco v. Court of Appeals 111 SCRA 262

G.R. No. L-33152 January 30,1982

Ponente: De Castro, J.:

Facts:

1. This case stems from a previous Special proceedings for the guardianship of incompetent Soriaya Rodriguez. The guardianship proceeding originally pertained to Branch 1, CFI of Quezon. Subsequently, it was transferred to Branch IV-Calauag, CFI of Quezon, where respondent judge Kayanan took cognizance of the case.

2. The private respondent, Francisco Rodriguez Jr. was the appointed guardian. Respondent judge approved the conveyance of three (3) parcels of land belonging to the ward to the petitioners, the spouses Parco. 

3. Almost two years after the guardianship court's approval of the 'sale', the private respondent filed an urgent petition for the examination of the subject conveyance of the lots to the petitioners, by virtue of the transfer of title to third parties.   He argued that the conveyance was actually a loan agreement with a right to recover while the spouses alleged that there was an absolute sale of the lands in dispute.  

Issue: Whether or not a guardianship court has jurisdiction to order the reconveyance of the properties to the ward

RULING: No, unlike in previous court decision, the facts of this case is not in all fours as there is a cloud over the titles of the properties in question. A reconveyance would  require the determination of the ownership or title of the subject three parcels of land, which is beyond the jurisdiction of the guardianship court, and thus must be threshed out in a separate and ordinary civil action.

In previous decisions, the court approved the reconveyance to the ward of properties embezzled, concealed or conveyed when there is not question as to the ward's title and ownership to the property. Herein, it is premature to say based only on the pleadings that the ward has clear and undisputable title to the properties.

Guy v. CA (Court of Appeals) Digest

Guy v. CA

502 SCRA 151

G.R. No. 163707 September 15, 2006

Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J.:

Facts:

1. The special proceeding case concerns the settlement of the estate of Sima Wei (a.k.a. Rufina Guy Susim). Private-respondents Karen and Kamille alleged that they are the acknowledged  illegitimate children of Sima Wei who died intestate. The minors were represented by their mother Remedios Oanes who filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration before the RTC of Makati City.

2. Petitioner who is one of the children of the deceased with his surviving spouse, filed for the dismissal of the petition alleging that his father left no debts hence, his estate may be settled without the issuance of letters administration. The other heirs filed a joint motion to dismiss alleging that the certification of non-forum shopping should have been signed by Remedios and not by counsel.

3. Petitioners further alleged that the claim has been paid and waived by reason of a Release of Claim or waiver stating that in exchange for financial and educational assistance from the petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharged the estate of the decedent from any and all liabilities.

4. The lower court denied the joint motion to dismiss as well as the supplemental motion ruling that the mother is not the duly constituted guardian of the minors hence, she could not have validly signed the waiver.  It also rejected the petitioner's objections to the certificate of non-forum shopping. The Court of Appeals affirmed the orders of the lower court. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not a guardian can validly repudiate the inheritance the wards

RULING: No, repudiation amounts to alienation of property and parents and guardians must necessarily obtain judicial approval. repudiation of inheritance must pass the court's scrutiny in order to protect the best interest of the ward. Not having been authorized by the court, the release or waiver is therefore void. Moreover, the private-respondents could not have waived their supposed right as they have yet to prove their status as illegitimate children of the decedent. It would be inconsistent to rule that they have waived a right which, according to the petitioner, the latter do not have.

As to the jurisdiction of the court to determine the heirs

The court is not precluded to receive evidence to determine the filiation of the claimants even if the original petition is for the issuance of letters administration. Its jurisdiction extends to matters collateral and incidental to the settlement of the estate, with the determination of heirship included. As held in previous decision, two causes of action may be brought together in one complaint, one a claim for recognition, and the other to claim inheritance. (Briz v. Briz)

People v. Navaja Digest 220 SCRA 624 GR. No. 104044

People v. Navaja

G.R. No 104044 March 30, 1993

Ponente: Davide, Jr., J

Disputable presumption: Suppression of Evidence

Facts:

1. The Accused Alexander Navaja was convicted of the crime of selling a prohibited drug, 'shabu' under RA 6425. The authorities set up a buy bust operation but he managed to elude arrest after the transaction. Accused was subsequently arrested during a hearing of the Habeas Corpus case filed by his mother, about a year after.

2. In his appeal the accused contended that the court erred in convicting him as only one of the witnesses among 5 (of the policemen who accosted him) were presented by the prosecution.

