Heirs of Lorenzo Yap v. CA Digest

Heirs of Lorenzo Yap v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No.. 133047 August 17, 1999

Facts: 

1. Petitioners as heirs of Lorenzo Yap filed an action against Ramon Yap and co-respondent for the reconveyance of land, with buildings and improvement on it. They alleged that the said property was held in trust by Ramon and that it was their father Lorenzo who purchased the said land and constructed the apartment building on it. However, alleging that since at that time, Lorenzo was still a Chinese citizen, hence prohibited from owning land, he caused it to be registered in the name of respondent Ramon.

2. The said property was sold by Ramon to his co-respondent which caused the petitioners to file this action.

3. The lower court ruled in favor of the respondents or the ownership of Ramon. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not a trust was constituted between Lorenzo and Ramon

RULING: No, and even it there was an implied trust, it could not have been valid as it was in contravention of applicable laws. There is a basic distinction between implied and express trusts. Express trusts cannot be proved by parole evidence. Even then, in order to establish the existence of an implied trust in real property by parole evidence, the prove should be as fully convincing as the facts as if the acts giving rise to the trust obligation are proven by an authentic document. The petitioners' evidence was insufficient to prove clearly that a trust was constituted between their father and Ramon.

Related Digest on Trusts: See Saltiga v. Romeo for detailed discussion on implied and express trusts

Saltiga v. Romero Digest

Saltiga v. Romero

G.R. No. 109307 November 25, 1999

Ponente: Gonzaga-Reyes, J.:

Trusts

Facts:

1. The petitioners filed an action against Lutero Romero and DBP (bank) for the reconveyance of a parcel of land alleging that the said property was conveyed to Romero by their father by virtue of a trust.

2. In 1939, Eugenio (father)of petitioners obtained the rights and interest to the then public land from the Jaug spouses but since he had already applied for a homestead previously, he could no longer apply for this said land. As a result he caused the application to be under the name of his eldest son Eustaquio. When the father died, the said land was portioned to the children who subsequently possessed each share.

3. Romero alleged that he was subsequently forced to sign three affidavits which purportedly sold the shares to his other siblings. He repudiated the said affidavits which made his sisters file estafa charges against him.

Issue:Whether or not a trust was created between their father and Romero for the benefit of the heirs of the former

RULING: No, and even if there was it would be void for being contrary to law. Eugenio Romero was never the owner of the subject land because all he obtained from the Jaug spouses were the rights and interests to the land. He could not have owned it as his application for homestead patent was disapproved.

More importantly, there was no evidence of the supposed trust. A trust is a legal relationship between a person having an equitable ownership in property and another owning a legal title to such property. The equitable ownership of the former entitles him to perform certain duties and powers by the latter. Trust relations can therefore be express or implied. Express being those created by direct and positive acts of the parties, by a writing or a deed, or will or by words that evidence an intention to create a trust. Implied trusts refer to those that are deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters of intent or which are superinduced on the transaction by operation of law as a matter of equity, independently of the particular intention of the parties. Implied trust can either be resulting  or constructive trusts, both coming by operation of law. 

resulting trusts arise from the equitable doctrine that valuable consideration and not legal title determines the equitable title or interest are presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties. While cosntructive trusts are created by construction of equity to satisfy the demands of justice and prevent enrichment.

Almayri v. Pabale Digest

Almayri v. Pabale

G.R. No. 151243 April 30, 2008

Ponente: Chico-Nazario, J.:

Facts:

1. Almayri petitions the court for the setting aside of the CA decision. 

2. Cesnando Fernando, representing S.M. Fernando Realty Corp filed an action for Specific Performance with Damages (Civil Case) against Nelly Nave who owns a parcel of land which the former alleged was the subject of a 'Kasunduan ng Pagbibilihan'. However, Nave allegedly reneged on their agreement when she refused to accept the partial payment of Fernando. The said lot was instead sold to the Pabale siblings.

3.  Subsequently, the civil proceedings were suspended by virtue of a guardianship proceedings. In June 1988, Nave was declared therein to be incompetent.

4. The lower court declared the nullity of the two sale agreements on the ground that Nave was found incompetent since 1980. The Pabale siblings intervened. The Court of Appeals granted the appeals of both Fernando and the Pabale siblings and upheld the validity of the Deed of Sale executed by Nelly Nave dated February 20,  1984. Hence this petition.

4. Petitioner alleged that since Nave was judicially determined to be an incompetent, all contracts that she subsequently entered into should be declared null and void.

Issue: Whether or not the declaration of incompetency constitutes res judicata 

RULING: No. There was no identity of parties and issues between the special proceeding on the guardianship of Nave and the civil case. The decision on the former on her incompetency should not therefore bar by conclusiveness of judgement the finding in the latter case (civil case) that Nave was competent and had capacity when she entered into the contract of sale over the subject lot in favor of the Pabale siblings.

