Eleizegui v. The Manila Lawn Tennis Club Digest G.R. No. 967

Eleizegui v. The Manila Lawn Tennis Club

G.R. No. 967 May 19, 1903

Facts:

A contract of lease was executed on January 25, 1980 over a piece of land owned by the plaintiffs Eleizegui (Lessor)  to the Manila Lawn Tennis Club, an English association (represented by Mr. Williamson) for a fixed consideration of P25 per month and accordingly, to last at the will of the lessee. Under the contract, the lessee can make improvements deemed desirable for the comfort and amusement of its members. It appeared that the plaintiffs terminated the lease right on the first month. The defendant is in the belief that there can be no other mode of terminating the lease than by its own will, as what they believe has been stipulated.

As a result the plaintiff filed a case for unlawful detainer for the restitution of the land claiming that article 1569 of the Civil Code provided that a lessor may judicially dispossess the lessee upon the expiration of the conventional term or of the legal term; the conventional term — that is, the one agreed upon by the parties; the legal term, in defect of the conventional, fixed for leases by articles 1577 and 1581. The Plaintiffs argued that the duration of the lease depends upon the will of the lessor on the basis of Art. 1581 which provides that, "When the term has not been fixed for the lease, it is understood to be for years when an annual rental has been fixed, for months when the rent is monthly. . . ." The second clause of the contract provides as follows: "The rent of the said land is fixed at 25 pesos per month."

The lower court ruled in favor of the Plaintiffs on the basis of Article 1581 of the Civil Code, the law which was in force at the time the contract was entered into. It is of the opinion that the contract of lease was terminated by the notice given by the plaintiff. The judgment was entered upon the theory of the expiration of a legal term which does not exist, as the case requires that a term be fixed by the courts under the provisions of article 1128 with respect to obligations which, as is the present, are terminable at the will of the obligee.

ISSUE: a) Whether or not the parties have agreed upon the duration of the lease

             b) Whether or not the lease depends upon the will of the lessee

RULING:

a)      YES, the parties have agreed upon a term hence Art. 1581 is inapplicable.

The legal term cannot be applied under Art 1581 as it appears that there was actually an agreement between the parties as to the duration of the lease, albeit implied that the lease is to be dependent upon the will of the lessee. It would be absurd to accept the argument of the plaintiff that the contract was terminated at its notice, given this implication.

Interestingly, the contract should not be understood as one stipulated as a life tenancy, and still less as a perpetual lease since the terms of the contract express nothing to this effect, even if they implied this idea. If the lease could last during such time as the lessee might see fit, because it has been so stipulated by the lessor, it would last, first, as long as the will of the lessee — that is, all his life; second, during all the time that he may have succession, inasmuch as he who contracts does so for himself and his heirs. (Art. 1257 of the Civil Code.) The lease in question does not fall within any of the cases in which the rights and obligations arising from a contract can not be transmitted to heirs, either by its nature, by agreement, or by provision of law. Moreover, being a lease, then it must be for a determinate period. (Art. 1543.) By its very nature it must be temporary, just as by reason of its nature, an emphyteusis must be perpetual, or for an unlimited period. (Art. 1608.)

B) The duration of the lease does not depend solely upon the will of the Lessee (defendant).

It cannot be concluded that the termination of the contract is to be left completely at the will of the lessee simply because it has been stipulated that its duration is to be left to his will.

The Civil Code has made provision for such a case in all kinds of obligations. In speaking in general of obligations with a term it has supplied the deficiency of the former law with respect to the "duration of the term when it has been left to the will of the debtor," and provides that in this case the term shall be fixed by the courts. (Art. 1128, sec. 2.) In every contract, as laid down by the authorities, there is always a creditor who is entitled to demand the performance, and a debtor upon whom rests the obligation to perform the undertaking. In bilateral contracts the contracting parties are mutually creditors and debtors. Thus, in this contract of lease, the lessee is the creditor with respect to the rights enumerated in article 1554, and is the debtor with respect to the obligations imposed by articles 1555 and 1561. The term within which performance of the latter obligation is due is what has been left to the will of the debtor. This term it is which must be fixed by the courts.

The only action which can be maintained under the terms of the contract is that by which it is sought to obtain from the judge the determination of this period, and not the unlawful detainer action which has been brought — an action which presupposes the expiration of the term and makes it the duty of the judge to simply decree an eviction. To maintain the latter action it is sufficient to show the expiration of the term of the contract, whether conventional or legal; in order to decree the relief to be granted in the former action it is necessary for the judge to look into the character and conditions of the mutual undertakings with a view to supplying the lacking element of a time at which the lease is to expire.

The lower court’s judgement is erroneous and  therefore reversed and the case was remanded with directions to enter a judgment of dismissal of the action in favor of the defendant, the Manila Lawn Tennis Club.