Issue: Whether or not the non-presentation of the other witnesses gave rise to the presumption of suppression of evidence

HELD:

The non-presentation of the corroborative witnesses did not constitute suppression of evidence and such would not be fatal the prosecution's case. The rule is settled that the adverse presumption is not applicable when ---

1) suppression is not willful

2) the evidence suppressed or withheld is merely corroborative or cumulative

3) the evidence is at the disposal of both parties

4) the suppresion is an exercise of privilege

Moreover, the Court has consistently held in drugs cases that absent any proof to the contrary, law enforcers are presumed to have regularly performed their duty. The accused has also failed to present proof of an ulterior motive on the part of the police officers.

Note: This case digest/summary may serve as a ticker or memory aid. Reading of the full text of the case is still highly recommended. 

Pangan v. Gatbalite Digest

Pangan v. Gatbalite Digest

Facts:

1. On September 16, 1987, the petitioner was convicted of the offense charged and was sentenced to serve a penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, on October 24, 1988, affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC. Petitioner never got to serve his sentence and hid for about nine years.

2. Then, on January 20, 2000, the petitioner was apprehended and detained at the Mabalacat Detention Cell. Four days thereafter, he filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at the RTC of Angeles City, impleading respondent (Acting Chief of Police of Mabalacat, Pampanga). Petitioner contended that his arrest was illegal and unjustified on the grounds that, a) the straight penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor prescribes in five years under No. 3,Article 93 [of the] Revised Penal Code, and (b)   having been able to continuously evade service of sentence for almost nine years, his criminalliability has long been totally extinguished under No. 6, Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code.

3. The petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied since there was no evasion of the service of the sentence. Evasion presupposes escape during the service of the sentence consisting in deprivation of liberty.

Issue: Whether or not the penalty already prescribed

HELD: NO.

The period of prescription of penalties – the succeeding Article 93 provides – "shall commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence". Article 157 of the RPC discussed how evasion of service of sentence was perfected. It is provided therein that, 

"The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of his sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment. To consider properly the meaning of evasion service of sentence, its elements must be present these are: (1) the offender is a convict by final judgment; (2) he "is serving his sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty"; and (3) he evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence. For, by the express terms of the statute, a convict evades "service of his sentence" by "escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment." 

That escape should take place while serving sentence, is emphasized by the second sentence of Article 157. It provides for a higher penalty if such "evasion or escape shall have taken place by means of unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors, or by using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivance with other convicts or employees of the penal institution, . . ." Indeed, evasion of sentence is but another expression of the term "jail breaking."

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, "escape" in legal parlance and for purposes of Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means the unlawful departure of prisoner from the limits of his custody. Clearly, one who has not been committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom.

 

In this case, the petitioner was never brought to prison. As the record would show, even before the execution of the judgment for his conviction, he was already in hiding. He now begs for the compassion of the Court because he has ceased to live a life of peace and tranquility after he failed to appear in court for the execution of his sentence. But it was petitioner who chose to become a fugitive. The Court accords compassion only to those who are deserving. Petitioner's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt but he refused to answer for the wrong he committed. He is therefore not to be rewarded therefor.

People vs. Ladao Digest

People v. Ladao

G.R. No. 100940-41 November 27, 2001

Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J.:

Confession

Facts:

1. The accused-appellant Ladao was among those apprehended by the Caloocan Police on the night of February 9, 1990, in connection with the rampant robbery and hold-up incidents in Caloocan. In the ensuing investigation conducted by Police Inspector Antonio Paras and Ricardo Concepcion, accused-appellant and his co-accused executed, with the assistance of Atty. Juanito R. Crisostomo of the Public Attorney's Office, Caloocan City, their extra-judicial confession admitting authorship of the crime of robbery with homicide.

2. In his extra-judicial confession, accused-appellant declared that he and his four co-accused, together with three others who were able to escape, held up the passenger jeepney driven by the victim. He further stated that they tied the hands and feet of the victim and threw him into the estero not knowing that the place was filled with water. Using the jeepney of the victim, they plied the Recto-Caloocan route and picked up passengers whom they likewise robbed. Thereafter, they abandoned the jeepney somewhere.

3. Accused-appellant Henry Soriano appeals from the lower court's decision convicting him and his four co-accused of the crime of robbery with homicide.