Herein, the Court expounded on the difference between the two rules on res judicata, namely; 1) bar by previous judgment, and 2) conclusiveness of judgement. Bar by previous judgement means that the judgement in the first case will bar the second case due to the identity of parties, subject-matter, and cause of action. While a bar by virtue of conclusiveness of judgement bars the re-litigation in a second case of a fact or question already settled in a previous case. Hence, even of there is identity of parties, but no identity of causes of action, the first judgement can be conclusive only as to the those matters actually controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved

Nery v. Lorenzo Digest

Nery v. Lorenzo 44 SCRA 431

G.R. No. L-23376  April 27, 1972

Ponente: Fernando, J.:

Facts:

1. A parcel of land was sold to vendee spouses Nery by the widow of the deceased Leoncio Lorenzo. The vendor was Bienvenida (widow), guardian of the decedent's minor children. Two (2) of whom later assailed the validity of the said transaction. The latter contended that despite the order of the guardianship court authorizing the sale of the lot, they were not informed of the move. Further, they contended that the guardianship proceeding was conducted without notifying the two older siblings although they were already more than 14 years of age at that time.

2. The heirs of Silveria Ferrer who allegedly owned 1/4 of the property likewise intervened in the action. The lower court adjudged them the owners of the 1/4 portion and it likewise declared the sale to be null and void.

3. The spouses Nery appealed to the Court of Appeals which declared the deed of sale to the spouses (as to the 3/4 portion) by the guardian is valid, without prejudice to the children demanding from their mother their participation in the proceeds. Not being satisfied with the appellate court's decision, the spouses Nery, the children of the deceased and Bienvenida filed these petitions.

Issue: Whether or not the probate court could have validly authorize the sale of the property

RULING:

No, the juridictional infirmity is clear. The Court of Appeals failed to give due weight to the jurisdictional defect that the minors over 14 years age were not notified. The probate court is therefor correct in not have authorized the sale due to this clear jurisdictional infirmity. The rights of the young should never be ignored and it does not matter if their guardian is their mother, as even in some cases, the interest of the mother is opposed to that of the children.

Finally, when minors are involve, the state being the parens patriae has the duty to protect the rights of persons or individuals who because of age or incapacity are in an unfavorable position.

Parco v. CA Digest

Parco v. Court of Appeals 111 SCRA 262

G.R. No. L-33152 January 30,1982

Ponente: De Castro, J.:

Facts:

1. This case stems from a previous Special proceedings for the guardianship of incompetent Soriaya Rodriguez. The guardianship proceeding originally pertained to Branch 1, CFI of Quezon. Subsequently, it was transferred to Branch IV-Calauag, CFI of Quezon, where respondent judge Kayanan took cognizance of the case.

2. The private respondent, Francisco Rodriguez Jr. was the appointed guardian. Respondent judge approved the conveyance of three (3) parcels of land belonging to the ward to the petitioners, the spouses Parco. 

3. Almost two years after the guardianship court's approval of the 'sale', the private respondent filed an urgent petition for the examination of the subject conveyance of the lots to the petitioners, by virtue of the transfer of title to third parties.   He argued that the conveyance was actually a loan agreement with a right to recover while the spouses alleged that there was an absolute sale of the lands in dispute.  

Issue: Whether or not a guardianship court has jurisdiction to order the reconveyance of the properties to the ward

RULING: No, unlike in previous court decision, the facts of this case is not in all fours as there is a cloud over the titles of the properties in question. A reconveyance would  require the determination of the ownership or title of the subject three parcels of land, which is beyond the jurisdiction of the guardianship court, and thus must be threshed out in a separate and ordinary civil action.

In previous decisions, the court approved the reconveyance to the ward of properties embezzled, concealed or conveyed when there is not question as to the ward's title and ownership to the property. Herein, it is premature to say based only on the pleadings that the ward has clear and undisputable title to the properties.

People vs Lase 219 SCRA 584 Digest

People v. Lase

Offer of Compromise in Criminal Case

Facts:

1. Appellant was convicted of the murder of one Dante Huelva. Huelva was urinating on the roadside when accused appellant stabbed him in the back. This was witnessed by two people Sayson and Pangatihon. 

2. Accused-appellant interposed the defense of alibi and relied on the testimony of his principal witnesses to support his version that he was somewhere else and not at the scene of the crime at the time of the killing. 

3. During the trial, Godofreda Huelva, mother of the victim testified that accused-appellant offered to settle the case for the sum of P10,000.00. In his surrebuttal testimony, accused-appellant vaguely denied this offer of compromise. He, however, insinuated that he could offer a higher amount

RTC: The Trial court held him liable for the killing of Dante Huelva qualifying it to murder,

Issue: Whether or not the offer to settle the case should be admitted as evidence of guilt

YES. An offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. The second paragraph of Section 27, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly provides that,'In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. Murder is not among those criminal cases that can be compromised. 

