Gago v. Mamuyac Digest

Gago vs. Mamuyac 

G.R. No. L-26317 January 29, 1927

Johnson, J. (Ponente)

Facts: 

1. Previously, Francisco Gago filed a petition for the probate of a will of Miguel Mamuyac executed on July 27, 1918. The oppositors alleged that the said will was already annulled and revoked. It appeared that on April 16, 1919, the deceased executed another will. The lower court denied the probate of the first will on the ground of the existence of the second will.

2. Another petition was filed to seek the probate of the second will. The oppositors alleged that the second  will presented was merely a copy. According to the  witnesses, the said will was allegedly revoked as per the testimony of Jose Tenoy, one of the witnesses who typed the document. Another witness testified that on December 1920 the original will was actually cancelled by the testator.  

3. The lower court denied the probate and held that the same has been annulled and revoked.

Issue: Whether or not there was a valid revocation of the will

RULING: Yes. The will was already cancelled in 1920. This was inferred when after due search, the original will cannot be found. When the will which cannot be found in shown to be in the possession of the testator when last seen, the presumption is that in the absence of other competent evidence, the same was deemed cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption applies when it is shown that the testator has ready access to the will and it can no longer be found after his death.

BPI v. Santiago Digest

G.R. No. 169116 March 28, 2007

Ponente: Chico-Nazario, J.:

Service of Summons

Facts:

1. Centrogen, a domestic corporation engaged in pharmaceutical business obtained several loans from Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC), which was secured by a real estate mortage over a parcel of land by Irene Santiago. Subsequently, FEBTC merged with BPI. Due to failure of Centrogen to pay its loans, 

BPI filed a case for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage over the subject property before the RTC of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. Thereafter, a Notice of Sale was issued by the Provincial Sheriff on 21 January 2003. On the same day, the Spouses Santiago were served with the copy of the Notice of Sale.Upon receipt the spouses and Centrogen filed a Complaint seeking the issuance of a TRO and Preliminary and Final Injunction and in the alternative, for the annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage with BPI.

2. The complaint alleged that the initial loan obligation in the amount of P490,000.00, including interest thereon has been fully paid. Such payment notwithstanding, the amount was still included in the amount of computation of the arrears as shown by the document of Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage filed by the latter. Moreover, the Spouses Santiago and Centrogen contended that the original loan agreement was for the amount of 5 Million  but only 2 Million was released by petitioner and as a result, the squalene project failed and the company groped for funds to pay its loan obligations.

3. On 27 February 2003, BPI was summoned to file and serve its Answer and on the same day, summons was served on the Branch Manager of BPI . Instead of filing an Answer, BPI filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and other procedural infirmities attendant to the filing of the complaint. BPI claimed that the Branch Manager of its Sta. Cruz, Laguna Branch, was not one of those authorized by Section 11, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court to receive summons on behalf of the corporation. The summons served upon its Branch Manager, therefore, did not bind the corporation.  Also alleged lack of authorityof the person who signed. RTC denied the MD and issued new summons. 

4. The RTC granted the TRO to prevent foreclosure sale. BPI file MR but was denied hence this petition with BPI alleging that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over its person and consequently, the Order issued by the RTC, permanently enjoining the foreclosure sale, was therefore void and does not bind BPI.

Issue: Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over BPI

YES. The Court acquired jurisdiction over BPI. The defect of the service of the original summons was cured by the issuance of the new summons which was not questioned by BPI.

1. There was substantial compliance. Although it may be true that the service of summons was made on a person not authorized to receive the same in behalf of the petitioner. Since it appears that the summons and complaint were in fact received by the corporation through its said clerk, the Court finds that there was substantial compliance with the rule on service of summons. 

2. The ultimate test on the validity and sufficiency on service of summons is whether the same and the attachments thereto where ultimately received by the corporation under such circumstances that no undue prejudice is sustained by it from the procedural lapse and it was afforded full opportunity to present its responsive pleadings. This is but in accord with the entrenched rule that the ends of substantial justice should not be subordinated to technicalities and, for which purpose, each case should be examined within the factual milieu peculiar to it.