Issue: W/N the extrajudicial confession is admissible against the accused

YES. Settled is the rule that once the prosecution has shown that there was compliance with the constitutional requirement on pre-interrogation advisories, a confession is presumed to be voluntary and the declarant bears the burden of proving that his confession was involuntary and untrue. The burden is on the accused to destroy this presumption.  A confession is admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat, or promise of reward or leniency. The exculpatory tone of accused-appellant’s confession is demonstrative of its voluntariness rather than compulsion.

Accused-appellant failed to present any proof that force and violence were employed to coerce him to sign the extra-judicial confession.  He did not submit himself to an examination by a physician to bolster his claim.  Neither did he complain of the alleged torture to his relatives or to Prosecutor Neptali Aliposa when he swore to the truth of his statement.  Likewise, he filed no criminal complaint or administrative charge against the police officers concerned. 

Moreover, the language of the confession and the details in it could only come from a participant in the commission of the crime.  Every aspect thereof jibes with the sworn statements given by his co-accused.  His confession reflects the manner in which the crime was committed; the kind of weapon used; the place where they boarded the victim’s jeepney; the role of each accused; and their relative positions inside the jeep.  Furthermore, accused-appellant's admission that they threw the victim in an estero filled with water confirms the result of the post mortem examination indicating that the victim drowned to death.

Valid confession

Accused-appellant’s allegation that he and his co-accused were not assisted by counsel during the custodial investigation is belied by the affidavit executed by Atty. Crisostomo attesting to the voluntariness of accused-appellant’s confession and the legal assistance he rendered during the investigation. Moreover, Atty. Crisostomo testified that he informed accused-appellant and his co-accused of their constitutional rights and assisted them during the custodial investigation. As such, his confession constitutes evidence of the highest order since it is backed up by the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless he is prompted by truth and his conscience.

Note that apart from the extra-judicial confession, the conviction is supported by other competent evidence.  Hilda Castro’s testimony, positively identifying accused-appellant and his co-accused as the persons who robbed them between Tayuman and Blumentritt, is on all fours with the confession of accused-appellant and that of his co-accused that after dumping the victim in the estero, they used the latter’s jeepney and robbed the passengers they picked up in the Recto-Caloocan route and vice-versa.  In fact, Hilda Castro’s bag was recovered from the abandoned jeepney of the victim, which shows that accused-appellant and his companions were the same persons who took away the jeepney of the victim and killed him, and thereafter staged another hold-up where Hilda Castro happened to be one of the victims.

People v Amaca 277 SCRA 215 Digest

People vs. Amaca

GR No. 110129 August 11, 1997
Ponente: Panganiban, J.:

Offer of compromise in Criminal Cases; Res Gestae

 Facts:

1.    Accused Amaca and another known as “Ogang” were charged for shooting Wilson Vergara. During the trial, the prosecution presented Dr. Edgar Pialago, a resident physician on duty when the victim was brought to the hospital after the shooting. The doctor testified that he was able to attend to the victim who had undergone a surgical operation conducted by another doctor. At that time, the major organs of the victim were no longer functioning normally, while his pancreas was likewise injured due to the 2 gunshot wounds at his back. The victim was admitted at 10:45PM but expired the following evening at 10PM. According to Dr. Pialago, even with immediate medical attention, the victim could not survive the wounds he sustained.

2.     Another witness testified, PO Mangubat,  a police officer , who interviewed the victim (Wilson Vergara) right after the shooting. Mangubat  testified that he saw the victim already on board a Ford Fiera pick-up ready for transport to the hospital. He inquired from the victim about the incident, and the former answered he was shot by CVO Amaca and Ogang. Upon query why he was shot, the victim said he did not know the reason why he was shot. Upon being asked as to his condition, the victim said that he was about to die.  He was able to reduce into writing the declaration of the victim and made latter affixed his thumb mark with the use of his own blood in the presence of Wagner Cardenas, the brother of the City Mayor. 

3.       Segundina Vergara, mother of the victim, and her son-in-law Jose Lapera both desisted from further prosecution of the case. the former because of the "financial help" extended by the accused to her family, and the latter because Segundina had already "consented to the amicable settlement of the case." Despite this, the Department of Justice found the existence of a prima facie case based on the victim's ante mortem statement.