Treachery was proven but not evident premeditation

The crime was committed with treachery due to the sudden and unexpected attack on the victim, who was then urinating at the side of the road, with a deadly 7-inch Batangas knife. Accused-appellant consciously adopted this mode of attack to facilitate or insure the commission of the crime without risk to himself arising from any defensive or retaliatory act on the part of the victim. Evident premeditation was not duly established by the prosecution.

As to the delay in giving the witness' statement

The failure of prosecution witness Pangantihon to immediately report the incident did not affect his credibility. His initial reluctance either due to unwillingness to be involved in or dragged into criminal investigations is understandable. 

BPI v. Santiago Digest

G.R. No. 169116 March 28, 2007

Ponente: Chico-Nazario, J.:

Service of Summons

Facts:

1. Centrogen, a domestic corporation engaged in pharmaceutical business obtained several loans from Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC), which was secured by a real estate mortage over a parcel of land by Irene Santiago. Subsequently, FEBTC merged with BPI. Due to failure of Centrogen to pay its loans, 

BPI filed a case for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage over the subject property before the RTC of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. Thereafter, a Notice of Sale was issued by the Provincial Sheriff on 21 January 2003. On the same day, the Spouses Santiago were served with the copy of the Notice of Sale.Upon receipt the spouses and Centrogen filed a Complaint seeking the issuance of a TRO and Preliminary and Final Injunction and in the alternative, for the annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage with BPI.

2. The complaint alleged that the initial loan obligation in the amount of P490,000.00, including interest thereon has been fully paid. Such payment notwithstanding, the amount was still included in the amount of computation of the arrears as shown by the document of Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage filed by the latter. Moreover, the Spouses Santiago and Centrogen contended that the original loan agreement was for the amount of 5 Million  but only 2 Million was released by petitioner and as a result, the squalene project failed and the company groped for funds to pay its loan obligations.

3. On 27 February 2003, BPI was summoned to file and serve its Answer and on the same day, summons was served on the Branch Manager of BPI . Instead of filing an Answer, BPI filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and other procedural infirmities attendant to the filing of the complaint. BPI claimed that the Branch Manager of its Sta. Cruz, Laguna Branch, was not one of those authorized by Section 11, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court to receive summons on behalf of the corporation. The summons served upon its Branch Manager, therefore, did not bind the corporation.  Also alleged lack of authorityof the person who signed. RTC denied the MD and issued new summons. 

4. The RTC granted the TRO to prevent foreclosure sale. BPI file MR but was denied hence this petition with BPI alleging that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over its person and consequently, the Order issued by the RTC, permanently enjoining the foreclosure sale, was therefore void and does not bind BPI.

Issue: Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over BPI

YES. The Court acquired jurisdiction over BPI. The defect of the service of the original summons was cured by the issuance of the new summons which was not questioned by BPI.

1. There was substantial compliance. Although it may be true that the service of summons was made on a person not authorized to receive the same in behalf of the petitioner. Since it appears that the summons and complaint were in fact received by the corporation through its said clerk, the Court finds that there was substantial compliance with the rule on service of summons. 

2. The ultimate test on the validity and sufficiency on service of summons is whether the same and the attachments thereto where ultimately received by the corporation under such circumstances that no undue prejudice is sustained by it from the procedural lapse and it was afforded full opportunity to present its responsive pleadings. This is but in accord with the entrenched rule that the ends of substantial justice should not be subordinated to technicalities and, for which purpose, each case should be examined within the factual milieu peculiar to it.

3. The Court also emphasized that there is no hard and fast rule pertaining to the manner of service of summons. Rather, substantial justice demands that every case should be viewed in light of the peculiar circumstances attendant to each.

Philamgen v. Breva Digest

Facts:

1. Respondent Milagros P. Morales filed a Complaint for damages and reimbursement of insurance premiums at RTC Davao against the petitioner Philamgen, a domestic corporation. The complaint specifically stated that the petitioner could be served with summons and other court processes through its Manager at its branch office located at Rizal St., Davao City.

2. Thereafter, Summons was served upon the petitioner's Davao regional office, and was received by its Insurance Service Officer.

3. In December 8, 1999, the petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over its person due to improper service of summons. It contended that summons was improperly served upon its employee in its regional office at Davao City, and that the said employee was not among those named in Section 11, Rule 14 upon whom service of summons may be properly made.The respondent filed an Amended Complaint, alleging that summons and other court processes could also be served at its principal office at the Philamlife Building, U.N. Avenue, Ermita, Manila, through the president or any of its officers authorized to receive summons.

4. The RTC denied the MD and directed the issuance of alias summons on its branch in Manila. the petitioner filed with the CA a special action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65, with application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, assailing the Orders dated December 10, 1999 and January 14, 2000.

