Dadivas de Villanueva v. Villanueva, 54 Phil 93

"The law is not so unreasonable as to require a wife to live in marital relations with a husband whose incurable propensity towards other women makes common habitation with him unbearable...xxx"

My dears, this case happened even before World War 2, think 1927-ish era.  Nevertheless, the story seems familiar, in fact, this is still good case law as it is still cited in one of my Remedial law books.
 

Villanueva v. Villanueva
G.R.  No. L-33352

Facts

The wife (Aurelia Dadivas de Villanueva) files for support against the husband (Rafael Villanueva) to obtain separate maintenance as she decided to live separately from the marital home (a month before filing this case) due to the husband's cruelty and repeated infidelity with other women outside their marital ties. The wife also wants to obtain custody of their 2 younger children, aged 10 and 9 as well as reimbursement of attorney's fees incurred for this case.

It appears that during the ten years prior to the filing of this case, the defendant has been involved in illicit relations with four different women, including another different one while this case was pending.

The complainant for the purpose of keeping the marriage intact, continued to bear with the infidelity of the defendant. It was only on April 20, 1927 when due to the cruelty of the defendant, the complainant decided to live their conjugal home.

The Lower Court's decision

The lower court absolved the defendant husband and abrogated a previous order approving support, hence the wife's appeal to the Court of Appeals.  Said decision was later affirmed hence this appeal.

Issue

Whether the complainant is entitled to support (separate maintenance) on the ground of cruelty and marital infidelity.

Ruling

Yes. The complainant is entitled to support.

It was held by the Supreme Court that (to quote)

"The law is not so unreasonable as to require a wife to live in marital relations with a husband whose incurable propensity towards other women makes common habitation with him unbearable.

Deeply rooted instincts of human nature sanction the separation in such a case, and the law is not so unreasonable as to require as acquiescence on the part of the injured party which is beyond the capacity of nature.

Inn order to entitle a wife to maintain a separate home and to require separate maintenance from her husband it is not necessary that the husband should bring a concubine into the marital domicile. Perverse and illicit relations with women outside of the marital establishment are enough.

As was said by Justice Moreland in Goitia v. Campos Rueda (35 Phil 252, 262),  a husband cannot, by his own wrongful acts, relieve himself from the duty to support his wife imposed by law; and where a husband by wrongful, illegal, and unbearable conduct, drives his wife from the domicile fixed by him, he cannot take advantage of her departure to abrogate the law applicable to the marital relations and repudiate his duties thereunder.

Filinvest v. Phil. Acetylene Digest, G.R. No. L-50449

Special Form of Payment - Dacion

Filinvest v. Phil. Acetylene

G.R. No. L-50449 January 30, 1982

Facts:

Phil. Acetylene (Defendant) purchased a vehicle through a Deed of Sale from Alexander Lim payable on installment. The balance is to be paid under a promissory note with the said vehicle as the subject of a chattel mortgage to secure the obligation. Subsequently, Lim assigned his rights to the vehicle to appellee corporation (Filinvest). Phil. Acetylene defaulted after it failed to pay nine (9) successive installments. The petitioner through a demand letter informed the defendant to make the full payment plus interests and charges or return the mortgaged property. As a result, the defendant returned the vehicle together with the document "Voluntary Surrender with Special Power of Attorney To Sell" by appellant on March 12, 1973 and confirmed to by Filinvest’s vice-president.

Filinvest then informed appellant thru a letter that it cannot sell the vehicle due to its unpaid taxes in the amount of P70,122. On the last portion of the said letter, appellee requested the appellant to update its account by paying the instalments in arrears and accruing interest in the amount of P4,232.21 on or before April 9, 1973. On May 8, 1973, appellee, in a letter, offered to deliver back the motor vehicle to the appellant but the latter refused to accept it, so the appellee instituted an action for collection of a sum of money with damages in the CFI of Manila.

Phil. Acetylene argued that appellee has no cause of action against it since its obligation towards the appellee was extinguished when it returned the mortgaged property, and that assuming that the return of the property did not extinguish its obligation, it was nonetheless justified in refusing payment since the appellee is not entitled to recover the same due to the breach of warranty committed by the original vendor-assignor Alexander Lim.

Issue: whether or not the return of the mortgaged motor vehicle to the appellee by virtue of a voluntary surrender by the appellant totally extinguished and/or cancelled the obligation

RULING: No. No dacion en pago here since there’s nothing in the evidence to show that Filinvest consented or intended that the mere delivery to and acceptance by him of the vehicle be construed as actual payment or more specifically, dacion en pago. The mere return of the mortgaged motor vehicle by the mortgagor (herein appellant) to the mortgagee, (appellee), does not constitute dation in payment or dacion en pago in the absence, express or implied of the true intention of the parties. Dacion en pago, (according to Manresa) is the transmission of the ownership of a thing by the debtor to the creditor as an accepted equivalent of the performance of obligation.  In dacion en pago, as a special mode of payment, the debtor offers another thing to the creditor who accepts it as equivalent of payment of an outstanding debt. The undertaking really partakes in one sense of the nature of sale, that is, the creditor is really buying the thing or property of the debtor, payment for which is to be charged against the debtor's debt. As such, the essential elements of a contract of sale, namely, consent, object certain, and cause or consideration must be present. In its modern concept, what actually takes place in dacion en pago is an objective novation of the obligation where the thing offered as an accepted equivalent of the performance of an obligation is considered as the object of the contract of sale, while the debt is considered as the purchase price.  In any case, common consent is an essential prerequisite, be it sale or innovation to have the effect of totally extinguishing the debt or obligation.