4.       The lower court convicted Amaca on the basis of the victim's ante mortem statement to Police Officer Mangubat positively identifying accused. The dying declaration was deemed sufficient to overcome the accused’s  defense of alibi. However, due to the voluntary desistance of the victim's mother from further prosecuting the case, the court a quo declined to make a finding on the civil liability of the appellant.

Issue:  1) Whether or not offer of compromise is admissible against the accused

YES. The "financial help" when viewed as an offer of compromise may be deemed as additional proof to demonstrate appellant's criminal liability. The victim's mother desisted from prosecuting the case in consideration of the "financial help" extended to her family by the accused-appellant. 

It is a well-settled rule that that the desistance of the victim's complaining mother does not bar the People from prosecuting the criminal action, but it does operate as a waiver of the right to pursue civil indemnity. Hence, in effectively waiving her right to institute an action to enforce the civil liability of accused-appellant, she also waived her right to be awarded any civil indemnity arising from the criminal prosecution. This waiver is bolstered by the fact that neither she nor any private prosecutor in her behalf appealed the trial court's refusal to include a finding of civil liability. But the heirs, if there are any may file an independent civil action to recover damages for the death of Wilson Vergara.

Issue (2): Whether or not  the dying declaration of victim should be admitted

YES.  The victim’s dying declaration is admissible.

A dying declaration is worthy of belief because it is highly unthinkable for one who is aware of his impending death to accuse, falsely or even carelessly, anyone of being responsible for his foreseeable demise. Indeed, "when a person is at the point of death, every motive for falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak the

truth." This is the rationale for this exception to the hearsay rule under Section 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The elements of such exception are: (1) the deceased made the declaration conscious of his impending death; (2) the declarant would have been a competent witness had he survived; (3) the declaration concerns the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (4) the declaration is offered in a criminal case where the declarant's death is the subject of inquiry; and (5) the declaration is complete in itself. All these concur in the present case.

Finally, Police Officer Mangubat is presumed under the law to have regularly performed his duty. There is nothing in the circumstances surrounding his investigation of the crime which shows any semblance of irregularity or bias, much less an attempt to frame Amaca. Even the accused testified that he had no previous misunderstanding with Police Officer Mangubat and knew no reason why the latter would falsely testify against him.

Declarant is a competent witness

The serious nature of the victim's injuries did not affect his credibility as a witness since said injuries, as previously mentioned, did not cause the immediate loss of his ability to perceive and to identify his shooter. 

Homicide only not murder

Appellant may be held liable only for homicide since treachery was not alleged in the Information, while evident premeditation and night time, although duly alleged, were not satisfactorily proven. The Information readily reveals that the killing was qualified only by evident premeditation. Treachery was not alleged in the information. It is  necessary to qualify the crime to murder. Treachery is an element of the crime. The Constitution requires that the accused must be informed of the "nature and cause of the accusation against him."The failure to allege treachery in the Information is a major lapse of the prosecution.

Moreover, treachery and night time may not be considered even as generic aggravating circumstances, because there is nothing in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses to convincingly show that the accused-appellant consciously and purposely adopted (1) such means of attack to render the victim defenseless and (2) the darkness of night to facilitate the commission of the crime, to prevent its discovery or even evade capture. 

People vs Lase 219 SCRA 584 Digest

People v. Lase

Offer of Compromise in Criminal Case

Facts:

1. Appellant was convicted of the murder of one Dante Huelva. Huelva was urinating on the roadside when accused appellant stabbed him in the back. This was witnessed by two people Sayson and Pangatihon. 

2. Accused-appellant interposed the defense of alibi and relied on the testimony of his principal witnesses to support his version that he was somewhere else and not at the scene of the crime at the time of the killing. 

3. During the trial, Godofreda Huelva, mother of the victim testified that accused-appellant offered to settle the case for the sum of P10,000.00. In his surrebuttal testimony, accused-appellant vaguely denied this offer of compromise. He, however, insinuated that he could offer a higher amount

RTC: The Trial court held him liable for the killing of Dante Huelva qualifying it to murder,

Issue: Whether or not the offer to settle the case should be admitted as evidence of guilt

YES. An offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. The second paragraph of Section 27, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly provides that,'In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. Murder is not among those criminal cases that can be compromised. 

Treachery was proven but not evident premeditation

The crime was committed with treachery due to the sudden and unexpected attack on the victim, who was then urinating at the side of the road, with a deadly 7-inch Batangas knife. Accused-appellant consciously adopted this mode of attack to facilitate or insure the commission of the crime without risk to himself arising from any defensive or retaliatory act on the part of the victim. Evident premeditation was not duly established by the prosecution.