5. On October 24, 2000, the CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the assailed orders of the RTC. The CA held that the service of the alias summons on the amended complaint upon the authorized officers of the petitioner at its principal office in Manila vested the RTC with jurisdiction over its person. The CA, likewise, denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said decision on April 25, 2001.

6. Hence, this petition for review, with petitioner averring that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over its person because the service of the summons at its regional office through an insurance service officer was improper.

Issue:  Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner as the defendant therein despite the amendment of the complaint

YES. 

1. Where the defendant has already been served summons on the original complaint, the amended complaint may be served upon him without need of another summons.  Conversely, when no summons has yet been validly served on the defendant, new summons for the amended complaint must be served on him

2. The complaint was amended after the petitioner filed the motion to dismiss.  The Rules provide that the amended complaint supersedes the complaint that it amends. Contrary to the petitioner’s claim, the summons issued on the amended complaint does not become invalid. In fact, summons on the original complaint which has already been served continues to have its legal effect. 

3. It is not pertinent whether the summons is designated as an “original” or an “alias” summons as long as it has adequately served its purpose. What is essential is that the summons complies with the requirements under the Rules of Court and it has been duly served on the defendant together with the prevailing complaint. In this case, the alias summons satisfies the requirements under the Rules, both as to its content and the manner of service. It contains all the information required under the rules, and it was served on the persons authorized to receive the summons on behalf of the petitioner at its principal office in Manila. Moreover, the second summons was technically not an alias summons but more of a new summons on the amended complaint. It was not a continuation of the first summons considering that it particularly referred to the amended complaint and not to the original complaint.

Signetics Corp. v. CA Digest

G.R. No. 105141 August 31, 1993

Ponente: Vitug, J.:

Service of Summons on Foreign Corporations

Facts:

1. The petitioner, Signetics was organized under the laws of the United States of America. Through Signetics Filipinas Corporation (SigFil), a wholly-owned subsidiary, Signetics entered into lease contract over a piece of land with Fruehauf Electronics Phils., Inc. (Freuhauf). 

2. Freuhauf sued Signetics for damages, accounting or return of certain machinery, equipment and accessories, as well as the transfer of title and surrender of possession of the buildings, installations and improvements on the leased land, before the RTC of Pasig (Civil Case No. 59264). Claiming that Signetics caused SigFil to insert in the lease contract the words "machineries, equipment and accessories," the defendants were able to withdraw these assets from the cost-free transfer provision of the contract. 

3. Service of summons was made on Signetics through TEAM Pacific Corp. on the basis of the allegation that Signetics is a "subsidiary of US PHILIPS CORPORATION, and may be served summons at Philips Electrical Lamps, Inc., Las Piñas, Metro Manila and/or c/o Technology Electronics Assembly & Management (TEAM) Pacific Corporation, Electronics Avenue, FTI Complex, Taguig, Metro Manila," service of summons was made on Signetics through TEAM Pacific Corporation.

4. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over its person. Invoking Section 14, Rule 14, of the Rules of Court and the rule laid down in Pacific Micronisian Line, Inc., v. Del Rosario and Pelington  to the effect that the fact of doing business in the Philippines should first be established in order that summons could be validly made and jurisdiction acquired by the court over a foreign corporation. 

5. The RTC denied the Motion to dismiss. While the CA affirmed RTC. Hence this petition. The petitioner argues that what was effectively alleged in the complaint as an activity of doing business was "the mere equity investment" of petitioner in SigFil, which the petitioner insists, had theretofore been transferred to TEAM holdings, Ltd.

Issue: Whether or not the lower court, had correctly assumed jurisdiction over the petitioner, a foreign corporation, on its claim in a motion to dismiss, that it had since ceased to do business in the Philippines.

YES.

1. Signetics cannot, at least in this early stage, assail, on the one hand, the veracity and correctness of the allegations in the complaint and proceed, on the other hand, to prove its own, in order to hasten a peremptory escape. As explained by the Court in Pacific Micronisian, summons may be served upon an agent of the defendant who may not necessarily be its "resident agent designated in accordance with law." The term "agent", in the context it is used in Section 14, refers to its general meaning, i.e., one who acts on behalf of a principal. 

The allegations in the complaint have thus been able to amply convey that not only is TEAM Pacific the business conduit of the petitioner in the Philippines but that, also, by the charge of fraud, is none other than the petitioner itself.

2. The rule is that, a foreign corporation, although not engaged in business in the Philippines, may still look up to our courts for relief; reciprocally, such corporation may likewise be "sued in Philippine courts for acts done against a person or persons in the Philippines" (Facilities Management Corporation v. De la Osa), provided that, in the latter case, it would not be impossible for court processes to reach the foreign corporation, a matter that can later be consequential in the proper execution of judgment. Hence, a State may not exercise jurisdiction in the absence of some good basis (and not offensive to traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice) for effectively exercising it, whether the proceedings are in rem, quasi in rem or in personam.