3. The Court also emphasized that there is no hard and fast rule pertaining to the manner of service of summons. Rather, substantial justice demands that every case should be viewed in light of the peculiar circumstances attendant to each.

Asiavest Limited v. CA Digest

Facts:

1. The plaintiff Asiavest Limited filed a complaint against the defendant Antonio Heras praying that said defendant be ordered to pay to the plaintiff the amounts awarded by the Hong Kong Court Judgment. The action filed in Hong Kong against Heras was in personam, since it was based on his personal guarantee of the obligation of the principal debtor. 

2. The trial court concluded that the Hong Kong court judgment should be recognized and given effect in this jurisdiction for failure of HERAS to overcome the legal presumption in favor of the foreign judgment.

3. Asiavest moved for the reconsideration of the decision. It sought an award of judicial costs and an increase in attorney's fees with interest until full payment of the said obligations. On the other hand, Heras no longer opposed the motion and instead appealed the decision to CA. 

4. The Court of Appeals (CA) agreed with Heras that notice sent outside the state to a non-resident is unavailing to give jurisdiction in an action against him personally for money recovery. Summons should have been personally served on Heras in Hong Kong,

Issue: Whether or not the judgment of the Hong Kong Court has been repelled by evidence of want of jurisdiction due to improper notice to the party

YES.

1. Asiavest cannot now claim that Heras was a resident of Hong Kong at the time since the stipulated fact that Heras "is a resident of New Manila, Quezon City, Philippines" refers to his residence at the time jurisdiction over his person was being sought by the Hong Kong court. Accordingly, since Heras was not a resident of Hong Kong and the action against him was, ne in personam, summons should have been personally served on him in Hong Kong. 

The extraterritorial service in the Philippines was therefore invalid and did not confer on the Hong Kong court jurisdiction over his person. It follows that the Hong Kong court judgment cannot be given force and effect here in the Philippines for having been rendered without jurisdiction.

2. On the same note, Heras was also an absentee,hence, he should have been served with summons in the same manner as a non-resident not found in Hong Kong. Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court providing for extraterritorial service will not apply because the suit against him was in personam. Neither can we apply Section 18, which allows extraterritorial service on a resident defendant who is temporarily absent from the country, because even if Heras be considered as a resident of Hong Kong, the undisputed fact remains that he left Hong Kong not only temporarily but for good. 

Director of Lands v. IAC, ACME Plywood and Veneer Co. Digest

Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appelate Court (IAC)
146 SCRA 509 December 29, 1986

Facts:

1. Defendant through his lawyer filed an answer therein admitting the averment in the complaint that the land was acquired by the plaintiff through inheritance from his parents, the former owners thereof. 

2.Subsequently, the defendant changed his counsel, and with leave of court, amended the answer. In the amended answer, the admission no longer appears. The alleged ownership of the land by the plaintiff was denied coupled with an allegation that the defendant is the owner of the land as he bought it from the plaintiff’s parents while they were still alive. 

3. After trial, the lower court upheld the defendant’s ownership of the land. On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the defendant is bound by the admission contained in his original answer. 

Issue: Whether or not the contention of plaintiff is correct

RULING: NO. The original pleading had been amended such that it already disappeared from the record, lost its status as a pleading and cease to be a judicial admission. While the said pleading may be utilized against the pleader as extrajudicial admission, they must, in order to have such effect, be formally offered in evidence. 

Leobrera v. CA Digest

G.R. No. 80001 February 27, 1989
Ponente: Cortez, J.:

Facts:

1. The petitioner was granted a credit facility and revolving fund by BPI consisting of several amounts. Both were secured by a mortgage. The facility was granted as part of an amicable settlement between BPI and Leobrera wherein the latter agreed to drop his claims for damages against the former for its alleged failure to deliver on time three export letters of credit opened in Leobrera's favor. In 1984, the facility was entirely converted into a revolving promissory note line. The line was last renewed on 21 March 1986 evidenced by two 90-day promissory notes.

2. Leobrera also obtained from BPI a separate three-year term loan in the amount of P 500,000.00 evidenced by Promissory Note. This three-year term loan was secured by a third real estate mortgage. Upon maturity of the 90-day notes, BPI and Leobrera negotiated on the terms of their renewal. No agreement having been reached by them, so BPI demanded the full payment of the loan. 