As to the delay in giving the witness' statement

The failure of prosecution witness Pangantihon to immediately report the incident did not affect his credibility. His initial reluctance either due to unwillingness to be involved in or dragged into criminal investigations is understandable. 

People vs. Manalo Digest 219 SCRA 656

People v. Manalo

G.R.Nos. 96123-24 March 8, 1993

Melo, J.:

Object Evidence

Facts:

1. Accused Rolando Manalo  for shooting one Warlito Bonillo and one Carlito Diomampo with an unlicensed pistol Colt Caliber .45.

2. The conviction was the result of the filing of two (2) amended informations. The accused pleaded not guilty. After trial on the merits the accused was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder in relation to PD 1728.

3. Witness Carlos Lacbay narrated that at about 5PM of Nov. 29, 1989 he visited one of the victims, Diomampo, in the latter's house where they conversed over some wine and camote regarding the latter's interest in buying a motorcycle. After 2 hours, witness Lacbay decided to leave, while Diomampo and a brother-in-law offered to accompany him home. After this, Lacbay rode on his service motorcycle while Diomampo and the other person (Bonilla) rode in tandem in their own motocycle.

4. When the group arrived at Bgy. San Rafael in San Pablo City at about 7 pm, and parked their motorcycles, accused Manalo (an acquaintance of both victims) arrived and invited the victims to his house for some drinks. The two acceded after insisting that Lacbay would go as he did, with them. As they were walking to accused house, Bonilla and Diamampao walked ahead, with accused following close by and Lacbay behind the latter.

5. After the victims entered the house of accused, the latter suddenly drew a .45 Caliber gun and shot Diomampo once in the head and then Bonilla on the temple about 3 meters from behind. Both died immediately, nevertheless, accused fired another shot at Diomampo. Lacbay who saw everything was so shocked. The accused told him that he shot both because Diomampo had impregnated his daughter, Dina Manalo. After this, accused asked Lacbay to dig, to which the latter refused. Finally, accused asked him not to leave the place as he would look for someone to do the digging. Lacbay took this chance to flee the scene. Subsequently, both the bodies of Bonilla and Diomampo were found buried in a shallow pit under the 'banggerahan' of accused' house.

6. The defense maintains the innocence of Manalo, arguing that he is merely a witness to the crime perpetrated by two unknown assailants. According to the defense' version of the story, it was these two unknown persons who killed both victims. Accordingle, the assailants were already waiting in the area for  Bonilla and Diomampo, then thereafter shot them.

RULING:

The court had examined the evidence and it found that it supported the judgement of the lower court.The accused banks on the alleged absence of physical evidence showing that accused fired a gun. The court held that this circumstance did not prove his innocence since even if a paraffin test would yield a negative result, it is still possible for one to have fired a gun and washed his hands thereafter.The court also recognized the great possibility that there will be no paraffin traces left in the hands when a bullet was fired from a .45 Caliber pistol, as held in the case of People vs. Rebullar (188 SCRA 838).

Finally, the lone witness to the crime, Lacbay has positively identified Manalo as the sole perpetrator of the killing. Lacbay can never be said to be a prejudiced witness since he had no other motive nor misunderstanding to maliciously testify against Manalo. The little delay in reporting the killings to the authorities was due to the shock, confusion and fear of Lacbay and that he had to wait ans consult with a relative who was a member of the Philippine marines.

More importantly, the accused Manalo has executed an extrajudicial statement admitting the killings but which he later on withdrew during the trial. Accused adopted two irreconciliable stands that is actually the heart of the case, rendering him unworthy of credit and belief. Accused also wrote several letters, one to Mr. Marcela Bonilla offering money as settlement for the death of the two victims and then to Fiscal Escondo requesting him no to charge murder but only homicide as he had no intention to kill the victims. In one of these letters, he even asked forgiveness for  the crime he had committed.

Moran Sison v. Teodoro Digest

Moran Sison vs. Teodoro

G.R. No. L-9271 March 29, 1957

Bautista Angelo, J.:

Facts:

1. The CFI of Manila which had jurisdiction over the estate of Margarita David, issued an order appointing appellantCarlos Moran Sison as judicial administrator without compensation after filing a bond. After entering into his duties as administrator, he filed an accounting of his administration which included items as an expense of administration the premiums he paid on his bond.