Samartino v. Raon, CA Digest

Facts:

1.       Respondents Leonor Bernardo-Raon and Agustin G. Crisostomo are the surviving sister and spouse, respectively, of the late Filomena Bernardo-Crisostomo, who passed away on May 17, 1994. Among the properties left by the deceased was her one-half share in a parcel of land in Noveleta, Cavite, registered under in the name of co-owners Lido Beach Corporation and Filomena Bernardo.

2.       2. In 1996, respondents instituted a complaint for ejectment against petitioner Regalado P. Samartino a complaint for ejectment alleging that during the lifetime of Filomena, she leased her share to petitioner for a period of five years counted from 1986; that the said lease expired and was not extended thereafter; and that petitioner refused to vacate the property despite demands therefor.

3.       Summons was served on Roberto Samartino, brother of petitioner. At the time of service, he was not at home as he was then confined at the NBI rehab center since January 19, 1996, where he was undergoing treatment and rehabilitation for drug dependency. Thus, on February 2, 1996, a liaison officer of the NBI-TRC appeared before the trial court with a certification that petitioner will be unable to comply with the directive to answer the complaint within the reglementary period, inasmuch as it will take six months for him to complete the rehabilitation program and before he can be recommended for discharge by the Rehabilitation Committee.^]

4.       The trial court, despite the written certification from NBI-TRC, declared petitioner in default and ordered them to present evidence ex-parte. On March 21, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondents. Counsel of respondent filed a motion to set aside judgement at the RTC, RTC affirmed lower court decision. This decision became final, the property was sold in an auction to the respondents, Petitioner filed petition for relief from judgement alleging  that the parcel of land from which he was being evicted had been sold to him by Filomena Bernardo-Crisostomo, as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 13, 1988. Petition was dismissed by RTC. Petitioner filed petition for certiorari before CA which was also dismissed, including his MR, hence this petition for review.

Issue: Whether or not the court (MTC & RTC) acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner

NO. The summon was ineffective.  There being no valid substituted service of summons, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. In actions in personam, summons on the defendant must be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. If efforts to serve the summons personally to defendant is impossible, service may be effected by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and discretion residing therein, or by leaving the copies at the defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.  

1.       Service of summons upon the defendant shall be by personal service first and only when the defendant cannot be promptly served in person will substituted service be availed of.

2.       The impossibility of personal service justifying availment of substituted service should be explained in the proof of service; why efforts exerted towards personal service failed. The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the proof of service or Officer’s Return; otherwise, the substituted service cannot be upheld.

3.       It is only under exceptional terms that the circumstances warranting substituted service of summons may be proved by evidence aliunde. It bears stressing that since service of summons, especially for actions in personam, is essential for the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, the resort to a substituted service must be duly justified. Failure to do so would invalidate all subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds

4. Furthermore, nowhere in the return of summons or in the records of this case is it shown that petitioner’s brother, on whom substituted service of summons was effected, was a person of suitable age and discretion residing at petitioner’s residence.

Valmonte v. CA Digest

G.R. No. 108538 January 22, 1996

Ponente: Mendoza, J.:

Service of Summons

Facts:

1. Petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a foreign resident. Petitioners Lourdes and Alfredo are husband and wife both residents of 90222 Carkeek Drive South Seattle, Washington, U.S.A. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte, who is a member of the Philippine bar, however, practices his profession in the Philippines, commuting for this purpose between his residence in the state of Washington and Manila, where he holds office at S-304 Gedisco Centre, 1564 A. Mabini, Ermita, Manila.
2.  Private respondent Rosita Dimalanta, who is the sister of petitioner filed an action for partition against former and her husband. She alleged that, the plaintiff is of legal age, a widow and is at present a resident of 14823 Conway Road, Chesterfield, Missouri, U.S.A., while the defendants are spouses but, for purposes of this complaint may be served with summons at Gedisco Center, Unit 304, 1564 A. Mabini St., Ermita, Manila where defendant Alfredo D. Valmonte as defendant Lourdes Arreola Valmonte’s spouse holds office and where he can be found.He husband was also her counsel, who has a law office in the Philippines. The summons were served on her husband.
3. Petitioner in a letter, referred private respondent’s counsel to her husband as the party to whom all communications intended for her should be sent. Service of summons was then made upon petitioner Alfredo at his office in Manila.  Alfredo D. Valmonte accepted his summons, but not the one for Lourdes, on the ground that he was not authorized to accept the process on her behalf. Accordingly the process server left without leaving a copy of the summons and complaint for petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte.
4.  Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte thereafter filed his Answer with Counterclaim. Petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte, however, did not file her Answer. For this reason private respondent moved to declare her in default. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte entered a special appearance in behalf of his wife and opposed the private respondent’s motion. RTC denied the MR of respondents. CA declared petitioner Lourdes in default. Said decision was received by Alfredo hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was validly served with summons.

NO.

There was no valid service of summons  on Lourdes.

