Dadivas de Villanueva v. Villanueva, 54 Phil 93

"The law is not so unreasonable as to require a wife to live in marital relations with a husband whose incurable propensity towards other women makes common habitation with him unbearable...xxx"

My dears, this case happened even before World War 2, think 1927-ish era.  Nevertheless, the story seems familiar, in fact, this is still good case law as it is still cited in one of my Remedial law books.
 

Villanueva v. Villanueva
G.R.  No. L-33352

Facts

The wife (Aurelia Dadivas de Villanueva) files for support against the husband (Rafael Villanueva) to obtain separate maintenance as she decided to live separately from the marital home (a month before filing this case) due to the husband's cruelty and repeated infidelity with other women outside their marital ties. The wife also wants to obtain custody of their 2 younger children, aged 10 and 9 as well as reimbursement of attorney's fees incurred for this case.

It appears that during the ten years prior to the filing of this case, the defendant has been involved in illicit relations with four different women, including another different one while this case was pending.

The complainant for the purpose of keeping the marriage intact, continued to bear with the infidelity of the defendant. It was only on April 20, 1927 when due to the cruelty of the defendant, the complainant decided to live their conjugal home.

The Lower Court's decision

The lower court absolved the defendant husband and abrogated a previous order approving support, hence the wife's appeal to the Court of Appeals.  Said decision was later affirmed hence this appeal.

Issue

Whether the complainant is entitled to support (separate maintenance) on the ground of cruelty and marital infidelity.

Ruling

Yes. The complainant is entitled to support.

It was held by the Supreme Court that (to quote)

"The law is not so unreasonable as to require a wife to live in marital relations with a husband whose incurable propensity towards other women makes common habitation with him unbearable.

Deeply rooted instincts of human nature sanction the separation in such a case, and the law is not so unreasonable as to require as acquiescence on the part of the injured party which is beyond the capacity of nature.

Inn order to entitle a wife to maintain a separate home and to require separate maintenance from her husband it is not necessary that the husband should bring a concubine into the marital domicile. Perverse and illicit relations with women outside of the marital establishment are enough.

As was said by Justice Moreland in Goitia v. Campos Rueda (35 Phil 252, 262),  a husband cannot, by his own wrongful acts, relieve himself from the duty to support his wife imposed by law; and where a husband by wrongful, illegal, and unbearable conduct, drives his wife from the domicile fixed by him, he cannot take advantage of her departure to abrogate the law applicable to the marital relations and repudiate his duties thereunder.

Eleizegui v. The Manila Lawn Tennis Club Digest G.R. No. 967

Eleizegui v. The Manila Lawn Tennis Club

G.R. No. 967 May 19, 1903

Facts:

A contract of lease was executed on January 25, 1980 over a piece of land owned by the plaintiffs Eleizegui (Lessor)  to the Manila Lawn Tennis Club, an English association (represented by Mr. Williamson) for a fixed consideration of P25 per month and accordingly, to last at the will of the lessee. Under the contract, the lessee can make improvements deemed desirable for the comfort and amusement of its members. It appeared that the plaintiffs terminated the lease right on the first month. The defendant is in the belief that there can be no other mode of terminating the lease than by its own will, as what they believe has been stipulated.

As a result the plaintiff filed a case for unlawful detainer for the restitution of the land claiming that article 1569 of the Civil Code provided that a lessor may judicially dispossess the lessee upon the expiration of the conventional term or of the legal term; the conventional term — that is, the one agreed upon by the parties; the legal term, in defect of the conventional, fixed for leases by articles 1577 and 1581. The Plaintiffs argued that the duration of the lease depends upon the will of the lessor on the basis of Art. 1581 which provides that, "When the term has not been fixed for the lease, it is understood to be for years when an annual rental has been fixed, for months when the rent is monthly. . . ." The second clause of the contract provides as follows: "The rent of the said land is fixed at 25 pesos per month."