The evidence fails to show that Filinvest consented, or at least intended, that the mere delivery to, and acceptance by him, of the mortgaged motor vehicle be construed as actual payment, more specifically dation in payment or dacion en pago. The fact that the mortgaged motor vehicle was delivered to him does not necessarily mean that ownership thereof, as juridically contemplated by dacion en pago, was transferred from appellant to appellee. In the absence of clear consent of appellee to the proferred special mode of payment, there can be no transfer of ownership of the mortgaged motor vehicle from appellant to appellee. If at all, only transfer of possession of the mortgaged motor vehicle took place, for it is quite possible that appellee, as mortgagee, merely wanted to secure possession to forestall the loss, destruction, fraudulent transfer of the vehicle to third persons, or its being rendered valueless if left in the hands of the appellant.

Finally the Voluntary Surrender with SPA to Sell executed reveals that the possession of the mortgaged motor vehicle was voluntarily surrendered by the appellant to the appellee authorizing the latter to look for a buyer and sell the vehicle in behalf of the former who retains ownership thereof, and to apply the proceeds of the sale to the mortgage indebtedness, with the undertaking of the appellant to pay the difference, if any, between the selling price and the mortgage obligation. With the stipulated conditions as stated, the appellee, in essence was constituted as a mere agent to sell the motor vehicle which was delivered to the appellee, not as its property. There is no estoppel on part of Filinvest to demand payment from the unpaid obligation since it never accepted the mortgaged motor vehicle in cull satisfaction of the mortgaged debt.

Aranas v. Tutaan Digest

Payment or Performance

Aranas v Tutaan

127 SCRA 828

Facts: The stocks of Universal Textile Mills (UTEX) were issued to co-defendants Manuel and Castaneda. Subsequently, in 1971, the lower court declared that Luisa Aranas is the rightful owner of the 400 shares of stocks at Universal Textile Mills (UTEX. Further, it ordered that dividends in cash or stocks pertaining to the same be delivered to Aranas. UTEX then filed a motion to clarify the phrase in said decision which states “to deliver to her all dividends appertaining to the same, whether in cash or in stocks” meant dividends properly pertaining to the plaintiffs after the court’s declaration of her ownership. The said motion was granted, where the court ordered UTEX to pay the plaintiff the cash dividends which accrued to the stocks in question after the current decision was rendered but the cash dividends already paid to the co-defendants before the court decision may not be claimed by the plaintiffs.

The co-defendants filed for a new trial  and the decision was the same as the the 1971 ruling. Upon appeal to the CA, the said ruling was affirmed. The lower court issued a writ of execution in 1979 directed to UTEX to 1) cancel the certificate of stocks of the co-defendants and issue new ones in the name of the petitioners, and 2) Pay the cash dividends accrued from 1972 to 1979 (period from the new trial to the issuance of writ of execution). UTEX alleged that the cash dividends had already  been paid.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was valid payment

RULING: No. It is elementary that payment made by a judgment debtor to a wrong party cannot extinguish the obligation of such debtor to its creditor. It was clear in the motion for clarification that all dividends accruing to the said shares after the rendition of judgement belonged to the Aranas. When UTEX paid the wrong parties, despite its knowledge and understanding of the final judgment, it is still liable to pay Aranas as the lawful declared owners of the said shares. The burden to recover the wrong payment is on UTEX and cannot be passed on to the Aranas as the innocent parties.

Eleizegui v. The Manila Lawn Tennis Club Digest G.R. No. 967

Eleizegui v. The Manila Lawn Tennis Club

G.R. No. 967 May 19, 1903

Facts:

A contract of lease was executed on January 25, 1980 over a piece of land owned by the plaintiffs Eleizegui (Lessor)  to the Manila Lawn Tennis Club, an English association (represented by Mr. Williamson) for a fixed consideration of P25 per month and accordingly, to last at the will of the lessee. Under the contract, the lessee can make improvements deemed desirable for the comfort and amusement of its members. It appeared that the plaintiffs terminated the lease right on the first month. The defendant is in the belief that there can be no other mode of terminating the lease than by its own will, as what they believe has been stipulated.

As a result the plaintiff filed a case for unlawful detainer for the restitution of the land claiming that article 1569 of the Civil Code provided that a lessor may judicially dispossess the lessee upon the expiration of the conventional term or of the legal term; the conventional term — that is, the one agreed upon by the parties; the legal term, in defect of the conventional, fixed for leases by articles 1577 and 1581. The Plaintiffs argued that the duration of the lease depends upon the will of the lessor on the basis of Art. 1581 which provides that, "When the term has not been fixed for the lease, it is understood to be for years when an annual rental has been fixed, for months when the rent is monthly. . . ." The second clause of the contract provides as follows: "The rent of the said land is fixed at 25 pesos per month."