1.       The action herein is in the nature of an action quasi in rem. Such an action is essentially for the purpose of affecting the defendant’s interest in a specific property and not to render a judgment against him. As petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a nonresident who is not found in the Philippines, service of summons on her must be in accordance with Rule 14, § 17. Such service, to be effective outside the Philippines, must be made either (1) by personal service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court should be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant; or (3) in any other manner which the court may deem sufficient.

2.       In the case at bar, the service of summons upon petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was not done by means of any of the first two modes.  This mode of service, like the first two, must be made outside the Philippines, such as through the Philippine Embassy in the foreign country where the defendant resides.  The service of summons on petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte was not made upon the order of the court as required by Rule 14, § 17 and certainly was not a mode deemed sufficient by the court which in fact refused to consider the service to be valid and on that basis declare petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte in default for her failure to file an answer.

3.       Secondly, the service in the attempted manner on petitioner was not made upon prior leave of the trial court as required also in Rule 14, § 17. As provided in § 19, such leave must be applied for by motion in writing, supported by affidavit of the plaintiff or some person on his behalf and setting forth the grounds for the application.

4.       Finally, and most importantly, because there was no order granting such leave, petitioner Lourdes was not given ample time to file her Answer which, according to the rules, shall be not less than sixty (60) days after notice. 

Asiavest Limited v. CA Digest

Facts:

1. The plaintiff Asiavest Limited filed a complaint against the defendant Antonio Heras praying that said defendant be ordered to pay to the plaintiff the amounts awarded by the Hong Kong Court Judgment. The action filed in Hong Kong against Heras was in personam, since it was based on his personal guarantee of the obligation of the principal debtor. 

2. The trial court concluded that the Hong Kong court judgment should be recognized and given effect in this jurisdiction for failure of HERAS to overcome the legal presumption in favor of the foreign judgment.

3. Asiavest moved for the reconsideration of the decision. It sought an award of judicial costs and an increase in attorney's fees with interest until full payment of the said obligations. On the other hand, Heras no longer opposed the motion and instead appealed the decision to CA. 

4. The Court of Appeals (CA) agreed with Heras that notice sent outside the state to a non-resident is unavailing to give jurisdiction in an action against him personally for money recovery. Summons should have been personally served on Heras in Hong Kong,

Issue: Whether or not the judgment of the Hong Kong Court has been repelled by evidence of want of jurisdiction due to improper notice to the party

YES.

1. Asiavest cannot now claim that Heras was a resident of Hong Kong at the time since the stipulated fact that Heras "is a resident of New Manila, Quezon City, Philippines" refers to his residence at the time jurisdiction over his person was being sought by the Hong Kong court. Accordingly, since Heras was not a resident of Hong Kong and the action against him was, ne in personam, summons should have been personally served on him in Hong Kong. 

The extraterritorial service in the Philippines was therefore invalid and did not confer on the Hong Kong court jurisdiction over his person. It follows that the Hong Kong court judgment cannot be given force and effect here in the Philippines for having been rendered without jurisdiction.

2. On the same note, Heras was also an absentee,hence, he should have been served with summons in the same manner as a non-resident not found in Hong Kong. Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court providing for extraterritorial service will not apply because the suit against him was in personam. Neither can we apply Section 18, which allows extraterritorial service on a resident defendant who is temporarily absent from the country, because even if Heras be considered as a resident of Hong Kong, the undisputed fact remains that he left Hong Kong not only temporarily but for good. 

Venturanza v. CA Digest

G.R. No. 77760 December 11, 1987

Ponente: Padilla, J.:

Service of Summons

Facts: 

1. Plaintiff Nieves Y. Senoran (now private respondent) filed a complaint against spouses Violeta S. Venturanza and Romy Venturanza (now petitioners) with MTC for collection of sums of money for loans evidenced by promissory notes and due to non-payment became demandable. 

2. The summons was served on the petitioners through the father who refused to sign the receipt. Due to petitioners failure to file an Answer, the court rendered a decision ordering petitioners to pay. However, the said decision could not be served to petitioners address since they were no longer residing there, hence it was served in the Office of Violeta at ADB.

3.  The petitioners filed a "Motion to Set Aside Decision and to Declare Past Proceedings Null and Void for Lack of Jurisdiction," alleging that there was no proper and valid service of summons upon them in accordance with either Section 7 or Section 8 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court and that the court a quonever acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioners, since the address where the summons was served is the residence of Violeta S. Venturanza's father, and not on her address. Hence this petition. 

Issue: Whether or not the Metropolitan Trial Court validly acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the petitioners when the summons was served upon Augusto Soan’s address which is not the residence of petitioners

NO.

1. There is no question that the case at bar which is an action for collection of sum of money, an action in personam thereby requiring personal service of summons on the defendants.  It is only when a defendant can not be personally served with summons within a reasonable time that a substituted service may be availed of. For a substituted service to be valid, summons served at the defendant's residence must be served at his residence at the time of such service and not at his former place of residence.