The lower court ruled in favor of the Plaintiffs on the basis of Article 1581 of the Civil Code, the law which was in force at the time the contract was entered into. It is of the opinion that the contract of lease was terminated by the notice given by the plaintiff. The judgment was entered upon the theory of the expiration of a legal term which does not exist, as the case requires that a term be fixed by the courts under the provisions of article 1128 with respect to obligations which, as is the present, are terminable at the will of the obligee.

ISSUE: a) Whether or not the parties have agreed upon the duration of the lease

             b) Whether or not the lease depends upon the will of the lessee

RULING:

a)      YES, the parties have agreed upon a term hence Art. 1581 is inapplicable.

The legal term cannot be applied under Art 1581 as it appears that there was actually an agreement between the parties as to the duration of the lease, albeit implied that the lease is to be dependent upon the will of the lessee. It would be absurd to accept the argument of the plaintiff that the contract was terminated at its notice, given this implication.

Interestingly, the contract should not be understood as one stipulated as a life tenancy, and still less as a perpetual lease since the terms of the contract express nothing to this effect, even if they implied this idea. If the lease could last during such time as the lessee might see fit, because it has been so stipulated by the lessor, it would last, first, as long as the will of the lessee — that is, all his life; second, during all the time that he may have succession, inasmuch as he who contracts does so for himself and his heirs. (Art. 1257 of the Civil Code.) The lease in question does not fall within any of the cases in which the rights and obligations arising from a contract can not be transmitted to heirs, either by its nature, by agreement, or by provision of law. Moreover, being a lease, then it must be for a determinate period. (Art. 1543.) By its very nature it must be temporary, just as by reason of its nature, an emphyteusis must be perpetual, or for an unlimited period. (Art. 1608.)

B) The duration of the lease does not depend solely upon the will of the Lessee (defendant).

It cannot be concluded that the termination of the contract is to be left completely at the will of the lessee simply because it has been stipulated that its duration is to be left to his will.

The Civil Code has made provision for such a case in all kinds of obligations. In speaking in general of obligations with a term it has supplied the deficiency of the former law with respect to the "duration of the term when it has been left to the will of the debtor," and provides that in this case the term shall be fixed by the courts. (Art. 1128, sec. 2.) In every contract, as laid down by the authorities, there is always a creditor who is entitled to demand the performance, and a debtor upon whom rests the obligation to perform the undertaking. In bilateral contracts the contracting parties are mutually creditors and debtors. Thus, in this contract of lease, the lessee is the creditor with respect to the rights enumerated in article 1554, and is the debtor with respect to the obligations imposed by articles 1555 and 1561. The term within which performance of the latter obligation is due is what has been left to the will of the debtor. This term it is which must be fixed by the courts.

The only action which can be maintained under the terms of the contract is that by which it is sought to obtain from the judge the determination of this period, and not the unlawful detainer action which has been brought — an action which presupposes the expiration of the term and makes it the duty of the judge to simply decree an eviction. To maintain the latter action it is sufficient to show the expiration of the term of the contract, whether conventional or legal; in order to decree the relief to be granted in the former action it is necessary for the judge to look into the character and conditions of the mutual undertakings with a view to supplying the lacking element of a time at which the lease is to expire.

The lower court’s judgement is erroneous and  therefore reversed and the case was remanded with directions to enter a judgment of dismissal of the action in favor of the defendant, the Manila Lawn Tennis Club.

Nepomuceno v. CA Digests

Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals

Facts:

1. Martin Hugo died on 1974 and he left a will wherein he instituted Sofia Nepomuceno as the sole and only executor. It was also provided therein that he was married to Rufina Gomez with whom he had 3 children.

2. Petitioner (Sofia) filed for the probate of the will but the legal wife and her children opposed alleging that the will was procured through improper and undue influence and that there was an admission of concubinage with the petitioner.

3. The lower court denied the probate on the ground of the testator's admission of cohabitation, hence making the will invalid on its face. The Court of Appeals reversed and held that the will is valid except the devise in favor of the petitioner which is null and void in violation of Art. 739 and 1028.