The lower court ruled in favor of the Plaintiffs on the basis of Article 1581 of the Civil Code, the law which was in force at the time the contract was entered into. It is of the opinion that the contract of lease was terminated by the notice given by the plaintiff. The judgment was entered upon the theory of the expiration of a legal term which does not exist, as the case requires that a term be fixed by the courts under the provisions of article 1128 with respect to obligations which, as is the present, are terminable at the will of the obligee.

ISSUE: a) Whether or not the parties have agreed upon the duration of the lease

             b) Whether or not the lease depends upon the will of the lessee

RULING:

a)      YES, the parties have agreed upon a term hence Art. 1581 is inapplicable.

The legal term cannot be applied under Art 1581 as it appears that there was actually an agreement between the parties as to the duration of the lease, albeit implied that the lease is to be dependent upon the will of the lessee. It would be absurd to accept the argument of the plaintiff that the contract was terminated at its notice, given this implication.

Interestingly, the contract should not be understood as one stipulated as a life tenancy, and still less as a perpetual lease since the terms of the contract express nothing to this effect, even if they implied this idea. If the lease could last during such time as the lessee might see fit, because it has been so stipulated by the lessor, it would last, first, as long as the will of the lessee — that is, all his life; second, during all the time that he may have succession, inasmuch as he who contracts does so for himself and his heirs. (Art. 1257 of the Civil Code.) The lease in question does not fall within any of the cases in which the rights and obligations arising from a contract can not be transmitted to heirs, either by its nature, by agreement, or by provision of law. Moreover, being a lease, then it must be for a determinate period. (Art. 1543.) By its very nature it must be temporary, just as by reason of its nature, an emphyteusis must be perpetual, or for an unlimited period. (Art. 1608.)

B) The duration of the lease does not depend solely upon the will of the Lessee (defendant).

It cannot be concluded that the termination of the contract is to be left completely at the will of the lessee simply because it has been stipulated that its duration is to be left to his will.

The Civil Code has made provision for such a case in all kinds of obligations. In speaking in general of obligations with a term it has supplied the deficiency of the former law with respect to the "duration of the term when it has been left to the will of the debtor," and provides that in this case the term shall be fixed by the courts. (Art. 1128, sec. 2.) In every contract, as laid down by the authorities, there is always a creditor who is entitled to demand the performance, and a debtor upon whom rests the obligation to perform the undertaking. In bilateral contracts the contracting parties are mutually creditors and debtors. Thus, in this contract of lease, the lessee is the creditor with respect to the rights enumerated in article 1554, and is the debtor with respect to the obligations imposed by articles 1555 and 1561. The term within which performance of the latter obligation is due is what has been left to the will of the debtor. This term it is which must be fixed by the courts.

The only action which can be maintained under the terms of the contract is that by which it is sought to obtain from the judge the determination of this period, and not the unlawful detainer action which has been brought — an action which presupposes the expiration of the term and makes it the duty of the judge to simply decree an eviction. To maintain the latter action it is sufficient to show the expiration of the term of the contract, whether conventional or legal; in order to decree the relief to be granted in the former action it is necessary for the judge to look into the character and conditions of the mutual undertakings with a view to supplying the lacking element of a time at which the lease is to expire.

The lower court’s judgement is erroneous and  therefore reversed and the case was remanded with directions to enter a judgment of dismissal of the action in favor of the defendant, the Manila Lawn Tennis Club.

Telefast v. Castro Digest G.R. No. 73867

Telefast v. Castro

G.R. No. 73867 February 29, 1988

Facts:

1. The petitioner is a company engaged in transmitting telegrams. The plaintiffs are the children and spouse of Consolacion Castro who died in the Philippines. One of the plaintiffs, Sofia sent a telegram thru Telefast to her father and other siblings in the USA to inform about the death of their mother. Unfortunately, the deceased had already been interred but not one from the relatives abroad was able to pay their last respects. Sofia found out upon her return in the US that the telegram was never received. Hence the suit for damages on the ground of breach of contract. The defendant-petitioner argues that it should only pay the actual amount paid to it.
2. The lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded compensatory, moral, exemplary, damages to each of the plaintiffs with 6% interest p.a. plus attorney’s fees.  The Court of Appeals affirmed this ruling but modified and eliminated the compensatory damages to Sofia and exemplary damages to each plaintiff, it also reduced the moral damages for each. The petitioner appealed contending that, it can only be held liable for P 31.92, the fee or charges paid by Sofia C. Crouch for the telegram that was never sent to the addressee, and that the moral damages should be removed since defendant's negligent act was not motivated by "fraud, malice or recklessness.

Issue: Whether or not the award of the moral, compensatory and exemplary damages is proper.