3. Leobrera failed to settle his loan account thus BPI prepared to foreclose the real estate mortgages securing the same. Before BPI could institute foreclosure proceedings however, Leobrera filed on 6 January 1987 a complaint for damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin BPI from foreclosing the mortgages.

4. The trial court issued an order restraining BPI from foreclosing the real estate mortgages securing the 90 day loans and, after hearing, issued a writ of preliminary injunction. Meanwhile, on 9 February 1987, the bank wrote Leobrera claiming that he failed to pay the amortization due on the three-year term loan, as a result of which, BPI opted to accelarate the maturity of the loan and called the entire loan due and demandable. Leobrera likewise failed to remit the amount due and BPI thus threatened to foreclose the real estate mortgage securing the loan.

5. Before BPI could foreclose the mortgage, petitioner filed with the trial court on 11 March 1987 a "Motion to File Supplemental Complaint," attaching the supplemental complaint which prayed for the issuance of an injunction to restrain BPI from foreclosing the third mortgage. The next day, 12 March 1987, the trial court granted Leobrera's motion to file the supplemental complaint and issued a restraining order enjoining BPI from proceeding with any "Legal, court or other action" arising from the promissory note evidencing the three-year term loan.

Issue: Whether or not the court erred in admitting the supplemental complaint

YES. 

1. The Court ruled that when the cause of action stated in the supplemental complaint is different from the causes of action mentioned in the original complaint, the court should not admit the supplemental complaint; the parties may file supplemental pleadings only to supply deficiencies in aid of an original pleading, but not to introduce new and independent causes of action.

As to the supplemental complaint, what likewise militates against its admission is the fact that the matters involved therein are entirely different from the causes of action mentioned in the original complaint.

2. The petitioner's main cause of action in the original complaint filed in Civil Case No. 15644 concerned BPI's threat to foreclose two real estate mortgages securing the two 90 day promissory notes executed by petitioner in 1986. Petitioner alleges that this threatened foreclosure violated the terms of the 1980 amicable settlement between BPI and petitioner.While the supplemental complaint alleged acts of harassment committed by BPI in unreasonably opting to declare petitioner in default and in demanding full liquidation of the 1985 three-year term loan. This three-year term loan, as previously mentioned, was entirely distinct and separate from the two promissory notes. It was independent of the 1980 amicable settlement between petitioner and BPI which gave rise to the credit facility subject of the original complaint. Although there is Identity in the remedies asked for in the original and supplemental complaints, i.e. injunction, petitioner's subsequent cause of action giving rise to the claim for damages in the supplemental complaint is unrelated to the amicable settlement which brought about the grant of the credit facilities, the breach of which settlement is alleged to be the basis of the original complaint. 

As the allegations reveal, the P 500,000.00 three-year term loan is a transaction independent of the P 800,000.00 credit facility and BPI's questioned act of threatening to foreclose the properties securing said loan was the result of an alleged default by petitioner in the payment of the amortization due for 9 February 1987 and not because of any circumstance related to the 1980 amicable settlement.

The two causes of action being entirely different, the latter one could not be successfully pleaded by supplemental complaint.

Young v. Sy Digest

G.R. 157745 September 26, 2006
Ponente: Austria-Martinez, J.:

Forum Shopping; Litis Pendentia

Facts:  

1. The case involves 2 petitions for review under Rule 45 which were consolidated. Both petitions originated from a Complaint for Nullification of Second Supplemental Extra-judicial Settlement, Mortgage, Foreclosure Sale and Tax Declaration filed by the petitioner Genalyn D. Young. In her complaint, she alleged that the extra-judicial partition executed by her mother that adjudicated an unregistered parcel of land solely in favor of the latter, is unenforceable, since at the time of the execution, she (petitioner) was only 15 years old and no court approval had been procured; that the partition had been registered with the Register of Deeds; that Lilia Dy obtained a loan from spouses Manuel Sy and Victoria Sy (respondents) and mortgaged the subject property; that the property was foreclosed and sold to the highest bidder, respondent Manuel Sy; that a Certificate of Sale for this purpose had been registered with the Register of Deeds; and that, thereafter, respondents obtained in their name a tax declaration over the property in question.