2. One of the heirs, herein appellee Narcisa Teodoro, objected to the approval of the items. The court approved the report but disallowed the items objected to on the ground that these cannot be considered as expenses of administration. Moran Sison filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not an executor or judicial administrator can validly charge the premiums on his bond as an expense of administration against the estate

NO.

The premiums paid by an executor or administrator serving without a compensation for his bond cannot be charged against the estate. Further Sec. 7 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court  does not authorize the executor or administrator to charge to the estate the money spent for the bond. As held in the case of Sulit v. Santos (56 Phil 626), the position of an executor or administrator is one of trust. The law safeguards the estates of deceased persons by making as a requirement for qualification the ability to give a suitable bond. The execution of said bond is therefore a condition precedent to acceptance of the responsibilities of the trust.

Further, the giving of the bond is not a necessary expense in the care, management, and settlement of the estate within the meaning of Sec. 680 of the Civil Code of Procedure, since such are the requirements after the executor or administrator has already qualified for the office and has entered the performance of his duties.

BPI v. Santiago Digest

G.R. No. 169116 March 28, 2007

Ponente: Chico-Nazario, J.:

Service of Summons

Facts:

1. Centrogen, a domestic corporation engaged in pharmaceutical business obtained several loans from Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC), which was secured by a real estate mortage over a parcel of land by Irene Santiago. Subsequently, FEBTC merged with BPI. Due to failure of Centrogen to pay its loans, 

BPI filed a case for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage over the subject property before the RTC of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. Thereafter, a Notice of Sale was issued by the Provincial Sheriff on 21 January 2003. On the same day, the Spouses Santiago were served with the copy of the Notice of Sale.Upon receipt the spouses and Centrogen filed a Complaint seeking the issuance of a TRO and Preliminary and Final Injunction and in the alternative, for the annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage with BPI.

2. The complaint alleged that the initial loan obligation in the amount of P490,000.00, including interest thereon has been fully paid. Such payment notwithstanding, the amount was still included in the amount of computation of the arrears as shown by the document of Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage filed by the latter. Moreover, the Spouses Santiago and Centrogen contended that the original loan agreement was for the amount of 5 Million  but only 2 Million was released by petitioner and as a result, the squalene project failed and the company groped for funds to pay its loan obligations.

3. On 27 February 2003, BPI was summoned to file and serve its Answer and on the same day, summons was served on the Branch Manager of BPI . Instead of filing an Answer, BPI filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and other procedural infirmities attendant to the filing of the complaint. BPI claimed that the Branch Manager of its Sta. Cruz, Laguna Branch, was not one of those authorized by Section 11, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court to receive summons on behalf of the corporation. The summons served upon its Branch Manager, therefore, did not bind the corporation.  Also alleged lack of authorityof the person who signed. RTC denied the MD and issued new summons. 

4. The RTC granted the TRO to prevent foreclosure sale. BPI file MR but was denied hence this petition with BPI alleging that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over its person and consequently, the Order issued by the RTC, permanently enjoining the foreclosure sale, was therefore void and does not bind BPI.

Issue: Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over BPI

YES. The Court acquired jurisdiction over BPI. The defect of the service of the original summons was cured by the issuance of the new summons which was not questioned by BPI.

1. There was substantial compliance. Although it may be true that the service of summons was made on a person not authorized to receive the same in behalf of the petitioner. Since it appears that the summons and complaint were in fact received by the corporation through its said clerk, the Court finds that there was substantial compliance with the rule on service of summons. 

2. The ultimate test on the validity and sufficiency on service of summons is whether the same and the attachments thereto where ultimately received by the corporation under such circumstances that no undue prejudice is sustained by it from the procedural lapse and it was afforded full opportunity to present its responsive pleadings. This is but in accord with the entrenched rule that the ends of substantial justice should not be subordinated to technicalities and, for which purpose, each case should be examined within the factual milieu peculiar to it.

3. The Court also emphasized that there is no hard and fast rule pertaining to the manner of service of summons. Rather, substantial justice demands that every case should be viewed in light of the peculiar circumstances attendant to each.

Philamgen v. Breva Digest

Facts:

1. Respondent Milagros P. Morales filed a Complaint for damages and reimbursement of insurance premiums at RTC Davao against the petitioner Philamgen, a domestic corporation. The complaint specifically stated that the petitioner could be served with summons and other court processes through its Manager at its branch office located at Rizal St., Davao City.