RULING: Yes, there was a contract between the petitioner and private respondent Sofia C. Crouch whereby, for a fee, petitioner undertook to send said private respondent's message overseas by telegram. Petitioner failed to do this despite performance by said private respondent of her obligation by paying the required charges. Petitioner was therefore guilty of contravening its and is thus liable for damages. This liability is not limited to actual or quantified damages. To sustain petitioner's contrary position in this regard would result in an inequitous situation where petitioner will only be held liable for the actual cost of a telegram fixed thirty (30) years ago.

Art. 1170 of the Civil Code provides that "those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages." Art. 2176 also provides that "whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done."

Award of Moral, compensatory and exemplary damages is proper.

The petitioner's act or omission, which amounted to gross negligence, was precisely the cause of the suffering private respondents had to undergo.  Art. 2217 of the Civil Code states: "Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate results of the defendant's wrongful act or omission."

Then, the award of P16,000.00 as compensatory damages to Sofia C. Crouch representing the expenses she incurred when she came to the Philippines from the United States to testify before the trial court. Had petitioner not been remiss in performing its obligation, there would have been no need for this suit or for Mrs. Crouch's testimony.

The award of exemplary damages by the trial court is likewise justified for each of the private respondents, as a warning to all telegram companies to observe due diligence in transmitting the messages of their customers.

Palay Inc. v. Clave Digest G.R. No. L-56076

Palay Inc. v. Clave

G.R. No. L-56076 September 21, 1983

Facts:

1.       On March 28, 1965, petitioner Palay, Inc., through its President, Albert Onstott sold a parcel of land owned by the corporation to the private respondent, Nazario Dumpit, by virtue of a Contract to Sell. The sale price was P23,300.00 with 9% interest per annum, payable with a down payment of P4,660.00 and monthly instalments of P246.42 until fully paid. Paragraph 6 of the contract provided for automatic extrajudicial rescission upon default in payment of any monthly instalment after the lapse of 90 days from the expiration of the grace period of one month, without need of notice and with forfeiture of all instalments paid.

2.    Respondent Dumpit paid the down payment and several instalments amounting to P13,722.50 with the last payment was made on December 5, 1967 for instalments up to September 1967. Almost six (6) years later, private respondent wrote petitioner offering to update all his overdue accounts and sought consent to the assignment of his rights to a certain Lourdes Dizon. Petitioners informed respondent that his Contract to Sell had long been rescinded pursuant to paragraph 6 of the contract, and that the lot had already been resold.

3.       Respondent filed a letter complaint with the National Housing Authority (NHA) questioning the validity of the rescission. The NHA held that the rescission is void in the absence of either judicial or notarial demand.  Palay, Inc. and Onstott in his capacity as President of the corporation, jointly and severally, was ordered to refund Dumpit the amount paid plus  12% interest from the filing of the complaint. Petitioners' MR was denied by the NHA. Respondent Presidential Executive Assistant, on May 2, 1980, affirmed the Resolution of the NHA. Reconsideration sought by petitioners was denied for lack of merit. Thus, the present petition.

Issue: W/N demand is necessary to rescind a contract

Ruling: As held in previous jurisprudence, the judicial action for the rescission of a contract is not necessary where the contract provides that it may be revoked and cancelled for violation of any of its terms and conditions. However, even in the cited cases, there was at least a written notice sent to the defaulter informing him of the rescission. A written notice is indispensable to inform the defaulter of the rescission. Hence, the resolution by petitioners of the contract was ineffective and inoperative against private respondent for lack of notice of resolution (as held in the U.P. vs. Angeles case). The act of a party in treating a contract as cancelled should be made known to the other. 

Later, RA 6551 6551 entitled "An Act to Provide Protection to Buyers of Real Estate on Instalment Payments,” emphasized the indispensability of notice of cancellation to the buyer when it specifically provided:

Sec. 3(b) ... the actual cancellation of the contract shall take place after thirty days from receipt by the buyer of the notice of cancellation or the demand for rescission of the contract by a notarial act and upon full payment of the cash surrender value to the buyer. (Emphasis supplied).

Moreover, there was no waiver on the part of the private respondent of his right to be notified under paragraph 6 of the contract since it was a contract of adhesion, a standard form of petitioner corporation, and private respondent had no freedom to stipulate. Finally, it is a matter of public policy to protect buyers of real estate on instalment payments against onerous and oppressive conditions. Waiver of notice is one such onerous and oppressive condition to buyers of real estate on instalment payments.

As a consequence of the resolution by petitioners, rights to the lot should be restored to private respondent or the same should be replaced by another acceptable lot but since the property had already been sold to a third person and there is no evidence on record that other lots are still available, private respondent is entitled to the refund of instalments paid plus interest at the legal rate of 12% computed from the date of the institution of the action. It would be most inequitable if petitioners were to be allowed to retain private respondent's payments and at the same time appropriate the proceeds of the second sale to another.