Issue: Whether or not the court can pass on the intrinsic validity of a will

RULING: Yes, as an exception. But the general rule is that the court's area of inquiry is limited to the an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. This general rule is however not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and may pass upon certain provisions of the will. The will itself admitted on its face the relationship between the testator and the petitioner.

The will was validly executed in accordance with law but the court didn't find it to serve a practical purpose to remand the nullified provision in a separate action for that purpose only since in the probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions.

The devisee is invalid by virtue of Art. 739 which voids a donation made between persons guilty of adultery/concubinage at the time of the donations. Under Art, 1028 it is also prohibited.

Gallanosa v. Arcangel Digest

Gallanosa v. Arcangel

Facts:

1. Florentino Gallanosa executed a will in 1938 when he was 80 years old. He owned 61 parcels of and at that time. He died in 1939 childless and survived by his brother Leon. In his will, he bequethed his 1/2 share of the conjugal estate to his second wife Tecla and if she predecease him (as what occurred), the said share shall be assigned to the spouses Gallanosa (Pedro & Corazon). Pedro is Tecla's son by her 1st marriage. He also gave 3 parcels of land to Adolfo, his protege.

2. The said will was admitted to probate with Gallanosa as executor. In 1952, thjhe legal heirs filed an action for the recovery of said 61 parcels of land. The action was dismissed on the ground of res judicata. Then, 28 years after probate, another acton agaisnt Gallanosa for annulment of the will, recovery of the lands alleging fraud and deceit, was filed. As a result, the lower court set aide the 1939 decree of probate.

Issue: Whether or not a will which has been probated may still be annulled

RULING: No. A final decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution of the will. Due execution means that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time of the execution and that he was not acting under duress, menace, fraud or undue influence. Finally, that it was executed in accordance with the formalities provided by law.

The period for seeking relief under Rule 38 has already expired, hence the judgment may only be set aside on the grounds of, 1) lack of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law, and 2) the judgment was obtained by means of extrinsic collateral fraud (which must be filed within 4 years from the discovery). Finally, Art. 1410 cannot apply to wills and testament.

Guevara v Guevara Digest

Guevara v. Guevara Digest

Facts:

1. Victorino Guevara executed a will in 1931 wherein he made various bequests t his wife, stepchildren, wife in the 2nd marriage. He has a legitimate son Ernesto and a natural daughter Rosario. Therein, he acknowledged Rosario as his natural daughter.

2. In 1933, Victorino died but his last will was never presented for probate nor was there any settlement proceeding initiated. It appeared that only his son Ernest possessed the land which he adjudicated to himself. While Rosario who had the will in her custody, did nothing to invoke the acknowledgment, as well as the devise given to her.

3. Subsequently, Rosario filed an action for the recovery of her legitime from Ernesto, a portion of a large parcel of land invoking the acknowledgment contained in the will and based on the assumption that the decedent died intestate because his will was not probated. She alleged that the disposition in favor of Ernesto should be disregarded.

4. The lower court and the Court of Appeals sustained Rosario's theory.

Issue: Whether or not the probate of a will can be dispensed with

RULING: No. Rosario's contention violates procedural law and considered an attempt to circumvent the last will and testament of the decedent. The presentation of a will to the court for probate is mandatory and its allowance is essential and indispensable to its efficacy.

Suppression of the wil is contrary to law and public policy for without probate, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory.

Diaz v. De Leon Digest

Diaz v. De Leon 
G.R. No. 17714 May 31, 1922

Facts:
1. Jesus de Leon executed 2 wills, the second will was not deemed in conformance to the requirements under the law. After executing his first will, he asked it to be immediately returned to him. As it was returned, he instructed his servant to tear it. This was done in the testator's presence and his nurse. After sometime, he was asked by his physician about the incident wherein he replied that the will has already been destroyed.

Issue: Whether or not there was a valid revocation of the will

RULING: Yes. His intention to revoke is manifest from the facts that he was anxious to withdraw or change the provisions he made in the first will. This fact was shown from his own statements to the witnesses and the mother superior of the hospital where he was subsequently confined. The original will which was presented for probate is deemed destroyed hence, it cannot be probated as the last will and testament of testator.