2. Thereafter, Summons was served upon the petitioner's Davao regional office, and was received by its Insurance Service Officer.

3. In December 8, 1999, the petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over its person due to improper service of summons. It contended that summons was improperly served upon its employee in its regional office at Davao City, and that the said employee was not among those named in Section 11, Rule 14 upon whom service of summons may be properly made.The respondent filed an Amended Complaint, alleging that summons and other court processes could also be served at its principal office at the Philamlife Building, U.N. Avenue, Ermita, Manila, through the president or any of its officers authorized to receive summons.

4. The RTC denied the MD and directed the issuance of alias summons on its branch in Manila. the petitioner filed with the CA a special action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65, with application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, assailing the Orders dated December 10, 1999 and January 14, 2000.

5. On October 24, 2000, the CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the assailed orders of the RTC. The CA held that the service of the alias summons on the amended complaint upon the authorized officers of the petitioner at its principal office in Manila vested the RTC with jurisdiction over its person. The CA, likewise, denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said decision on April 25, 2001.

6. Hence, this petition for review, with petitioner averring that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over its person because the service of the summons at its regional office through an insurance service officer was improper.

Issue:  Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner as the defendant therein despite the amendment of the complaint

YES. 

1. Where the defendant has already been served summons on the original complaint, the amended complaint may be served upon him without need of another summons.  Conversely, when no summons has yet been validly served on the defendant, new summons for the amended complaint must be served on him

2. The complaint was amended after the petitioner filed the motion to dismiss.  The Rules provide that the amended complaint supersedes the complaint that it amends. Contrary to the petitioner’s claim, the summons issued on the amended complaint does not become invalid. In fact, summons on the original complaint which has already been served continues to have its legal effect. 

3. It is not pertinent whether the summons is designated as an “original” or an “alias” summons as long as it has adequately served its purpose. What is essential is that the summons complies with the requirements under the Rules of Court and it has been duly served on the defendant together with the prevailing complaint. In this case, the alias summons satisfies the requirements under the Rules, both as to its content and the manner of service. It contains all the information required under the rules, and it was served on the persons authorized to receive the summons on behalf of the petitioner at its principal office in Manila. Moreover, the second summons was technically not an alias summons but more of a new summons on the amended complaint. It was not a continuation of the first summons considering that it particularly referred to the amended complaint and not to the original complaint.

Signetics Corp. v. CA Digest

G.R. No. 105141 August 31, 1993

Ponente: Vitug, J.:

Service of Summons on Foreign Corporations

Facts:

1. The petitioner, Signetics was organized under the laws of the United States of America. Through Signetics Filipinas Corporation (SigFil), a wholly-owned subsidiary, Signetics entered into lease contract over a piece of land with Fruehauf Electronics Phils., Inc. (Freuhauf). 

2. Freuhauf sued Signetics for damages, accounting or return of certain machinery, equipment and accessories, as well as the transfer of title and surrender of possession of the buildings, installations and improvements on the leased land, before the RTC of Pasig (Civil Case No. 59264). Claiming that Signetics caused SigFil to insert in the lease contract the words "machineries, equipment and accessories," the defendants were able to withdraw these assets from the cost-free transfer provision of the contract. 

3. Service of summons was made on Signetics through TEAM Pacific Corp. on the basis of the allegation that Signetics is a "subsidiary of US PHILIPS CORPORATION, and may be served summons at Philips Electrical Lamps, Inc., Las Piñas, Metro Manila and/or c/o Technology Electronics Assembly & Management (TEAM) Pacific Corporation, Electronics Avenue, FTI Complex, Taguig, Metro Manila," service of summons was made on Signetics through TEAM Pacific Corporation.

4. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over its person. Invoking Section 14, Rule 14, of the Rules of Court and the rule laid down in Pacific Micronisian Line, Inc., v. Del Rosario and Pelington  to the effect that the fact of doing business in the Philippines should first be established in order that summons could be validly made and jurisdiction acquired by the court over a foreign corporation. 

5. The RTC denied the Motion to dismiss. While the CA affirmed RTC. Hence this petition. The petitioner argues that what was effectively alleged in the complaint as an activity of doing business was "the mere equity investment" of petitioner in SigFil, which the petitioner insists, had theretofore been transferred to TEAM holdings, Ltd.