Onstott not personally liable

Onstott was made liable because he was then the President of the corporation and the controlling stockholder but there was no sufficient proof that he used the corporation to defraud private respondent. He cannot, therefore, be made personally liable just because he "appears to be the controlling stockholder". Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation is not of itself sufficient ground for disregarding the separate corporate personality. 

Finally, there are no badges of fraud on the petitioners' part. They had literally relied, albeit mistakenly, on paragraph 6 (supra) of the contract when it rescinded the contract to sell extrajudicially and had sold it to a third person.

Petitioner Palay, Inc. is liable to refund to respondent Dumpit the amount of P13,722.50, with interest at twelve (12%) p.a. from November 8, 1974, the date of the filing of the Complaint.

The Bachrach Motor Co v. Espiritu Digest

The Bachrach Motor Co v. Espiritu

G.R. No. L-28497    November 6, 1928

Facts:

1.       This is a consolidated case(Cases no. 28497 and 28948) involving two separate sale transactions. One made in Feb. 18, 1925 (case 28498), when the defendant earlier bought a truck on instalment from the petitioner and said truck was mortgaged together with the two others (no. 77197 & 92744 in the the subsequent sale transaction dated July 28, 1925. The said two of the other trucks were also purchased (but already paid previously) from the plaintiff.  The defendant failed to pay the balance. In July 1925, defendant again purchased another truck from Bachrach. The said truck, together with the 3 other vehicles were mortgaged to the plaintiff to secure the remaining balance. The defendant failed to pay the balance for the latest truck obtained.

2.     It was agreed in both sales that 12% interest will be paid on the unpaid price, and in case of the non-payment of the total debt at maturity, 25% shall be the penalty. The defendant also signed a promissory note solidarily with his brother Rosario (acting as intervenor), the sums secured by the mortgages. Rosario is alleged to be the owner of the two white trucks no. 77197 & 92744 mortgaged.

3.       While these two cases were pending in the lower court the mortgaged trucks were sold by virtue of the mortgage, all of them together bringing in, after deducting the sheriff's fees and transportation charges to Manila, the net sum of P3,269.58.

4.       The lower court ordered the defendants and the intervenor to pay plaintiff in case 28497 the sum of P7,732.09 with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from May 1, 1926 until fully paid, and 25 per cent thereof in addition as penalty. In case 28498, the trial court ordered the defendant and the intervenor to pay plaintiff the sum of P4,208.28 with interest at 12 per cent per annum from December 1, 1925 until fully paid, and 25 per cent thereon as penalty.

5.       The appellants contend that trucks 77197 and 92744 were not mortgaged, because, when the defendant signed the mortgage deeds these trucks were not included in those documents, and were only put in later, without defendant's knowledge. Appellants also alleged that on February 4, 1925, the defendant sold his rights in said trucks Nos. 77197 and 92744 to the intervenor, and that as the latter did not sign the mortgage deeds, such trucks cannot be considered as mortgaged.

6.       But there is positive proof that they were included at the time the defendant signed these documents. Besides, there were presented two of defendant's letters to Hidalgo, an employee of the plaintiff's written a few days before the transaction, acquiescing in the inclusion of all his White trucks already paid for, in the mortgage (Exhibit H-I).

Issue: W/N the 25% penalty upon the debt in addition to the 25% p.a. is usurious

Ruling: No, Article 1152 of the Civil Code permits the agreement upon a penalty apart from the interest. Should there be such an agreement, the penalty, as was held in the case of Lopez vs. Hernaez (32 Phil., 631), does not include the interest, and which may be demanded separately. The penalty is not to be added to the interest for the determination of whether the interest exceeds the rate fixed by the law, since said rate was fixed only for the interest. But considering that the obligation was partly performed, and making use of the power given to the court by article 1154 of the Civil Code, this penalty is reduced to 10 per cent of the unpaid debt. The penalty is however reduced from 25 % upon the sum owed, the defendants need pay only 10 % thereon as penalty. (Judgment appealed from is affirmed in all other respects).

Nepomuceno v. CA Digests

Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals

Facts:

1. Martin Hugo died on 1974 and he left a will wherein he instituted Sofia Nepomuceno as the sole and only executor. It was also provided therein that he was married to Rufina Gomez with whom he had 3 children.

2. Petitioner (Sofia) filed for the probate of the will but the legal wife and her children opposed alleging that the will was procured through improper and undue influence and that there was an admission of concubinage with the petitioner.

3. The lower court denied the probate on the ground of the testator's admission of cohabitation, hence making the will invalid on its face. The Court of Appeals reversed and held that the will is valid except the devise in favor of the petitioner which is null and void in violation of Art. 739 and 1028.

Issue: Whether or not the court can pass on the intrinsic validity of a will

RULING: Yes, as an exception. But the general rule is that the court's area of inquiry is limited to the an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. This general rule is however not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and may pass upon certain provisions of the will. The will itself admitted on its face the relationship between the testator and the petitioner.

The will was validly executed in accordance with law but the court didn't find it to serve a practical purpose to remand the nullified provision in a separate action for that purpose only since in the probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions.