Gago v. Mamuyac Digest

Gago vs. Mamuyac 

G.R. No. L-26317 January 29, 1927

Johnson, J. (Ponente)

Facts: 

1. Previously, Francisco Gago filed a petition for the probate of a will of Miguel Mamuyac executed on July 27, 1918. The oppositors alleged that the said will was already annulled and revoked. It appeared that on April 16, 1919, the deceased executed another will. The lower court denied the probate of the first will on the ground of the existence of the second will.

2. Another petition was filed to seek the probate of the second will. The oppositors alleged that the second  will presented was merely a copy. According to the  witnesses, the said will was allegedly revoked as per the testimony of Jose Tenoy, one of the witnesses who typed the document. Another witness testified that on December 1920 the original will was actually cancelled by the testator.  

3. The lower court denied the probate and held that the same has been annulled and revoked.

Issue: Whether or not there was a valid revocation of the will

RULING: Yes. The will was already cancelled in 1920. This was inferred when after due search, the original will cannot be found. When the will which cannot be found in shown to be in the possession of the testator when last seen, the presumption is that in the absence of other competent evidence, the same was deemed cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption applies when it is shown that the testator has ready access to the will and it can no longer be found after his death.

Maloto v. CA Digest

Maloto v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 76464 February 29, 1988

Sarmiento, J. (Ponente)

Facts: 

1. Petitioners and respondents are the neices/nephews or Adriana Maloto who died in 1963. The four heirs believed that the deceased  did not leave a will, hesnce they filed an intestate proceeding. However, the parties executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate dividing it into four equal parts.

2. In 1967, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, ex-associate of the deceased's counsel allegedly discovered her last will which was purportedly dated 1940, inside a cabinet. Hence the annulment of the proceedings and a probate petition was filed by the devisees and legatees. The said will was allegedly burned by the househelp under the   instruction of the deceased

3. The lower court denied the probate on the ground that the animus revocandi in the burning of the will was sufficiently proven.

Issue: Whether or not there was valid revocation of the will

RULING: No, there was no revocation. For a valid revocation to occur,the 'corpus' and 'animus' must concur, one without the other will not produce a valid revocation. The physical act of destruction of a will must come with an intention to revoke (animus revocandi). In this case, there's paucity of evidence to comply with the said requirement. The paper burned was not established to be the will and the burning though  done under her express direction was not done in her presence.

Under Art. 830, the physical act of destruction, in this case the burning of the will, does not constitute an effective revocation, unless it is coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the testator. Since animus is a state of mind, it has to be accompanied by an overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating or cancelling done by the testator himself or by another under his express direction and  presence.

Gonzales v. Court of Appeals (CA) Digest

Gonzales v. CA

G.R. No. L-37453 May 25, 1979
Guerrero, J. (Ponente)

Facts: 

1. Petitioner Rizalina Gonzales and Lutgarda Santiago (Private respondent) are the nieces of the deceased Isabel Gabriel who died a widow. A will was thereafter submitted to probate. The said will was typewritten, in Tagalog and appeared to have been executed in April 1961 or two months prior to the death of Isabel. It consisted of 5 pages including the attestation and acknowledgment, with the signature of testatrix on page 4 and the left margin of all the pages.

2. Lutgarda was named as the universal heir and executor. The petitioner opposed the probate. 

3. The lower court denied the probate on the ground that the will was not executed and attested in accordance with law on the issue of the competency and credibility of the witnesses.

Issue: Whether or not the credibility of the subscribing witnesses is material to the validity of a will

RULING: No. The law requires only that witnesses posses the qualifications under Art. 820 (NCC) and none of the disqualifications of Art. 802. There is no requirement that they are of good standing or reputation in the community, for trustworthiness, honesty and uprightness in order that his testimony is believed and accepted in court. For the testimony to be credible, it is not mandatory that evidence be established on record that the witnesses have good standing in the the community. Competency is distinguished from credibility, the former being determined by Art. 820 while the latter does not require evidence of such good standing. Credibility depends on the convincing weight of his testimony in court.