2. It is further required by law that an effort or attempt should first be made to personally serve the summons and after this has failed, a substituted service may be caused upon the defendant, and the same must be reflected in the proof of service. Upon examination of the sheriff 's Return in this case, no statement was made that an effort or attempt was exerted to personally serve the summons on the defendants and that the same had failed. In fact, said Return did not indicate the address of the defendants to whom summons was supposed to have been served. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions by the sheriff is not applicable in this case where it is patent that the sheriff's return is defective. CA decision reversed and set aside.

Cabili v. Badelles Digest

Facts:

1. Elections of November 10, 1959, Respondent Badelles and Petitioner Cabili were rival candidates for the office of city mayor of Iligan City. Cabili was proclaimed elected and thereafter assumed office, succeeding Badelles the incumbent.

2. Thereafter, Badelles filed a case for quo warranto, questioning Cabili's right to hold the office on the ground that the latter was not a resident of the City for at least one year prior to his election. The petition was filed by the law firm of San Juan, Africa and Benedicto, as counsel for Badelles. Badelles was also represented by several other lawyers but the senior counsel was Atty. Africa, who, in the initial hearing, explained that he is the one in charge of the case, and therefore, requested that all pleadings, notices, orders and other papers be served at his office at 480 Padre Faura St., Manila. In order to avoid any confusion in the service of pleadings and orders, he made of record that only service at the given address will be considered as service on petitioner Badelles and counsel. The Court took note of said request of Attorney Africa.

3. The lower court dismissed the petition with copy of the decision sent to the office address of Atty. Africa and was received the same day. It appears however, that, in the interim, i.e. on December 28, 1959, Badelles, who was then in Iligan City, requested the judge for a copy of the decision. Badelles, was given a copy but refused to sign a receipt therefor. The judge ordered his court interpreter to record the fact of said delivery of a copy to Badelles. This order was complied with. The judge also telegraphed the law office of Atty. Africa in Manila that copy of the decision was sent to them on December 1959 and that petitioner Badelles personally was furnished a copy also on that same day. The telegram was received by Atty. Africa on December 29, 1959.

4. Upon receipt of the decision on January 4, 1960, the Africa Law Office, counsel for Badelles, sent a notified appeal by registered mail on the same date. On January 5, 1960, Badelles filed his own notice of appeal to with a corresponding cash appeal bond of sixty pesos.  The Counsel for Cabili objected to the appeal on the ground that it was filed beyond the period. 

5. On February 15 and 19, 1960, respectively, the court dismissed the appeals filed by Badelles and his counsel on the ground that the same were filed beyond the five-day statutory period for appeal, as provided in Section 178 of the improvised Election Code.  A motion for reconsideration filed by counsel for Badelles was denied for lack of merit, so Badelles filed the petition for certiorari and mandamus in CA to annul said orders. CA granted.

Issue: Whether or not the service to the client was valid

NO. 

1. In accordance with the provisions of Rule 27, Section 2, service of decisions should be made to the lawyers on record and not to parties. In a long line of decisions, the Court have held that when a party appears by an attorney who makes of record his appearance, service of pleadings is required to be made upon said attorney and not upon the party

2. A notice given to the client and not to his attorney is not a notice in law and that service upon a party who has an attorney of record is not a compliance with Rule 27, Sec. 2, which makes service upon counsel mandatory; and that personal information by a party of the rendition of a decision does not satisfy the right of counsel to receive a copy of the decision rendered. 

Gardner v. CA Digest

G.R. No. L-59952 August 31, 1984

Ponente: Melencio-Herrera, J.:

Facts:

1. The case involve several transfers of the subject real property. It appears that petitioners the Gardner spouse enter into an agreement with Respondent spouses, the Santoses to subdivide 2 parcels of land and executed an absolute deed of sale in favor of the latter. The real truth is that what occurred was a sale ‘in trust’ since the petitioner obtained an amount of money  from the respondents, who inturn promised to improve the land.

2. Apparently, the Santoses transferred the properties to the Cuencas who in turn transferred it to the Verroyas who executive a mortgage over the lot. Then Verroya executed a deed of transfers to the Natividads.  Note that from the titles of the Cuencas (the Second Transferees) to the titles of the Natividads (the Fourth Transferee), the Adverse Claim of the Gardners continued to be carried, and that throughout the successive transfers, the petitioners continued to remain in possession, cultivation and occupation of the disputed properties.

3. In their Answer, the Santoses claimed that the sale to them was conditional in the sense that the properties were to be considered as the investment of the petitioners in the subdivision venture and that in the event that this did not materialize they were to reconvey the lots to petitioners upon reimbursement by the latter of all sums advanced to them; and that the deed of sale was to be registered for the protection of the Santoses considering the moneys that the latter would be advancing.