The devisee is invalid by virtue of Art. 739 which voids a donation made between persons guilty of adultery/concubinage at the time of the donations. Under Art, 1028 it is also prohibited.

Gallanosa v. Arcangel Digest

Gallanosa v. Arcangel

Facts:

1. Florentino Gallanosa executed a will in 1938 when he was 80 years old. He owned 61 parcels of and at that time. He died in 1939 childless and survived by his brother Leon. In his will, he bequethed his 1/2 share of the conjugal estate to his second wife Tecla and if she predecease him (as what occurred), the said share shall be assigned to the spouses Gallanosa (Pedro & Corazon). Pedro is Tecla's son by her 1st marriage. He also gave 3 parcels of land to Adolfo, his protege.

2. The said will was admitted to probate with Gallanosa as executor. In 1952, thjhe legal heirs filed an action for the recovery of said 61 parcels of land. The action was dismissed on the ground of res judicata. Then, 28 years after probate, another acton agaisnt Gallanosa for annulment of the will, recovery of the lands alleging fraud and deceit, was filed. As a result, the lower court set aide the 1939 decree of probate.

Issue: Whether or not a will which has been probated may still be annulled

RULING: No. A final decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution of the will. Due execution means that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time of the execution and that he was not acting under duress, menace, fraud or undue influence. Finally, that it was executed in accordance with the formalities provided by law.

The period for seeking relief under Rule 38 has already expired, hence the judgment may only be set aside on the grounds of, 1) lack of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law, and 2) the judgment was obtained by means of extrinsic collateral fraud (which must be filed within 4 years from the discovery). Finally, Art. 1410 cannot apply to wills and testament.

Guevara v Guevara Digest

Guevara v. Guevara Digest

Facts:

1. Victorino Guevara executed a will in 1931 wherein he made various bequests t his wife, stepchildren, wife in the 2nd marriage. He has a legitimate son Ernesto and a natural daughter Rosario. Therein, he acknowledged Rosario as his natural daughter.

2. In 1933, Victorino died but his last will was never presented for probate nor was there any settlement proceeding initiated. It appeared that only his son Ernest possessed the land which he adjudicated to himself. While Rosario who had the will in her custody, did nothing to invoke the acknowledgment, as well as the devise given to her.

3. Subsequently, Rosario filed an action for the recovery of her legitime from Ernesto, a portion of a large parcel of land invoking the acknowledgment contained in the will and based on the assumption that the decedent died intestate because his will was not probated. She alleged that the disposition in favor of Ernesto should be disregarded.

4. The lower court and the Court of Appeals sustained Rosario's theory.

Issue: Whether or not the probate of a will can be dispensed with

RULING: No. Rosario's contention violates procedural law and considered an attempt to circumvent the last will and testament of the decedent. The presentation of a will to the court for probate is mandatory and its allowance is essential and indispensable to its efficacy.

Suppression of the wil is contrary to law and public policy for without probate, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory.

Diaz v. De Leon Digest

Diaz v. De Leon 
G.R. No. 17714 May 31, 1922

Facts:
1. Jesus de Leon executed 2 wills, the second will was not deemed in conformance to the requirements under the law. After executing his first will, he asked it to be immediately returned to him. As it was returned, he instructed his servant to tear it. This was done in the testator's presence and his nurse. After sometime, he was asked by his physician about the incident wherein he replied that the will has already been destroyed.

Issue: Whether or not there was a valid revocation of the will

RULING: Yes. His intention to revoke is manifest from the facts that he was anxious to withdraw or change the provisions he made in the first will. This fact was shown from his own statements to the witnesses and the mother superior of the hospital where he was subsequently confined. The original will which was presented for probate is deemed destroyed hence, it cannot be probated as the last will and testament of testator.

Gago v. Mamuyac Digest

Gago vs. Mamuyac 

G.R. No. L-26317 January 29, 1927

Johnson, J. (Ponente)

Facts: 

1. Previously, Francisco Gago filed a petition for the probate of a will of Miguel Mamuyac executed on July 27, 1918. The oppositors alleged that the said will was already annulled and revoked. It appeared that on April 16, 1919, the deceased executed another will. The lower court denied the probate of the first will on the ground of the existence of the second will.

2. Another petition was filed to seek the probate of the second will. The oppositors alleged that the second  will presented was merely a copy. According to the  witnesses, the said will was allegedly revoked as per the testimony of Jose Tenoy, one of the witnesses who typed the document. Another witness testified that on December 1920 the original will was actually cancelled by the testator.  

3. The lower court denied the probate and held that the same has been annulled and revoked.

Issue: Whether or not there was a valid revocation of the will

RULING: Yes. The will was already cancelled in 1920. This was inferred when after due search, the original will cannot be found. When the will which cannot be found in shown to be in the possession of the testator when last seen, the presumption is that in the absence of other competent evidence, the same was deemed cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption applies when it is shown that the testator has ready access to the will and it can no longer be found after his death.