Kalaw v. Relova Digest

Kalaw v. Relova

G.R. No. L-40207 September 28, 1984

Melencio-Herrera, J. (Ponente)

Facts:

1. Gregorio Kalaw, the private respondent, claiming to be the sole heir of sister Natividad, filed a peition for probate of the latter's holographic will in 1968. The will contained 2 alterations: a) Rosa's name, designated as the sole heir was crossed out and instead "Rosario" was written above it. Such was not initialed, b) Rosa's name was crossed out as sole executrix and Gregorio's ma,e was written above it. This alteration was initialed by the testator.

2. Rosa contended that the will as first written should be given effect so that she would be the sole heir. The lower court denied the probate due to the unauthenticated alterations and additions.

Issue: Whether or not the will is valid

RULING: No, the will is voided or revoked since nothing remains in the will which could remain valid as there was only one disposition in it. Such was altered by the substitution of the original heir with another. To rule that the first will should be given effect is to disregard the testatrix' change of mind. However, this change of mind cannot be given effect either as she failed to authenticate it in accordance with Art. 814, or by affixing her full signature.

Cruz v. Villasor Digest

Cruz v. Villasor 

G.R. L-32213 November 26, 1973

Ponente: Esguerra, J.:

Facts:

1. The CFI of Cebu allowed the probate of the last will and testament of the late Valenti Cruz. However, the petitioner opposed the allowance of the will alleging that it was executed through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, and undue influence. He further alleged that the instrument was executed without the testator having been informed of its contents and finally, that it was not executed in accordance with law.

2. One of the witnesses, Angel Tevel Jr. was also the notary before whom the will was acknowledged. Despite the objection, the lower court admitted the will to probate on the ground that there is substantial compliance with the legal requirements of having at least 3 witnesses even if the notary public was one of them.

Issue: Whether or not the will is valid in accordance with Art. 805 and 806 of the NCC

HELD: NO.

The will is not valid. The notary public cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the said will. An acknowledging officer cannot serve as witness at the same time.

To acknowledge before means to avow, or to own as genuine, to assent, admit, and 'before' means in front of or preceding in space or ahead of. The notary cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation int he making of the will. To permit such situation would be absurd.

Finally, the function of a notary among others is to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements, a function defeated if he were to be one of the attesting or instrumental witnesses. He would be interested in sustaining the validity of the will as it directly involves himself and the validity of his own act. he would be in an inconsistent position, thwarting the very purpose of the acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud.

Nera v. Rimando Digest

Nera v. Rimando 

G.R. L-5971 February 27, 1911

Ponente: Carson, J.:

'Test of Presence'

Facts:

1. At the time the will was executed, in a large room connecting with a smaller room by a doorway where a curtain hangs across, one of the witnesses was in the outside room when the other witnesses were attaching their signatures to the instrument.

2. The trial court did not consider the determination of the issue as to the position of the witness as of vital importance in determining the case. It agreed with the ruling in the case of Jaboneta v. Gustillo that the alleged fact being that one of the subscribing witnesses  was in the outer room while the signing occurred in the inner room, would not be sufficient to invalidate the execution of the will.

3. The CA deemed the will valid.

Issue: Whether or not the subscribing witness was able to see the testator and other witnesses in the act of affixing their signatures.

HELD: YES

The Court is unanimous in its opinion that had the witnesses been proven to be in the outer room when the testator and other witnesses signed the will in the inner room, it would have invalidated the will since the attaching of the signatures under the circumstances was not done 'in the presence' of the witnesses in the outer room. The line of vision of the witness to the testator and other witnesses was blocked by the curtain separating the rooms. 

The position of the parties must be such that with relation to each other at the moment of the attaching the signatures, they may see each other sign if they chose to.

In the Jaboneta case, the true test of presence is not whether or not they actualy saw each other sign but whether they might have seen each other sign if they chose to doso considering their physical, mental condition and position in relation to each other at the moment of the inscription of the signature.

Matias v. Salud Digest

Matias vs. Salud

G.R. L-10907 June 29, 1957

Ponente: Concepcion, J.