4. Hence, the Gardners filed an action for declaration of Nullity, Rescission and damages against the 5 transferres and mortgagees. The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners declaring the transfers null and void. The CA affirmed in toto the RTC but reconsidered it decision and ruled that the sale of land to Natividad’s are valid.

Issue: Whether or not the admissions made by Santos in the pleadings are admissible

NO.

The testimony of Ariosto Santos is at variance with the allegations in his Answer. As a general rule, facts alleged in a party's pleading are deemed admissions of that party and binding upon it, but this is not an absolute and inflexible rule. An Answer is a mere statement of fact which the party filing it expects to prove, but it is not evidence. 

1. Santos himself, in open Court, had repudiated the defenses raised in his answer and against his own interest, his testimony is deserving of weight and credence. Both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court believed in his credibility and we find no reason to overturn their findings thereon. Santos likewise admitted against his own interest that the petitioners did not receive from him any consideration, which corroborated the declarations of the petitioners. The Subdivision Joint Venture Agreement and the Supplemental Agreement express that the true and real nature of the agreement between the parties, which was for a subdivision and not a sale transaction.

2. All Five Transfers were absolutely simulated and fictitious and were, therefore, void ab initio and inexistent. Contracts of sale are void and produce no effect whatsoever where the price, which appears therein as paid, has, in fact, never been paid by the purchaser to the vendor.

Santos v. Lumbao Digest

Santos vs Lumbao

Facts:

1. Respondent spouses Lumbao filed an action for reconveyance with damages against petitioners. Petitioners are survivors and legitimate heirs of Rita Santos who allegedly sold 2 parcels of land to respondents when she was alive by virtue of a document called ‘bilihan ng lupa’, The repsondents even claimed that the execution of the document was signed and witnessed by petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo.

2. After having acquired the subject property, respondents Spouses Lumbao took actual possession and built a house which they occupied as exclusive owners up to the present. The respondents Spouses Lumbao made several verbal demands upon Rita, during her lifetime, and thereafter upon herein petitioners, to execute the necessary documents to effect the issuance of a separate title in their  favor. 

3. Respondents Spouses Lumbao alleged that prior to her death, Rita informed respondent Proserfina Lumbao she could not deliver the title to the subject property because the entire property inherited by her and her co-heirs from Maria had not yet been partitioned. 

4. Finally, the respondents Lumbao claimed that petitioners, acting fraudulently and in conspiracy with one another, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement, adjudicating and partitioning among themselves and the other heirs, the estate left by Maria, which included the lot already sold to  them. Due to refusal of petitioners to convey the said propert, the spouses filed the action.

5. The lower court (RTC) dismissed the complaint of ground  of lack of cause of action as the spouses allegedly did not comply with the required barangay conciliation. The CA granted and ordered the petititoners  to convey the land to the spouses, hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the admissions made are admissible and binding

YES. As a general rule, facts alleged in a party’s pleading are deemed admissions of that party and are binding upon him, but this is not an absolute and inflexible rule.

1. An answer is a mere statement of fact which the party filing it expects to prove, but it is not evidence. And in spite of the presence of judicial admissions in a party’s pleading, the trial court is still given leeway to consider other evidence presented.However, in the case at bar, petitioners had not adduced any other evidence to override the admission made in their answer that Virgilio and Tadeo actually signed the [Bilihan ng Lupa. Hence, the general rule that the admissions made by a party in a pleading are binding and conclusive upon him applies in this case.

2. In the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979, the signatures of petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo appeared thereon. Moreover, in petitioners’ Answer and Amended Answer to the Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages, both petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo made an admission that indeed they acted as witnesses in the execution of the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979. However, in order to avoid their obligations in the said "Bilihan ng Lupa," petitioner Virgilio, in his cross-examination, denied having knowledge of the sale transaction and claimed that he could not remember the same as well as his appearance before the notary public due to the length of time that had passed.

Director of Lands v. IAC, ACME Plywood and Veneer Co. Digest

Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appelate Court (IAC)
146 SCRA 509 December 29, 1986

Facts:

1. Defendant through his lawyer filed an answer therein admitting the averment in the complaint that the land was acquired by the plaintiff through inheritance from his parents, the former owners thereof. 

2.Subsequently, the defendant changed his counsel, and with leave of court, amended the answer. In the amended answer, the admission no longer appears. The alleged ownership of the land by the plaintiff was denied coupled with an allegation that the defendant is the owner of the land as he bought it from the plaintiff’s parents while they were still alive. 

3. After trial, the lower court upheld the defendant’s ownership of the land. On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the defendant is bound by the admission contained in his original answer. 

Issue: Whether or not the contention of plaintiff is correct

RULING: NO. The original pleading had been amended such that it already disappeared from the record, lost its status as a pleading and cease to be a judicial admission. While the said pleading may be utilized against the pleader as extrajudicial admission, they must, in order to have such effect, be formally offered in evidence.