Maloto v. CA Digest

Maloto v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 76464 February 29, 1988

Sarmiento, J. (Ponente)

Facts: 

1. Petitioners and respondents are the neices/nephews or Adriana Maloto who died in 1963. The four heirs believed that the deceased  did not leave a will, hesnce they filed an intestate proceeding. However, the parties executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate dividing it into four equal parts.

2. In 1967, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, ex-associate of the deceased's counsel allegedly discovered her last will which was purportedly dated 1940, inside a cabinet. Hence the annulment of the proceedings and a probate petition was filed by the devisees and legatees. The said will was allegedly burned by the househelp under the   instruction of the deceased

3. The lower court denied the probate on the ground that the animus revocandi in the burning of the will was sufficiently proven.

Issue: Whether or not there was valid revocation of the will

RULING: No, there was no revocation. For a valid revocation to occur,the 'corpus' and 'animus' must concur, one without the other will not produce a valid revocation. The physical act of destruction of a will must come with an intention to revoke (animus revocandi). In this case, there's paucity of evidence to comply with the said requirement. The paper burned was not established to be the will and the burning though  done under her express direction was not done in her presence.

Under Art. 830, the physical act of destruction, in this case the burning of the will, does not constitute an effective revocation, unless it is coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the testator. Since animus is a state of mind, it has to be accompanied by an overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating or cancelling done by the testator himself or by another under his express direction and  presence.

Gonzales v. Court of Appeals (CA) Digest

Gonzales v. CA

G.R. No. L-37453 May 25, 1979
Guerrero, J. (Ponente)

Facts: 

1. Petitioner Rizalina Gonzales and Lutgarda Santiago (Private respondent) are the nieces of the deceased Isabel Gabriel who died a widow. A will was thereafter submitted to probate. The said will was typewritten, in Tagalog and appeared to have been executed in April 1961 or two months prior to the death of Isabel. It consisted of 5 pages including the attestation and acknowledgment, with the signature of testatrix on page 4 and the left margin of all the pages.

2. Lutgarda was named as the universal heir and executor. The petitioner opposed the probate. 

3. The lower court denied the probate on the ground that the will was not executed and attested in accordance with law on the issue of the competency and credibility of the witnesses.

Issue: Whether or not the credibility of the subscribing witnesses is material to the validity of a will

RULING: No. The law requires only that witnesses posses the qualifications under Art. 820 (NCC) and none of the disqualifications of Art. 802. There is no requirement that they are of good standing or reputation in the community, for trustworthiness, honesty and uprightness in order that his testimony is believed and accepted in court. For the testimony to be credible, it is not mandatory that evidence be established on record that the witnesses have good standing in the the community. Competency is distinguished from credibility, the former being determined by Art. 820 while the latter does not require evidence of such good standing. Credibility depends on the convincing weight of his testimony in court.

Rodelas v. Aranza Digest

Rodelas v. Aranza 

G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982

Relova, J. (Ponente)

Facts:

1. The appellant filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo Bonilla in 1977. The petition was opposed by the appellees on the ground that the deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise.

2. The lower court dismissed the petition for probate and held that since the original will was lost, a photostatic copy cannot stand in the place of the original.

Issue: Whether or not a holographic will can be proved by means of a photocopy

RULING: Yes. A photocopy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court with the standard writings of the testator.

Garcia v. Vasquez Digest

Garcia v. Vasquez 

G.R. No. L-26808 March 28, 1969

Fernando, J (Ponente)

Facts:

1. Gliceria del Rosario executed 2 wills, one in June 1956, written in Spanish, a language she knew an spoke. The other will was executed in December 1960 consisting of only one page, and written in Tagalog. The witnesses to the 1960 will declared that the will was first read 'silently' by the testatrix before signing it. The probate court admitted the will.

2. The oppositors alleged that the as of December 1960, the eyesight of the deceased was so poor and defective that she could not have read the provisions contrary to the testimony of the witnesses.

Issue: Whether or not the will is valid

RULING: The will is not valid. If the testator is blind, Art. 808 of the New Civil Code (NCC) should apply.If the testator is blind or incapable of reading, he must be apprised of the contents of the will for him to be able to have the opportunityto object if the provisions therein are not in accordance with his wishes.

The testimony of her opthalmologist established that notwithstanding an operation to remove her cataract and being fitted with the lenses, this did not improve her vision. Her vision remained mainly for viewing distant objects and not for reading. There was no evidence that her vision improved at the time of the execution of the 2nd will. Hence, she was incapable of reading her own will. The admission of the will to probate is therefor erroneous.

Javellana v. Ledesma Digest

Javellana vs. Ledesma

G.R. No. L-7179

Facts:

1. The CFI of Iloilo admitted to probate a will and codicil executed by the deceased Apolinaria Ledesma in July 1953. This testament was deemed executed on May 1950 and May 1952. The contestant was the sister and nearest surviving relative of the deceased.  She appealed from this decision alleging that the will were not executed in accordance with law. 