Facts: 

1. This case is an appeal from a CFI Cavite order denying the probate of the will of Gabina Raquel. The document consist of 3 pages and it seems that after the attestation clause, there appears the siganture of the testatrix 'Gabina Raquel', alongside is a smudged in violet ink claimed by the proponents as the thumbmark allegedly affixed by the tetratrix. On the third page at the end of the attestation clause appears signatures on the left margin of each page, and also on the upper part of each left margin appears the same violet ink smudge accompanied by the written words 'Gabina Raquel' with 'by Lourdes Samonte' underneath it.

2. The proponent's evidence is to the effect that the decedent allegedly instructed Atty. Agbunag to drat her will and brought to her on January 1950. With all the witnesses with her and the lawyer, the decedent affixed her thumbmark at the foot of the document and the left margin of each page. It was also alleged that she attempted to sign using a sign pen but was only able to do so on the lower half of page 2 due to the pain in her right shoulder. The lawyer, seeing Gabina unable to proceed instructed Lourdes Samonte to write 'Gabina Raquel by Lourdes Samonte' next to each thumbmark, after which the witnesses signed at the foot of the attestation clause and the left hand margin of each page.

3. The probate was opposed by Basilia Salud, the niece of the decedent.

4. The CFI of cavite denied the probate on the ground that the attestation clause did not state that the testatrix and the witnesses signed each and every page nor did it express that Lourdes was specially directed to sign after the testatrix.

Issue: Whether or not the thumbprint was sufficient compliance with the law despite the absence of a description of such in the attestation clause

HELD: YES

The absence of the description on the attestation clause that another person wrote the testatrix' name  at her request is not a fatal defect, The legal requirement only ask that it be signed by the testator, a requirement satisfied by a thumbprint or other mark affixed by him.

As to the issue on the clarity of the ridge impression, it is held to be dependent on the aleatory circumstances. Where a testator employs an unfamiliar way of signing and that both the attestation clause and the will are silent on the matter, such silence is a factor to be considered against the authenticity of the testament. However, the failure to describe the signature itself alone is not sufficient to refuse probate when evidence fully satisfied that the will was executed and witnessed in accordance with law.

Testate Estate of Cagro v. Cagro Digest

Testate Estate of Cagro vs. Cagro

G.R. L-5826

Facts: 

1. The case is an appeal interposed by the oppositors from a decision of the CFI of Samar which admitted to probate a will allegedly executed by Vicente Cagro who died in Pambujan, Samar on Feb. 14, 1949.

2. The appellants insisted that the will is defective because the attestation was not signed by the witnesses at the bottom although the page containing the same was signed by the witnesses on the left hand margin.

3. Petitioner contended that the signatures of the 3 witnesses on the left hand margin conform substantially to law and may be deemed as their signatures to the attestation clause.

Issue: Whether or not the will is valid

HELD: Will is not valid. The attestation clause is a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the will. It is required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses and it must necessarily bear their signatures.

An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses since the omission of their signatures at the bottom negatives their participation.

Moreover, the signatures affixed on the let hand margin is not substantial conformance to the law. The said signatures were merely in conformance with the requirement that the will must be signed on the left-hand margin of all its pages. If the attestation clause is unsigned by the 3 witnesses at the bottom, it would be easier to add clauses to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or all of the witnesses.

The probate of the will is denied.

Hasegawa and Nippon Eng. Consultants v. Kitamura Digest

Hasegawa and Nippon Eng. v. Kitamura 

G.R. No. 149177 November 23, 2007

Ponente: Justice Nachura

Facts:

1. The petitioner Nippon Engineering Consultants Co. is a Japanese consultancy firm which provides technical and management support in the infrastructure project of foreign governments. It entered into a Independent Contractor Agreement (ICA) with respondent Kitamura, a Japanese national permanently residing in the Philippines. Under the ICA, the respondent will extend professional services to the petitioner for a year.