2. The petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion to Admit Supplemental Complaint, attaching the Supplemental Complaint and she invoked her right, as co-owner, to exercise the legal redemption. 

3. The RTC denied the Motion hence the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA denied the petition and held that the cause of action of the petitioner in the Supplemental Complaint is entirely different from the original complaint; that the Supplemental Complaint did not merely supply its deficiencies; and that, at any rate, in the event the trial court issues an adverse ruling, the petitioner can still appeal the same, hence, the petition under Rule 65 is not proper. Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.

3. While the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus (re: Supplemental Complaint) was pending in the CA, trial in the RTC continued. On August 29, 2001, a day before the hearing slated for August 30, 2001, the petitioner filed a Motion to Cancel Hearing, alleging that she was indisposed. On the day of the hearing, respondents, through counsel, objected to the postponement and moved for the dismissal of the case for non-suit. The RTC sustained the objection and issued the assailed August 30, 2001 Order dismissing the Complaint. 

4. On top of the foregoing appeal, the petitioner, four months after filing her Notice of Appeal to the CA,  filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 70610 to annul the same RTC Orders that comprise the subject matter of the ordinary appeal. The petitioner raised essentially the same issues. CA denied the petition and held that the dismissal of the case by the RTC on the ground of non prosequitur has the effect of an adjudication upon the merits that may constitute an error of judgment correctible by ordinary appeal and not by certiorari; that the petitioner actually chose the mode of ordinary appeal by filing a Notice of Appeal on January 31, 2000; and that since the remedy of appeal was available, then the petition for certiorari, being an extraordinary remedy, must fail.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is forum shopping

YES, the Petitioner guilty of forum shopping

1. Forum shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. There is forum shopping where there exist: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful would amount to res judicata.

2. The petitioner, by filing an ordinary appeal and a petition for certiorari with the CA, engaged in forum shopping. When the petitioner commenced the appeal, only four months had elapsed prior to her filing with the CA the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 and which eventually came up to this Court by way of the instant Petition.

3. The elements of litis pendentia are present between the two suits. Both suits are founded on exactly the same facts and refer to the same subject matter—the RTC Orders which dismissed Civil Case No. SP-5703 (2000) for failure to prosecute. In both cases, the petitioner is seeking the reversal of the RTC orders. The parties, the rights asserted, the issues professed, and the reliefs prayed for, are all the same. It is evident that the judgment of one forum may amount to res judicata in the other.

Hinlo v. Hinlo Digest

G.R. No. 170243 April 16, 2008 

Facts of the Case: 

Enrique Hinlo died intestate in 1986. His heirs, herein petitioners filed for letters of administration where the widow Ceferina was initially appointed as special administrator but was eventually replaced by Nancy Zayco and Remo Hinlo (as co-admin) due ot the illness of their mother.

In 2003, respondent Atty. Hinlo, the grandson of the deceased filed for a petition of issuance of letters in his favor and for the removal of the petitioners. This was opposed by the petitioners. The lower court revoked the appointment of the petitioners and issued letters of administration in favor of respondent wherein he was also required to file a bond.

The petitioners received the copy of the decision dated July 23 on August 2, 2002. They then file a Motion for reconsideration on August 9. The lower court (RTC) denied their motion in an order dated July 23, 2003. The petitioners received their copy of this decision on July 31, 2003 and submitted their record on appeal on the 29th of August 2003. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) denied the notice on appeal/record on appeal on the ground that the July 23 orders are interlocutory and not subject to appeal, and that they were also filed late. The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition for mandamus and affirmed RTC decision that the appeal was filed late.

Issue: Whether or not the July 23 orders are interlocutory

NO.

 (1)The July 23 orders are not interlocutory but final orders hence, are appealable. The order appointing an administrator of a deceased person's estate is a final determination of the rights of the parties in connection with the administration, management and settlement of the decedent’s estate.

(2) In appeals in special proceedings, a record on appeal is required. Both the notice and record should be field within the 30-day period from the receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Hence, the petitioner has until August 30 to file the appeal, so their appeals  was made on time. The CA decision was reversed and set aside. Petition is granted.