2. The testament was executed at the house of the testatrix. One the other hand, the codicil was executed after the enactment of the New Civil Code (NCC), and therefore had to be acknowledged before a notary public. Now, the contestant, who happens to be one of the instrumental witnesses asserted that after the codicil was signed and attested at the San Pablo hospital, that Gimotea (the notary) signed and sealed it on the same occasion. Gimotea, however, said that he did not do so, and that the act of signing and sealing was done afterwards.

2. One of the allegations was that the certificate of acknowledgement to the codicil was signed somewhere else or in the office of the notary. The ix and the witnesses at the hospital, was signed and sealed by the notary only when he brought it in his office.

Issue: Whether or not the signing and sealing of the will or codicil in the absence of the testator and witnesses affects the validity of the will

RULING: NO. Unlike in the Old Civil Code of 1899, the NCC does not require that the signing of the testator, the witnesses and the notary be accomplished in one single act. All that is required is that every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and witnesses. The subsequent signing and sealing is not part of the acknowledgement itself nor of the testamentary act. Their separate execution out of the presence of the testator and the witnesses cannot be a violation of the rule that testaments should be completed without interruption.

Cruz v. Villasor Digest

Cruz v. Villasor 

G.R. L-32213 November 26, 1973

Ponente: Esguerra, J.:

Facts:

1. The CFI of Cebu allowed the probate of the last will and testament of the late Valenti Cruz. However, the petitioner opposed the allowance of the will alleging that it was executed through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, and undue influence. He further alleged that the instrument was executed without the testator having been informed of its contents and finally, that it was not executed in accordance with law.

2. One of the witnesses, Angel Tevel Jr. was also the notary before whom the will was acknowledged. Despite the objection, the lower court admitted the will to probate on the ground that there is substantial compliance with the legal requirements of having at least 3 witnesses even if the notary public was one of them.

Issue: Whether or not the will is valid in accordance with Art. 805 and 806 of the NCC

HELD: NO.

The will is not valid. The notary public cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the said will. An acknowledging officer cannot serve as witness at the same time.

To acknowledge before means to avow, or to own as genuine, to assent, admit, and 'before' means in front of or preceding in space or ahead of. The notary cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation int he making of the will. To permit such situation would be absurd.

Finally, the function of a notary among others is to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements, a function defeated if he were to be one of the attesting or instrumental witnesses. He would be interested in sustaining the validity of the will as it directly involves himself and the validity of his own act. he would be in an inconsistent position, thwarting the very purpose of the acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud.

Garcia v. Lacuesta Digest

Garcia v. Lacuesta 

G.R. L-4067 November 29, 1951

Ponente: Paras, C.J.

Facts:

1. The CA disallowed the probate of the will of Antero Mercado dated Jan 1943. The said will was written in Ilocano dialect.

2. The will appears to have been signed by Atty. Florentino Javier who wrote the name of the testator followed below by 'A ruego del testador' and the name of Florentino Javier. In effect, it was signed by another although under the express direction of the testator. This fact however was not recited in the attestation clause. Mercado also affixed a cross on the will.

3. The lower court admitted the will to probate but this order was reversed by the Court of Appeals on the ground that the attestation failed to recite the facts surrounding the signing of the testator and the witnesses. 

Issue: Whether or not the attestation clause in the will is valid

HELD: NO the attestation is fatally defective for its failure to state that Antero or the testator caused Atty. Javier to write the former's name under his express direction as required by Sec. 618 of the Civil Procedure. Finally, on the cross affixed on the will by the testator, the Court held that it is not prepared to liken the mere sign of a cross to a thumbmark for obvious reasons- the cross does not have the trustworthiness of a thumbmark so it is not considered as a valid signature.

Hasegawa and Nippon Eng. Consultants v. Kitamura Digest

Hasegawa and Nippon Eng. v. Kitamura 

G.R. No. 149177 November 23, 2007

Ponente: Justice Nachura

Facts:

1. The petitioner Nippon Engineering Consultants Co. is a Japanese consultancy firm which provides technical and management support in the infrastructure project of foreign governments. It entered into a Independent Contractor Agreement (ICA) with respondent Kitamura, a Japanese national permanently residing in the Philippines. Under the ICA, the respondent will extend professional services to the petitioner for a year.

2. Subsequently Kitamura was assigned as project manager of STAR project in 1999. In 2000, he was informed by the petitioner that it will no longer renew the ICA and that he will be retained until its expiration. Kitamura filed a civil casefor specific performance before the RTC of Lipa and damages.

3. The lower court ruled that it has jurisdiction over the dispute and denied the petitioner's motion to dismiss since accordingly, it is vested by law with the power to entertain and hear the civil case filed by Kitamura. The Court of Appeals upheld the lower court's decision.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case

HELD: YES

1. The only issue is the jurisdiction, hence, choice-of-law rules as raised by the petitioner is inapplicable and not yet called for (reference to lex loci, lex contractus, or state of most significant rule). The petitioner prematurelyinvoked the said rules before pointing out any conflict between the laws of Japan and the Philippines.

2. The doctrine on forum non conveniens cannot be invoked to deprive the RTC of its jurisdiction. Dismissing the case on this ground requires a factual determination hence the principle is considered to be more a matter of defense.