2. Subsequently Kitamura was assigned as project manager of STAR project in 1999. In 2000, he was informed by the petitioner that it will no longer renew the ICA and that he will be retained until its expiration. Kitamura filed a civil casefor specific performance before the RTC of Lipa and damages.

3. The lower court ruled that it has jurisdiction over the dispute and denied the petitioner's motion to dismiss since accordingly, it is vested by law with the power to entertain and hear the civil case filed by Kitamura. The Court of Appeals upheld the lower court's decision.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case

HELD: YES

1. The only issue is the jurisdiction, hence, choice-of-law rules as raised by the petitioner is inapplicable and not yet called for (reference to lex loci, lex contractus, or state of most significant rule). The petitioner prematurelyinvoked the said rules before pointing out any conflict between the laws of Japan and the Philippines.

2. The doctrine on forum non conveniens cannot be invoked to deprive the RTC of its jurisdiction. Dismissing the case on this ground requires a factual determination hence the principle is considered to be more a matter of defense.

Bank of America, NT & SA v. Litonjua

Bank of America, NT & SA v. Litonjua

G.R. No. 120135 March 31, 2003

Ponente: Austria-Martinez, J.

Facts:

1. The Litonjuas (Eduardo and Aurelio), private respondents, were engaged in the shipping business. They owned 2 vesselsthrough their company and deposited their revenues with the petitioner banks in both Hongkong and UK. The respondents alleged that the petitioner offered easy loans to help them acquire additional three (3) vessels through their company. The operation and the funds were then placed under the control of the petitioner while the possession of the vessels were left in the hands of persons designated.

2. The said vessels were subsequently foreclosed when the business of respondents declined. However, the bank as trustee failed to render an accounting of the incomes of the said vessels. This prompted the Litonjuas to file a complaint. The petitioner bank filed a motion to dismiss  on the ground of forum non conveniens and lack of cause of action. The MD was denied by the lower court. The petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with the CA. The Court of Appeals dismissed. It was treated by the CA as a petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the case should have been dismissed on the ground of FNC

HELD:

NO. Whether a suit is to be dismissed on the ground of FNC depends largely upon the facts of the case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the courts. The following requisites must be met: 

- The Philippine court must be one to which the parties may conveniently resort to

- The Philippine courts is in the position to make intelligent decisions as to law and facts

- It has or likely have the power to enforce its decision.

As to the issue on forum shopping, the court held that there is no forum shopping due to the pendency of the foreign action. Forum shopping exists where elements of litis pendentia are present and where a final judgement is one case will amount to res judicata in the other. Litis pendentia presuposses the existence of these elements; identity of parties, identity of righs asserted and relief prayed for (founded on the same acts) and the identity of the two cases is such that judgement in one case would amount to res judicata in the other. 

Not all the elements for litis pendentia are present here. The petitioner failed to show these as it merely mentioned that civil cases were filed in Hongkong and UK without showing the identity of the rights asserted or reliefs sought, as well as the presence of elements of res judicata should one of the case be adjudged.

Sinochem International Co. v. Malaysia International Shipping Corp. Digest

Sinochem International Co. v. Malaysia International Shipping Corp. Digest

549 U.S. 422 (2007)

Facts:

1. Sinochem is a Chinese government-owned company. It contracted with Triorient for Sinochem to purchase steel coils paid by a letter of credit (LC) through the production of a valid bill of lading. It alleged that the respondent backdated the bill of lading and petitioned the Chinese court to arrest the vessel. 

2. Malaysia International (respondent) is a Malaysian company, chartered and subcontracted bu Triorient to transport the steel coils. Sinochem filed the action in a Chinese court. Malaysia Int'l filed an action in the US citing Sinochem's petition for preservation allegedly contained misrepresentation.. The US districtcourt however dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens on the ground that the case could be adjudicated adequately and conveniently in the Chinese courts. Moreover, it is the latter which accordingly had subject-matter jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether or not a district court can validly dismiss a case at once based on forum non conveniens (FNC) even without any other threshold objection

HELD:

YES. The court has the jurisdiction to respond immediately to an FNC plea and there is no need to take up first any other threshold objection. In essence, a court need not even resolve whether it has authority to adjudicate the case on the basis of subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction over the defendant if it determines that in any event, a foreign tribunal is the more suitable arbiter of the merits of the case. Forum non conveniens is a non merits ground for dismissal.