Issue: Whether or not the lower court, had correctly assumed jurisdiction over the petitioner, a foreign corporation, on its claim in a motion to dismiss, that it had since ceased to do business in the Philippines.

YES.

1. Signetics cannot, at least in this early stage, assail, on the one hand, the veracity and correctness of the allegations in the complaint and proceed, on the other hand, to prove its own, in order to hasten a peremptory escape. As explained by the Court in Pacific Micronisian, summons may be served upon an agent of the defendant who may not necessarily be its "resident agent designated in accordance with law." The term "agent", in the context it is used in Section 14, refers to its general meaning, i.e., one who acts on behalf of a principal. 

The allegations in the complaint have thus been able to amply convey that not only is TEAM Pacific the business conduit of the petitioner in the Philippines but that, also, by the charge of fraud, is none other than the petitioner itself.

2. The rule is that, a foreign corporation, although not engaged in business in the Philippines, may still look up to our courts for relief; reciprocally, such corporation may likewise be "sued in Philippine courts for acts done against a person or persons in the Philippines" (Facilities Management Corporation v. De la Osa), provided that, in the latter case, it would not be impossible for court processes to reach the foreign corporation, a matter that can later be consequential in the proper execution of judgment. Hence, a State may not exercise jurisdiction in the absence of some good basis (and not offensive to traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice) for effectively exercising it, whether the proceedings are in rem, quasi in rem or in personam.

Samartino v. Raon, CA Digest

Facts:

1.       Respondents Leonor Bernardo-Raon and Agustin G. Crisostomo are the surviving sister and spouse, respectively, of the late Filomena Bernardo-Crisostomo, who passed away on May 17, 1994. Among the properties left by the deceased was her one-half share in a parcel of land in Noveleta, Cavite, registered under in the name of co-owners Lido Beach Corporation and Filomena Bernardo.

2.       2. In 1996, respondents instituted a complaint for ejectment against petitioner Regalado P. Samartino a complaint for ejectment alleging that during the lifetime of Filomena, she leased her share to petitioner for a period of five years counted from 1986; that the said lease expired and was not extended thereafter; and that petitioner refused to vacate the property despite demands therefor.

3.       Summons was served on Roberto Samartino, brother of petitioner. At the time of service, he was not at home as he was then confined at the NBI rehab center since January 19, 1996, where he was undergoing treatment and rehabilitation for drug dependency. Thus, on February 2, 1996, a liaison officer of the NBI-TRC appeared before the trial court with a certification that petitioner will be unable to comply with the directive to answer the complaint within the reglementary period, inasmuch as it will take six months for him to complete the rehabilitation program and before he can be recommended for discharge by the Rehabilitation Committee.^]

4.       The trial court, despite the written certification from NBI-TRC, declared petitioner in default and ordered them to present evidence ex-parte. On March 21, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondents. Counsel of respondent filed a motion to set aside judgement at the RTC, RTC affirmed lower court decision. This decision became final, the property was sold in an auction to the respondents, Petitioner filed petition for relief from judgement alleging  that the parcel of land from which he was being evicted had been sold to him by Filomena Bernardo-Crisostomo, as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 13, 1988. Petition was dismissed by RTC. Petitioner filed petition for certiorari before CA which was also dismissed, including his MR, hence this petition for review.

Issue: Whether or not the court (MTC & RTC) acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner

NO. The summon was ineffective.  There being no valid substituted service of summons, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. In actions in personam, summons on the defendant must be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. If efforts to serve the summons personally to defendant is impossible, service may be effected by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and discretion residing therein, or by leaving the copies at the defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.  

1.       Service of summons upon the defendant shall be by personal service first and only when the defendant cannot be promptly served in person will substituted service be availed of.

2.       The impossibility of personal service justifying availment of substituted service should be explained in the proof of service; why efforts exerted towards personal service failed. The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officer’s Return; otherwise, the substituted service cannot be upheld.

3.       It is only under exceptional terms that the circumstances warranting substituted service of summons may be proved by evidence aliunde. It bears stressing that since service of summons, especially for actions in personam, is essential for the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, the resort to a substituted service must be duly justified. Failure to do so would invalidate all subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds

4. Furthermore, nowhere in the return of summons or in the records of this case is it shown that petitioner’s brother, on whom substituted service of summons was effected, was a person of suitable age and discretion residing at petitioner’s residence.