Yamashita v. Styer Digest

Yamashita vs. Styer

G.R. L-129 December 19, 1945

Ponente: Moran, C.J.

Facts:

1. Yamashita was the Commanding General of the Japanese army in the Philippines during World War 2. He was charged before the American military commission for war crimes.

2. He filed a petition for habeas corpus and prohibition against Gen. Styer to reinstate his status as prisoner of war from being accused as a war criminal. Petitioner also questioned the jurisdiction of the military tribunal.

Issue: Whether or not the military tribunal has jurisdiction

Held:

YES.
1. The military commission was lawfully created in conformity with an act of Congress sanctioning the creation of such tribunals.

2. The laws of war imposes upon a commander the duty to take any appropriate measures within his powers to control the troops under his command to prevent acts which constitute violation of the laws of war. Hence, petitioner could be legitimately charged with personal responsibility arising from his failure to take such measure. In this regard the SC invoked Art. 1 of the Hague Convention No. IV of 1907, as well as Art. 19 of Hague Convention No. X, Art. 26 of 1929 Geneva Convention among others.

3. Habeas corpus is untenable since the petitioner merely sought for restoration to his former status as prisoner of war and not a discharge from confinement. This is a matter of military measure and not within the jurisdiction of the courts.

4. The petition for prohibition against the respondent will also not life since the military commission is not made a party respondent in the case. As such, no order may be issued requiring it to refrain from trying the petitioner.

Abangan vs. Abangan Digest

Abangan v. Abangan

Facts:

1. On September 1917, the CFI of Cebu admitted to probate Ana Abangan's will executed on July 1916. It is from this decision which the opponent appealed. It is alleged that the records do not show the testatrix knew the dialect in which the will was written.

Issue: Whether or not the will was validly probated

YES. The circumstance appearing on the will itself,  that it was executed in Cebu City and in the dialect of the place where the testarix is a resident is enough to presume that she knew this dialect in the absence of any proof to the contrary. On the authority of this case and that of Gonzales v Laurel, it seems that for the presumption to apply, the following must appear: 1) that the will must be in a language or dialect generally spoken in the place of execution, and, 2) that the testator must be a native or resident of the said locality

Vitug vs. CA Digest

Vitug v. Court of Appeals

Facts:

1. The case is a chapter in an earlier suit involving the issue on two (2) wills of the late Dolores Vitug who died in New York, USA in Nov 1980. She named therein private respondent Rowena Corona (Executrix) while Nenita Alonte was co-special administrator together with petitioner Romarico pending probate.

2. In January 1985, Romarico filed a motion asking for authorization of the probate court to sell shares of stocks and real property of the estate as reimbursements for advances he made to the estate. The said amount was spent for payment of estate tax from a savings account in the Bank of America.

3. Rowena Corona opposed the motion to sell contending that from the said account are conjugal funds, hence part of the estate. Vitug insisted saying that the said funds are his exclusive property acquired by virtue of a survivorship agreement executed with his late wife and the bank previously. In the said agreement, they agreed that in the event of death of either, the funds will become the sole property of the survivor.

4. The lower court upheld the validity of the survivorship agreement and granted Romarico's motion to sell. The Court of Appeals however held that said agreement constituted a conveyance mortis causa which did not comply with the formalities of a valid will. Further, assuming that it is donation inter vivos, it is a prohibited donation. Vitug petitioned to the Court contending that the said agreement is an aleatory contract.

Issue: Whether or not the conveyance is one of mortis causa hence should conform to the form required of wills

NO. The survivorship agreement is a contract which imposed a mere obligation with a term--being death. Such contracts are permitted under Article 2012 on aleatory contracts. When Dolores predeceased her husbandm the latter acquired upon her death a vested right over the funds in the account. The conveyance is therefore not mortis causa.